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ABSTRACT 
Effects of IFRS adoption on earnings quality: Evidence from Canada 
Hai Q. Ta 
 
 
 
This paper examines the effects of the IFRS adoption on earnings quality of 1245 
Canadian firms. I analyze the effects IFRS adoption on earnings persistence, earnings 
predictability, persistence of earnings components, cash flow predictability, accruals 
quality, value relevance, earnings smoothness, conservatism, and timeliness. I find that 
earnings quality of Canadian firms, on average, improves following the adoption and the 
improvements are mostly driven not by U.S. adopters but by IFRS adopters, suggesting 
that IFRS has a positive impact on earnings quality. Partitioning the sample, I find that 
firms with incentives for transparent reporting have stable earnings quality throughout the 
sample period whereas firms without such incentives show an improvement in earnings 
quality following the adoption. I also find that earnings quality declines to a greater 
degree for firms in extractive/high-litigation-risk industries relative to firms in non-
extractive/low-litigation-risk industries. Further analyses reveal that (1) earnings quality 
seems to deteriorate for firms with intense reliance on fair value accounting after the 
adoption but not for firms with minimal reliance on fair value accounting, that (2) R&D 
intensive firms see some weak improvements in earnings quality following the adoption 
in comparison to non-R&D intensive firms, and that (3) IFRS adoption is associated with 
a greater improvement in earnings quality for loss firms than for profitable firms. Finally, 
the effects of IFRS seem unlikely to be uniform across different measures of earnings 
quality. Taken all together, the findings suggest that standard setters and researchers 
should probably not consider the effects of IFRS in isolation of firms' reporting 
incentives and that the SEC, that the Financial Accounting Standards Board's 
(FASB) concerns about the lack of implementation guidance in extractive and high-
litigation-risk industries are warranted, and that fair value accounting is likely to be 
harmful to earnings quality.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper examines the effects of mandatory adoption of International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) in Canada on January 01, 2011 on earnings quality of Canadian 
firms.12 In particular, this paper investigates whether earnings quality of Canadian firms 
deteriorates or improves after the IFRS adoption controlling for changes in macro-economic 
factors as well as firm characteristics. Understanding the effects of the adoption on earnings 
quality in Canada is of potential interest to U.S. regulators on the policy debate surrounding 
whether the U.S. should adopt IFRS. Furthermore, evidence on this paper is of particular 
important to the Canadian Accounting Standards Board (AcSB) as it can help the board evaluates 
the consequences of its decision. Moreover, the paper also helps the IASB to assess whether its 
stated objective of improving accounting quality is being accomplished with the most recent 
updated version of IFRS. Finally, analysts, investors, and other users may also find it useful to 
understand the effects of IFRS adoption on accounting quality to potentially reassess how they 
use accounting information.  
The final staff report released on July 03, 2012 by the Securities Exchange Commission 
(SEC) has fueled new debates as to whether the U.S. adopts IFRS. 3 The staff report expresses the 
SEC’s concerns in many areas with respect to the prospect of IFRS adoption in the U.S., e.g. 
there are underdeveloped areas in IFRS (e.g., the accounting for extractive industries, insurance, 
rate-regulated industries). The report also shuts down the “roadmap” for the potential 
                                                 
1 In this paper, I refer to IFRS (IAS) as accounting standards issued by the International Accounting 
Standard Boards (International Accounting Standard Committees) after (before) 2001. IASB continues to 
accept IAS after 2001. 
2 While the AcSB allows Canadian companies cross-listed in the U.S. to choose between IFRS and U.S. 
GAAP, they require domestic firms to adopt IFRS. 
3 On July 13, 2012, the Office of Chief Accounting of the SEC published this final staff report on the Work 
Plan (published in February 2010) for considering the incorporation of IFRS into the financial reporting for 
U.S. issuers. See http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-135.htm for the press release. 
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incorporation of IFRS into the U.S. financial system proposed by the SEC themselves in 2008.4 
The report contains no recommendation or conclusion as to either the ultimate adoption of IFRS 
or any particular timetable or phase-in period for its adoption.  In light of this recent development, 
evidence from this study likely benefits U.S. regulators as the U.S. is considering the IFRS 
adoption prospect.  
Prior research considers only two experimental settings that permit the examination of the 
effects of IFRS relative to U.S. GAAP: 1) Germany’s New Market exchange that allowed the 
choice between IFRS and U.S. GAAP (Leuz 2003) and 2) foreign firms cross-listed in the U.S. 
(Lang, Raedy, and Wilson 2006; Gordon, Jorgensen, and Linthicum 2012). These firms prepared 
financial statements in accordance with IFRS; and provided reconciliation to U.S. GAAP, and 
were subject to SEC oversight.5  The Canadian setting provides direct tests useful in addressing 
concerns discussed in a recent staff report published by the U.S. Securities & Exchange 
Commission (SEC) because the Canadian setting is not subject to limitations of settings 
employed in prior studies.  
First, self-selection bias arises in these settings because firms can choose to voluntarily 
report under U.S. GAAP when they listed on the New Market or the U.S. exchanges, 
respectively. Self-selection bias could be a factor that affects earnings quality (Ahmed, Neel, and 
Wang 2013). Meanwhile, Canadian firms are required to adopt IFRS with the exception of firms 
qualified for private issuers’ status and cross-listed in the United States. Hence, studies relying on 
the Canadian setting can potentially mitigate such self-selection bias because domestic firms in 
Canada are required to adopt IFRS.  
In addition, these settings used in prior research are quite different from the U.S. in terms 
of institutional factors. For example, most countries in the European Union have civil law legal 
                                                 
4 See SEC Release No. 33-8982 (Nov. 14, 2008), Roadmap for the Potential Use of Financial Statements 
Prepared in Accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards by U.S. Issuers. 
5 In November 15, 2007, the SEC eliminated the reconciliation requirement. As a result, cross-listed firms 
that report under IFRS no longer have to provide reconciliation with U.S. GAAP.  
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origin, the exceptions being Ireland and the United Kingdom. Ball, Kothari, and Robin (2000) 
document that legal origin is a determinant of earnings quality. Given that the United States is 
classified as a common law country (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 1998), the 
generalizability to U.S. firms of the results regarding the effects of IFRS adoption from a sample 
of firms located in civil law countries such as Germany may be limited. Meanwhile, U.S. 
regulators have historically designated Canada a special consideration as more similar to the U.S. 
than to Germany or to any other country.6   
The similarity between Canada and the U.S. in terms of institutional factors is important 
for two reasons. One is that reporting incentives play a significant role in shaping reporting 
practices (Ball et al. 2000; Hail, Leuz, and Wysocky 2010a, etc.). To the extent that reporting 
incentives are shaped by institutional factors, studying the effects of IFRS in a setting that is 
similar to the U.S. can help mitigate the possibility that reporting incentives may cloud the 
results. Next, changes in accounting standards cannot be considered in insolation from other 
elements of institutional infrastructures (i.e., the notion of institutional complementarities) (Hail 
et al. 2010a). Insofar as institutional factors in Canada are similar to those in the U.S., Canada is a 
better setting than Germany or cross-listed firms in the U.S. to study the effects of IFRS relative 
to U.S. GAAP.  
Finally, Canadian GAAP and U.S. GAAP are viewed as similar and both are considered 
high-quality accounting standards while German GAAP (or other domestic GAAPs) in other 
settings are very different from U.S. GAAP.  Under the Canada-U.S. multijurisdictional 
disclosure system (MJDS), Canadian GAAP and U.S. GAAP are allowable alternatives for cross-
listed firms. Canadian firms can choose either Canadian GAAP or U.S. GAAP for domestic 
reporting. Meanwhile, U.S. regulators accept Canadian GAAP for foreign private issuers, without 
                                                 
6 Tricia O’Malley, the former Canadian Accounting Standards Board and International Accounting 
Standard Board member, suggests that the Canadian environment is probably most resembles the U.S.  
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reconciliation to U.S. GAAP.7 After Canada adopted IFRS, while domestic firms must adopt 
IFRS, Canadian firms cross-listed in the U.S. are allowed to choose between IFRS and U.S. 
GAAP.  
 The paper is also motivated by the fact that IFRS have changed dramatically from the 
early voluntary adoption period to the later mandatory adoption period, particularly from 2003 to 
2005 when the IASB was making compromises to win endorsement (without carve-outs) of 
IAS/IFRS standards from EU member countries (Capkun, Collins, and Jeanjean 2012). More than 
one third of the existing standards at that time (14 out of 34 IAS standards) were revised and six 
new standards (IFRS) were introduced, all of which became effective in 2005. Since then, more 
standards have been revised (e.g., IAS 1: Presentation of Financial Statements; IAS 19: Employee 
Benefits; IAS 23: Borrowing Costs; etc.) and new standards have been issued (e.g., IFRS 8: 
Operating Segments, IFRS 13: Fair Value Measurement; IFRS 10: Consolidated Financial 
Statements). If IFRS have evolved significantly overtime, the effects of IFRS may also change. 
Thus, the findings of studies that examine the 2003 version of IFRS or the 2005 version of IFRS 
may no longer be generalizable to the U.S. In fact, Capkun et al. (2012) show that greater 
flexibility in choosing among alternative accounting treatments under the current (i.e., 2005 
version) IFRS reporting regime has led to greater earnings management (smoothing). Therefore, 
given the evolving nature of IFRS, more recent evidence from the Canadian experience is 
potentially important to regulators from Canada, U.S., as well as other countries.8 
In addition, this paper is motivated in part by the reactions within Canada to the decision 
by the Canadian Accounting Standards Board (AcSB) to adopt IFRS. For example, Blanchette 
                                                 
7 Canadian firms cross-listed in the U.S. must qualify for foreign private issuer status to be allowed to file 
under Canadian GAAP. To quality for foreign private issuer status, an issuer must 1) be incorporated or 
organized in Canada and be a foreign private issuer; 2) have been reporting for the preceding 36 months to 
Canadian securities regulatory authorities; 3) have been listed for the preceding 12 months on the Montreal 
or Toronto Stock Exchange or the Senior Board of the Vancouver Stock Exchange; 4) and be currently in 
compliance with its reporting and listing obligations. 
8 Accounting standards (e.g., IFRS or U.S. GAAP) are generally evolving or changing in order to reflect 
objectives of financial reporting as documented in the new conceptual framework adopted by FASB and 
IASB. 
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and Desfleurs (2011) provide a critical perspective on the implementation of IFRS in Canada, 
presenting a thorough analysis of expected benefits and costs of IFRS adoption as well as of 
potential problems associated with that adoption. While their study provides a useful theoretical 
perspective on the costs and benefits of IFRS adoption, there is virtually dearth of empirical 
evidence on the effects of IFRS adoption on earnings quality. Moreover, the AcSB reflects in the 
recently released annual report that the feedback to the IFRS adoption strategy in Canada reveals 
“a generally lower level of satisfaction” and that “some stakeholders” question, or disagree with, 
the adoption of IFRS. This paper is among the first to empirically document the effects of the 
IFRS adoption on earnings quality in Canada.  
The general consensus in prior research is that accounting earnings are a premier source 
of firm-specific information. For example, Biddle, Seow, and Siegel (1995), Francis et al. (2003), 
and Liu et al. (2002) show that investors rely on earnings more than on any other summary 
measure of performance. Moreover, enhanced accounting quality is one of the two main 
arguments that IFRS proponents use in making the case for IFRS adoption (the other being 
comparability). Hence, this paper attempts to examine the effects of IFRS adoption in Canada on 
earnings quality. Following prior research (Dichev, Graham, Campbel, and Rajgopal 2013; 
Dechow, Ge, and Schrand 2010; Francis, Olsson, and Schipper 2006, Francis et al. 2004), I 
examine three aspects of earnings quality, i.e. the sustainability of earnings (proxied by earnings 
persistence and predictability, cash flow predictability, accruals quality, and persistence of 
earnings components: accruals, retained cash, cash distributions to debt holders, and cash 
distribution to equity holds), the value relevance of earnings, and other common measures of 
earnings quality (smoothness, conservatism, timeliness).  
I conduct analyses on 1245 Canadian firms that were required by the AcSB to adopt 
either IFRS or U.S. GAAP on the fiscal year beginning on or after January 01, 2011. Of the total 
sample, 1035 domestic firms are required by the AsCB to begin reporting under IFRS in the first 
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quarter of 2011.9 10 These 1035 firms previously reported under Canadian GAAP. The remaining 
210 firms, which are U.S. foreign private issuers, can choose between IFRS and U.S. GAAP. 47 
out of these 210 firms that are registered with the SEC previously reported under U.S. GAAP. 
After January 01, 2011, 44 of these companies continued to report under U.S. GAAP. Out of 163 
cross-listed firms that previously reported under Canadian GAAP, 31 firms voluntarily choose 
U.S. GAAP over IFRS. 
In this paper, I conduct two sets of analyses. The first set consists of three analyses 
intended to examine the overall effects of the IFRS adoption on earnings quality. I first 
investigate whether earnings quality of all Canadian firms improves or declines after the adoption 
to gauge the general effects of the adoption. Next, I analyze earnings quality of Canadian firms 
that switch from Canadian GAAP to IFRS. This analysis is intended to isolate the effects of IFRS 
from those of U.S. GAAP because some Canadian firms switch from Canadian GAAP to U.S. 
GAAP. Finally, I strive to directly compare earnings quality under IFRS to that under U.S GAAP 
by using only post-adoption firm-year observations. The purpose of the third analysis is two-fold. 
On one hand, it aims to further isolate the effects of U.S. GAAP from the effects of IFRS on 
earnings quality following the adoption. On the other hand, this analysis relies on pre-adoption 
firm-year observations being the control sample; that is, observations of each firm in the pre-
adoption period would serve as a control firm for that firm in the post-adoption period. The 
underlying assumption here is that firm characteristics do not change substantially after the 
adoption; therefore, this approach will partially control for firm characteristics.  
                                                 
9 Due to delayed International Accounting Standards Board (IASB)’s projects involving investment 
companies, insurance contracts, and accounting for rate-regulated entities, the AsSB allowed investment 
companies, insurance companies, and rate-regulated entities to delay IFRS adoption until fiscal years 
beginning on or after January 1, 2014 (2013 for re-regulated entities). 
10 Domestic firms are identified based on their filing status with the SEC the year before the adoption year. 
For example, a firm which adopts IFRS in fiscal year 2011 is a domestic firm if it is not cross-listed in the 
U.S. at the end of fiscal year 2010. If that firm is cross-listed in the U.S. at the end of fiscal year 2010, it is 
identified as a cross-listed firm. 
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The results of the first analysis seem to indicate that earnings sustainability (persistence 
of accruals and persistence of cash distribution to debt holders) and value relevance, on average, 
improves following the IFRS adoption. Simultaneously, timeliness seems to decline slightly, but 
other measures of earnings quality do not change significantly. The second analysis reveals that 
persistence of accruals, persistence of cash distributions to debt holders, and value relevance, and 
timeliness improve after the adoption. In the third analysis, controlling for pre-adoption 
differences and firm characteristics, I find that IFRS adopters have better earnings persistence, 
cash flow predictability, persistence of accruals, value relevance, and timeliness than U.S. 
adopters in the post-adoption period. Taken all together, these results suggest that earnings 
quality of Canadian firms improves following the adoption and the improvements are driven 
mostly by IFRS adopters (not U.S. adopters), suggesting a positive impact by the IFRS adoption.  
The second set of analyses attempts to reveal the cross-sectional variations in the extent 
to which the IFRS adoption impacts earnings quality. In particular, I examine settings in which 
the effects of adopting IFRS are expected to be more pronounced.  
First, the extant literature documents the significance of reporting incentives (e.g. Ball et 
al. 2000; Ball and Shivakumar 2006; Burgstahler, Hail, and Leuz 2006; Hail, Leuz, and Wysocky. 
2010a; Ahmed, Neel, and Wang 2013; Hansen, Pownall, Prakash, and Vulcheva 2013; Daske, 
Hail, Leuz, and Verdi 2013) in determining the reporting outcome. In an attempt to examine how 
changes in accounting rules interact with reporting incentives in shaping reporting outcomes, I 
identify “serious adopters”, firms that were committed to transparent reporting, and “label 
adopters”, firms that were not committed to transparent reporting.  The idea behind this 
classification is that firms with incentives for transparency, i.e., “serious adopters” are likely to 
have high quality accounting information to begin with. Therefore, it is possible that those firms 
will not observe improvement in accounting quality after the adoption even if IFRS is a superior 
set of accounting standards. Conversely, firms without such incentives, i.e., “label adopters” are 
more likely to be affected by accounting standards. If IFRS is a superior set of accounting 
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standards, then it is likely that earnings quality of those firms will improve. On the other hand, if 
IFRS is of lower quality than Canadian GAAP, it is likely that earnings quality of these firms will 
decline.  In either case, it is perceivable that “label adopters” see more changes in earnings quality 
than do “serious adopters” following the adoption.  
Given the likely differential effects of IFRS on “serious adopters” and “label adopters”, I 
analyze the effects of IFRS adoption on “serious adopters” and label adopters” separately. The 
idea behind these tests is to illustrate that the effects of IFRS adoption, if significant, also vary 
with changes in firms’ economics. This, in turn, calls into question whether the earnings quality 
effects of IFRS are uniform across firms. Following, Daske et al. (2013), I use three proxies to 
identify major changes in firm-level reporting incentives around IFRS adoptions. In particular, for 
each of the three proxies, I compute the changes around the IFRS adoptions, and use the 
distribution of the changes to split the sample into “serious” and “label” firms. “Serious adopters” 
are firms with changes in reporting incentives above the median of the distribution of the changes 
whereas “label adopters” are firms with changes in reporting incentives below the median. 
The first proxy is input-based and focuses directly on firm characteristics that shape 
management’s reporting incentives. Specifically, I expect managers in firms that are larger, are 
more profitable, are more international, have larger financing needs, and have larger growth 
opportunities to have stronger incentives for transparent financial reporting. I use factor analysis 
to summarize the incentive effects from these firm attributes and extract a single factor (with 
consistent loadings). Using this proxy as a partitioning variable, I show that (1) the persistence of 
accruals improves after the adoption for “label adopters” but not for “serious adopters”, that (2) 
the persistence of cash distribution to debt holders improves for both “serious adopters” and 
“label adopters” after Canada adopted IFRS but to a greater magnitude for “label adopters”, and 
that (3) timeliness improves for “label adopters” whereas it does not change significantly for 
“serious adopters”. These results suggest that it seems like “serious adopters”, i.e., firms with 
incentives for transparent reporting, do not show improvement in earnings quality while do “label 
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adopters” after the adoption, which is consistent with the idea that “serious adopters” are firms 
that have high quality earnings quality to start with.  
The second proxy is output-based and focuses on firms’ reporting behavior. It is built on 
the idea that actual reporting changes are ultimately driven by changes in the underlying 
incentives. Following Daske et al. (2013) and Leuz et al. (2003), I use the magnitude of accruals 
relative to the cash flow from operations as a simple characterization of reporting behavior and 
earnings informativeness. The analyses using this second proxy as a partitioning variable reveal 
that the persistence of cash distribution to debt holders improves for both “serious adopters” and 
“label adopters” in the post-adoption period; however, the magnitude of the increase is greater for 
“label adopters”. In addition, value relevance drops slightly for “serious adopters” but improves 
for “label adopters” after the adoption. Finally, timeliness and conservatism significantly improve 
for “label adopters” but not for “serious adopters”. Similar to results from the first partitioning 
variable, these results also suggest that earnings quality of “serious adopters” do not change 
significantly while that of “label adopters” improves following the adoption. These results 
provide evidence in line with the argument that earnings quality of firms with incentives for 
transparent financial reporting is high to start with. Simultaneously, earnings quality of firms 
without such incentives is more likely to be affected by accounting standards. Given the evidence 
that points towards the likelihood that IFRS is a better set of accounting standards, firms without 
incentives for transparent reporting show improvement in earrings quality in the post-adoption 
period. 
The third proxy is about changes in the external reporting environment.  I use the number 
of analysts following a firm. The idea is that scrutiny by analysts and markets also shapes 
management’s reporting incentives. The difference-in-differences and the cross-sectional tests 
show the following results. First, earnings predictability significantly improves for “label 
adopters” following the adoption but not for “serious adopters”. Second, accruals quality 
significantly declines for “serious adopters” after Canada adopted IFRS but it slightly improves 
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for “label adopters”. However, cash flow predictability improves for “serious adopters” but slight 
drops for “label adopters”. Next, the persistence of retained cash improves for “label adopters” in 
the post adoption period but not for “serious adopters”. These results are consistent with results 
from the previous two partitioning variables, reporting incentives and reporting behaviors, in that 
they provide evidence supporting the point that earnings quality of firms with commitment to 
transparency is high to begin with and the IFRS adoption unlikely causes significant change. 
However, earnings quality of firms without commitment to transparency is more likely to 
improve if the adopted set of accounting standards is superior.11  
Taken together, although the analyses based on the three above partitioning variables 
provide some evidence that earnings quality improves for “serious adopters” but not “label 
adopters” following the adoption (e.g., cash flow predictability based on the third proxy for 
reporting incentives), evidence that suggests otherwise, i.e., earnings quality improves to a greater 
degree for “label adopters” than it does for “serious adopters” in the post-adoption period, is 
overwhelming. The findings are consistent with the notion of the impact of reporting incentives. 
“Serious adopters” are firms with strong incentives for transparent reporting; therefore, they are 
likely to produce high quality accounting information regardless of accounting standards. Thus, 
whether or not IFRS is a set of high quality accounting standards should not bear significant 
effects on those firms’ accounting quality. On the other hand, “label adopters” are firms without 
strong incentives for transparent reporting. Thus, a superior set of accounting standards is likely 
to limit their ability to engage in opportunistic behaviors. Consequently, to the extent that IFRS is 
a better set of accounting standards than Canadian GAAP, “label adopters” likely show 
improvements in accounting quality following the adoption. In sum, it seems that “label adopters” 
benefit more from the IFRS adoption in Canada. Also, researchers and standard setters should not 
consider the effects of IFRS adoption in isolation of firms’ reporting incentives.  
                                                 
11 I also use whether a firm’s auditor is a Big 4 accounting firm as an alternative proxy for external 
environment. The results based on this partitioning variable are similar to those based on analyst coverage.  
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I also investigate the following settings, extractive industries, insurance industries, high-
litigation-risk industries. The SEC and FASB have expressed concerns about the lack of IFRS 
implementation guidelines in certain industries. The SEC reiterates the concern in the recent staff 
report issued in July 2012. The basis of the concern is that investors may lose information 
currently available under U.S. GAAP once the U.S. adopters IFRS because of the lack of 
implementation guidance. If such information is relevant to investors, earnings quality of firms in 
those industries could decline after the adoption. Simultaneously, the lack of specific guidance 
could cause issues for firms in high-litigation-risk industries. Without specific implementation 
guidance, managers of firms in litigious industries have to rely more on their judgment when 
interpreting IFRS, which could make it more difficult to defend in courts. Thus, managers could 
engage in overly conservative accounting policies in order to avoid litigation risks. Overly 
conservative accounting policies, in turn, could lead to lower accounting quality due to the loss of 
important accounting information. Therefore, firms in litigious industries could show a decrease 
in earnings quality following the adoption.  
The results on firms in extractive industries show some evidence that (1) earnings 
predictability and accruals quality decline for extractive firms in the post-adoption period but 
slightly improve for non-extractive firms, that (2) the persistence of accruals improves to a lesser 
degree in the post-adoption period for extractive firms than it does it does for non-extractive 
firms, that (3) earnings smoothness improves for non-extractive firms following the adoption 
while it slightly deteriorates for extractive firms, that (4) timeliness improves to a greater degree 
for non-extractive firms than it does for extractive firms in the post-adoption period, and that (5) 
conservatism improves to a greater degree for extractive firms than it does for non-extractive 
firms in the post-adoption period. Despite the result for conservatism, these findings seem to 
overwhelmingly support the notion that earnings quality of extractive firms declines to a greater 
degree after the adoption than does earnings quality of non-extractive firms, suggesting some 
differential effects of IFRS on extractive industries. The findings on those extractive industries 
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underscore the concern by the SEC and the FASB that the lack of implementation guidance could 
prove to be an issue.   
The evidence is inconsistent with the finding in Joos and Leung (2013) suggesting that 
investors of extractive firms may be confident with the efforts by the IASB to bridge the 
differences between IFRS and U.S. GAAP in accounting policies for those industries. In fact, the 
evidence in this paper supports the opposite view. To the extent that the finding is applicable to 
the U.S., the IASB may have more work to do if they want to make the case for IFRS being a set 
of accounting standards that can replace U.S. GAAP.  
Whereas the concern by the SEC and the FASB about the lack of implementation 
guidance in extractive industries seems warranted, such concern about the insurance industries 
does not have much empirical support. In particular, the analyses on firms in insurance industries 
reveal mixed results. In particular, earnings persistence, earnings predictability, and accruals 
quality improve slightly for insurance firms following the adoption but not for non-insurance 
firms. On the other hand, value relevance of earnings declines for firms in insurance industries 
following the adoption while it improves for firms in non-insurance industries. Finally, insurance 
firms have improved earnings smoothness, conservatism, but declined timeliness in the post-
adoption period whereas non-insurance firms have declined earnings smoothness, improved 
conservatism, and improved timeliness in the post-adoption period. The findings, in general, seem 
support the idea that the IFRS adoption may affect firms in insurance industries in a different 
fashion that it does to firms in other industries; however, the direction of the impact is unclear. At 
best, the effects of IFRS adoption on firms in insurance industries can be described as not 
uniform across measures of earnings quality. These mixed findings are consistent with Joos and 
Leung (2013) documenting that investors of firms in those industries do not react strongly to 
events that increase the likelihood of IFRS adoption in the U.S. In general, the findings do not 
lend a lot of support to the concern by the SEC and FASB that the lack of implementation 
guidance in insurance industries may be an issue when the U.S. adopts IFRS.  
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There are several likely explanations to this phenomenon. First, firms in insurance 
industries are allowed to delay the adoption till the fiscal year on or after January 01, 2013 and 
many firms chose to exercise this option. There are 19 firms in those industries that adopted IFRS 
early and the small sample size could drive the insignificance of the results. Plus, early adopters 
could be those benefiting the most from the adoption, suggesting a likely self-selection bias. 
Finally, it is also possible that IFRS is already developed to the level that it makes little difference 
in earnings quality for insurance firms reporting under IFRS or Canadian GAAP (or U.S. GAAP).  
Nevertheless, analyses on high-litigation-risk industries yield similar results to results 
from analyses on extractive industries. In particular, I find that accruals quality declines for high-
litigation-risk firms in the post-adoption period but it improves (though not significant) for low-
litigation-risk firms. I also find the persistence of accruals declines after the adoption for high-
litigation-risk firms but it improves for low-litigation-risk firms, and that the persistence of cash 
distribution to debt holders improves to a lesser degree for high-litigation-risk firms following the 
adoption than it does for firms in low-litigation-risk industries. Results for value relevance, 
earnings smoothness, and timeliness are similar. These findings seem to support the notion that 
earnings quality declines a greater degree in the post-adoption period for high-litigation-risk firms 
than it does for low-litigation-risk firms, supporting the concern put forward by the SEC and 
FASB about the lack of implementation guidance in these industries. These findings are also 
consistent with the findings in Joos and Leung (2013) documenting that investors of firms in 
these industries react negatively to events that increase the likelihood of adopting IFRS in the 
U.S.   
Moreover, I analyze firms with heavy reliance on fair value accounting and R&D 
intensive firms because IFRS and Canadian GAAP (and U.S. GAAP) differ significantly in those 
areas. In particular, IFRS allows a much greater reliance on fair value accounting relative to 
Canadian GAAP. Fair value accounting has been subject to criticism by opponents of the 
standards that it offers too much discretion to managers, e.g., asset valuation with unobservable 
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inputs. However, too much discretion may not necessarily bad (Hail et al. 2010a) because how 
firms use such discretion is driven by firms’ reporting incentives.  
Simultaneously, the treatment of R&D expenditures under IFRS also generates some 
debates. IFRS allows capitalization of R&D expenditures while Canadian GAAP (and U.S. 
GAAP) does in only some limited circumstances. Proponents of the capitalization of R&D 
expenditures suggest the treatment is appropriate because R&D expenditures carry significant 
future benefits while opponents argue that the conservatism principle dictates that R&D 
expenditures need to be immediately expensed because of the great uncertainty associated with 
R&D expenditures. However, Lev et al. (2005) suggest that young firms (early in the life cycle) 
tend to report R&D more conservatively (immediate expensing of R&D) while mature firms 
(later in the life cycle) tend to report R&D more aggressively (capitalization of R&D), which 
suggests that the effects of the accounting treatment of R&D are not uniform across firms. In fact, 
they are likely driven by firms’ reporting incentives; e.g., young firms have different reporting 
incentives from mature firms.  
Analyses for firms with intense use of fair value accounting (fair-value-accounting firms) 
reveal the following results. The persistence of accruals, the persistence of cash distribution to 
debt holders, timeliness, and conservatism improve to a lesser degree after the adoption for fair-
value-accounting firms than they do for non-fair-value-accounting firms. Also, value relevance 
decreases in the post-adoption period for fair-value-accounting firms but not for non-fair-value-
accounting firms. The findings, taken together, seem to indicate that the heavy use of fair value 
accounting under IFRS likely deteriorates earnings quality. However, it is also important to note 
that firms with heavy reliance on fair value accounting are mostly from the financial industries 
that are allowed to delay the adoption of IFRS until the fiscal year on or after January 1, 2013. 
Thus, further research is likely necessary to draw a solid conclusion.  
Meanwhile, analyses for R&D intensive firms suggest some weak evidence that these 
firms experience some improvements in earnings quality after the adoption while non-R&D 
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intensive firms see minimal changes in earnings quality, documenting the differential effects of 
IFRS. In particular, earnings predictability, accruals, and earnings smoothness improves for R&D 
intensive firms but drop for non-R&D intensive firms. Value relevance improves more for R&D 
intensive firms than it does for non-R&D intensive firms following adoption. Similarly, 
timeliness improves significantly for R&D intensive firms but not (statistically) significant for 
non-R&D intensive firms. 
Furthermore, I expect the convergence benefits to be more pronounced in industries 
where many foreign firms have already adopted IFRS (IFRS predominant industries); therefore, I 
analyze firms in industries with widespread IFRS adoption. The widespread adoption of IFRS 
overtime improves the integration of IFRS as a language of business at the transactional level. 
Hence, it is possible that earnings quality of firms in those industries improves after the adoption. 
However, analyses on this group of firms demonstrate mixed findings. In particular, the results on 
value relevance and those on timeliness point to different directions. Value relevance seems to 
improve for IFRS-predominant firms but not for non-IFRS-predominant firms following the 
adoption. However, timeliness follows the opposite pattern. Therefore, the appropriate conclusion 
here is that the effects of IFRS adoption on earnings quality are not uniform across different 
earnings quality measures for firms in the IFRS predominant industries. These findings seem to 
signal that while it is possible that the widespread adoption of IFRS may be beneficial for firms 
due to the ability to adopt IFRS at the transactional level, the effects of the adoption on earnings 
quality in those industries are unclear.   
Finally, prior research suggests that negative earnings have different valuation properties 
from positive earnings (Collins et al. 1999, Ndubizu and Sanchez 2007).  Hence, I evaluate 
negative earnings firms and positive earnings firms separately. The results indicate that the IFRS 
adoption is associated with a greater improvement in earnings quality for loss firms than it does 
for profitable firms. Such improvements are likely driven by the changes in persistence of 
accruals, persistence of cash distribution to debt holders, value relevance, and timeliness.  
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Dichev et al. (2013) provide insights into earnings quality from a survey of 169 CFOs of 
public companies and in-depth interviews of 12 CFOs and two standard setters. They find that 
CFOs believe that above all, high- quality earnings are sustainable and repeatable; specific 
characteristics include consistent reporting choices, backing by actual cash flows, and absence of 
one-time items and long-term estimates. I define such characteristics of earnings as earnings 
sustainability. In this paper, I find that earnings sustainability improves significantly after the 
adoption and the results are robust across different analyses. The results are particularly 
pronounced for persistence of accruals and persistence of cash distribution to debt holders. Thus, 
IFRS seems to have a positive impact on earnings sustainability, which is the most important 
indicator of earnings quality (Dichev et al. 2013).  
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, this paper provides 
regulatory implications. It is among the first studies that provide a comprehensive set of empirical 
results to inform Canadian regulators of the consequences of the IFRS adoption in Canada. It also 
informs the policy debate in the U.S. about the substitutability of IFRS and U.S. GAAP due to the 
similarities in accounting standards and institutional factors between Canadian and the U.S. In 
addition, global regulators may be interested in these findings as they decide whether to adopt 
IFRS fully or partially with some exceptions. Finally, the findings in this paper are important to 
the IASB because the paper studies the effects of the most recent set of standards issued by the 
IASB. As the IASB attempt to make IFRS a more and more popular set of accounting standards 
around the world, it is important to understand the intended as well as the unintended 
consequences of IFRS.   
Second, prior research and the IASB maintain that one of main benefits of IFRS adoption 
is enhanced earnings quality (e.g., the IASC 1989; Hung and Subramanyam 2007; Barth et al. 
2008). However, only few studies have examined the effects of IFRS on a setting with strong 
enforcement and high quality accounting standards. This paper complements this stream of 
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literature by examining the potential effects of IFRS on earnings quality in a setting with strong 
enforcement (La Porta et al. 1998) and already high accounting quality (i.e., Canadian GAAP). 
Third, this study is among the first to highlight and test firm-level heterogeneity in the 
earnings quality effects around IFRS adoptions. Existing studies tend to focus on the average 
effect of these adoptions with respect to some outcome variable or examine cross-sectional 
differences at the country level (Barth et al. 2008; Capkun et al. 2013; Ahmed et al. 2013). My 
study shows that firm-level heterogeneity in reporting incentives plays a significant role for the 
earnings quality effects around IFRS adoptions. In doing so, this paper contributes to the 
literature on the importance of firms’ reporting incentives (e.g., Ball, Robin, and Wu 2003; Leuz 
et al. 2003; Burgstahler, Hail, and Leuz 2006; Barth et al. 2008; Ahmed et al. 2013) in shaping 
earnings quality. Much of this literature has focused on differences in countries’ institutions as a 
driver of reporting incentives. I extend this literature by analyzing the notion of reporting 
incentives at the firm level, rather than at the broad and relatively stable country level.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature 
and develops hypotheses. Section 3 discusses methodology. Section 4 presents empirical results. 
Section 5 summarizes and concludes.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW, AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1. Institutional Background 
The globalization of accounting standards through the development and growth of IFRS 
is one of the most important phenomena in corporate governance today due to the increasing 
integration of global capital markets. Since the early 2000s, several countries, led by the 
European Union (EU), have embarked on a project to unite globally divergent accounting 
standards into one common set of accounting principles, IFRS. As of 2012, more than 100 
countries around the globe, including all of the world’s major economies, either have adopted 
IFRS, or have initiated an IFRS harmonization program, or have in place some national strategy 
to respond to IFRS. 
 
2.2. IFRS adoption in Canada 
Prior to 2004, two of the Canadian Accounting Standard Board’s (AcSB) primary 
objectives were to eliminate or minimize differences between Canadian GAAP and U.S. 
GAAP/IFRS (Discussion Paper of Accounting Standards in Canada: Future Directions June 24, 
2004). Its primary focus was to harmonize Canadian GAAP with U.S. GAAP. Each year the 
AcSB performed a detailed review of differences between Canadian and U.S. GAAP for a 
random sample of Canadian firms that reported reconciliations from Canadian to U.S. GAAP. 
The AcSB then developed standards that eliminated or minimized these differences.  
However, on May 31, 2004, the AcSB issued an invitation for comment from the 
financial reporting users and suppliers on the board’s 2005-2010 strategic plan, its first indication 
of potential IFRS adoption in Canada. Specifically, the board sought input on whether Canada 
should keep Canadian GAAP, or adopt either U.S. GAAP or IFRS. Constituents advocated for all 
three positions. Proponents of maintaining Canadian GAAP argued that the costs involved in 
switching to either U.S. GAAP or IFRS outweighed the benefits. They felt that Canadian GAAP 
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better represented the economics of Canadian firms. Proponents of adopting U.S. GAAP argued 
that this was the natural choice since so many companies already reported under U.S. GAAP for 
primary or secondary reporting purposes. They further argued that it was a high quality standard 
and that separate Canadian and U.S. GAAPs led to poor comparability within industry peers and 
within a single North American market. Proponents of IFRS emphasized that capital markets had 
become truly international, a trend they believed would only accelerate in the future, and that it 
was in the best long-term interest of Canada to adopt IFRS. Not all constituents favored choosing 
only one standard. Some, such as PricewaterhouseCoopers, advocated permitting firms to choose 
between IFRS and U.S. GAAP.  
After considering their constituent’s input, on February 10, 2005, the AcSB proposed 
adopting IFRS in full to its oversight body, the Accounting Standards Oversight Council, while 
allowing entities that want to do so to use U.S. GAAP. On March 31, 2005, the AcSB sought 
comment on its proposal to adopt IFRS. On April 15, 2005, the SEC introduced a possible road 
map to eliminate the reconciliation requirement for IFRS. This event had an impact on many 
constituents. For example, Ernst & Young expressed a preference for U.S. GAAP on May 31, 
2004. On August 5, 2005, nearly a year later, Ernst & Young changed its mind and expressed a 
preference for IFRS. It cited the SEC’s elimination of the reconciliation requirement as a primary 
reason for this switch.  
On September 7, 2005, the AcSB tentatively decided to continue with its plan to adopt 
IFRS. Then on January 10, 2006, the AcSB ratified its plan to adopt IFRS over a five-year 
transition period, while allowing SEC registrants to continue reporting with U.S. GAAP. On 
November 15, 2007, the SEC voted to eliminate the reconciliation requirement for foreign private 
issuers reporting under U.S. GAAP. The final event in Canada’s IFRS adoption was the AcSB’s 
confirmation of the IFRS changeover with the announcement that Canadian publicly accountable 
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enterprises would be required to adopt IFRS for fiscal years beginning on or after January 1, 
2011.12 
Recently, the AcSB reflects in the released 2011-2012 annual report that the feedback to 
the IFRS adoption strategy in Canada reveals “a generally lower level of satisfaction” and that 
“some stakeholders” question, or disagree with, the adoption of IFRS. Therefore, this paper is 
among the first to empirically document the effects of the IFRS adoption in Canada in order to 
inform the AcSB, as well as other global accounting standard setters such as the SEC, IASB, and 
FASB. 
 
2.2.1. The case of the U.S. 
The SEC and the FASB have recognized the growing importance of IFRS and have been 
working with their international counterparts on a convergence effort to develop high quality, 
internationally comparable financial information that is useful to investors in making decisions in 
global capital markets (SEC 2008; Financial Accounting Foundation 2009). The convergence 
efforts have focused on coordinating standard setting and reducing differences in accounting 
standards.  
To this end, the FASB and the IASB are working to achieve the standard-setting 
milestones specified in their Memorandum of Understanding (FASB and IASB 2008) with a goal 
of developing a single set of high quality accounting standards. However, earnings quality is not 
only a function of accounting standards, but also of interpretation, auditing, and the regulatory 
and litigation environment (Barth et al. 2012). Thus, the International Auditing and Assurance 
Standards Board has been developing International Standards on Auditing to enhance coverage 
convergence in application of accounting standards around the globe. Similarly, the SEC, the 
                                                 
12 Due to delayed International Accounting Standards Board (IASB)’s projects involving investment 
companies, insurance contracts, and accounting for rate-regulated entities, the AsSB allowed investment 
companies, insurance companies, and rate-regulated entities to delay adoption of IFRS until fiscal years 
beginning on or after January 01, 2014 (2013 for re-regulated entities). 
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International Organization of Securities Commissions, and Committee of European Securities 
Regulations are working to coordinate oversight and regulation to facilitate consistent 
enforcement across countries. 
In 2007, the SEC issued a Final Rule (SEC 2007) permitting foreign companies listed on 
the U.S. stock exchange to file their reports in accordance with IFRS without reconciliation to 
U.S.-GAAP. With this decision, the Commission seems to recognize IFRS as being equivalently 
valuable as U.S. GAAP and take note of the increasing importance of IFRS in the world (SEC 
2007) even though U.S. firms are still required to file financial statements in accordance with 
U.S. GAAP. Consistent with the SEC’s stated desire for firms to use a single set of high quality 
accounting standards, the SEC issued a proposed rule, “Roadmap for the Potential Use of 
Financial Statements Prepared in Accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards by 
U.S. Issuers,” in November 2008. The Roadmap states: 
“Through this Roadmap, the Commission is seeking to realize the objective of 
providing investors with financial information from U.S. issuers under a set of 
high quality globally accepted accounting standards, which would enable U.S. 
investors to better compare financial information of U.S. issuers and competing 
international investment opportunities.” 
 
With this roadmap, the SEC seems convinced that the mandatory use of IFRS in the U.S. 
would improve U.S. investors’ ability to “compare effectively and efficiently their investment 
opportunities in a global capital market” (SEC 2008). The roadmap scheduled the introduction of 
IFRS for large accelerated filers from 2014, for other accelerated filers from 2015, and for all 
filers from 2016 (SEC 2008). However, in February 2010, the SEC produced a Commission 
Statement that postponed the roadmap timetable, delaying the earliest possible adoption date to 
2015 or 2016 (SEC 2010a).  
However, recently, in July 2012, the SEC’s Office of the Chief Accountant published its 
final staff report on the Work Plan for considering the incorporation of IFRS into the financial 
reporting for U.S. issuers. The final report contains no recommendation or conclusion as to either 
the ultimate adoption of IFRS or any particular timetable or phase-in period for its adoption. In 
22 
 
 
 
addition, the final report strikes a cautionary note as to IFRS findings, among other things, that (i) 
there “continue to be areas underdeveloped,” (ii) the IFRS Interpretation Committee “should do 
more to address issues on a timely basis,” (iii) a majority of U.S. issuers expressed concerned that 
moving to IFRS has the potential to result “in significant expense to the company and confusion 
for investors”, and finally (iv) significant effort would be required to change the references from 
U.S. GAAP, as U.S. GAAP is “imbedded throughout laws and regulations and in a significant 
number of private contracts”.  In other words, U.S. GAAP is integrated into the language of 
business at the transactional levels. In essence, in its 2012 final report, the SEC has effectively 
shut down the roadmap timeline for U.S. incorporation of IFRS into its accounting systems.  
In light of the new development regarding the prospect of IFRS incorporation in the U.S., 
examining the Canadian experience of adopting IFRS can provide new evidence to inform the 
debate about the competition between IFRS and U.S. GAAP-based standards for at least three 
reasons.  
First, Canada permits the choice between IFRS and U.S. GAAP, which allows a direct 
comparison between IFRS and U.S. GAAP. Hence, the consequences of Canada’s IFRS adoption 
are of particular interest to not only the Canadian Accounting Standards Board (AcSB) but also 
the SEC.  
Second, strong similarities exist between the U.S. and Canada in terms of both accounting 
standards and institutional factors. In terms of accounting standards, Canadian GAAP and U.S. 
GAAP are viewed as similar: both are considered high-quality accounting standards. In fact, 
under the Canada-U.S. multijurisdictional disclosure system (MJDS), Canadian GAAP and U.S. 
GAAP are allowable alternatives for cross-listed firms.13 Canadian firms can choose either 
Canadian GAAP or U.S. GAAP for domestic reporting. Meanwhile, U.S. regulators accepted 
                                                 
13 Canadian regulators also permitted these Canadian firms to report under U.S. GAAP. 
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Canadian GAAP for foreign private issuers, without reconciliation to U.S. GAAP.14 After Canada 
adopted IFRS, while domestic firms must adopt IFRS, Canadian cross-listed firms have the 
option to choose between IFRS and U.S. GAAP. In terms of institutional factors, those in Canada 
are considered to be more like those in the U.S. than in any other countries. Consider the 
following quote from the former Canadian Accounting Standards Board and International 
Accounting Standard Board member Tricia O’Malley: 
“And it is actually true, in some respects, that the Canadian environment is - 
probably most resembles the situation that the U.S. is going to be in if it makes a 
similar kind of decision.” 
 
Thus, the shift from Canadian GAAP to IFRS is more likely to provide relevant insights 
to the U.S. than a move from any other local GAAP to IFRS.  
Finally, IFRS have changed dramatically from the early voluntary adoption period to the 
later mandatory adoption period. From 2003 to 2005, there were so many new standards issued 
and revised when the IASB was making compromises to win endorsement (without carve-outs) of 
IAS/IFRS standards from EU member countries (Capkun et al. 2012). In particular, more than 
one third of the existing standards at that time (14 out of 34 IAS standards) were revised and six 
new standards (IFRS) were introduced, all of which became effective in 2005. Since then, many 
more new standards have been revised and issued, e.g. IFRS 08 – Operating Segments. If IFRS 
have changed significantly overtime, the effects of IFRS may also change. Thus, the results of 
studies that examine the 2003 version of IFRS or 2005 version of IFRS may no longer be 
generalizable in today’s environments. In fact, Capkun et al. (2012) document that greater 
flexibility in choosing among alternative accounting treatments under the current (i.e., 2005 
version) IFRS has led to greater earnings management (smoothing). Therefore, given the evolving 
nature of IFRS, the timely evidence from the Canadian experience is potentially important to 
U.S./Canadian and global regulators, the IASB, and firms. 
                                                 
14 A Canadian firm cross-listed in this U.S. must qualify for foreign private issuer status to be allowed to 
file under Canadian GAAP.  
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2.3. Literature Review 
 The global acceptance of IFRS has led to a vast literature studying the effects of IFRS 
adoption around the world. For example, Ahmed et al. (2013) study the effects of mandatory 
IFRS adoption in Europe on accounting quality using a relatively broad set of firms from 20 
countries that adopted IFRS in 2005. They use a benchmark group of firms from countries that 
did not adopt IFRS matched on the strength of legal enforcement, industry, size, book-to-market, 
and accounting performance. They find that IFRS firms exhibit significant increases in income 
smoothing and aggressive reporting of accruals, and a significant decrease in timeliness of loss 
recognition relative to these benchmark firms; however, they do not find significant differences 
across IFRS and benchmark firms in meeting or beating earnings targets. This stream of literature 
focuses on both voluntary and mandatory adoption of IFRS around the world.15  
 
2.3.1. Theoretical background 
General Arguments on the Effects of IFRS Adoption 
The empirical studies in this literature are motivated by the assumption that mandating 
IFRS has the potential to improve transparency (financial reporting quality) and/or to harmonize 
financial reporting practices across countries (comparability). Prior research suggests that IFRS 
adoption has the potential to improve reporting quality for at least two reasons. First, IFRS are 
arguably more principles-based than domestic accounting standards and the IASB have taken 
steps to remove allowable accounting alternatives and to require accounting measurements that 
better reflect a firm’s economic position and performance (IASC 1989; Barth et al. 2008). In 
other words, IFRS limit management’s opportunistic discretion in determining accounting 
amounts (Ashbaugh and Pincus 2001; Barth et al. 2008) and, thereby, also enhance accounting 
                                                 
15 For recent survey papers on this body of literature, see, among others, Brüggemann et al. (2012), Hail et 
al. (2010a and 2010b). 
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quality. Similarly, Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) develop a rational model predicting that tighter 
accounting standards limit management’s discretion and, thus, improve earnings quality.   
Second, accounting numbers that better reflect a firm’s underlying economics, resulting 
from either principles-based standards or required accounting measurements, can enhance 
accounting quality because such accounting numbers provide investors with information useful in 
making investment decisions (Barth et al. 2008). For example, IFRS permits fair value accounting 
that may better reflect the underlying economics than do domestic standards. However, the issue 
of asset salability remains. 
Nevertheless, there are at least two reasons that IFRS adoption per se may neither 
enhance nor reduce accounting quality. First, reducing the amount of reporting discretion also 
makes it harder for managers to convey private information through financial statements. More 
specifically, IFRS could eliminate those accounting alternatives that are most appropriate for 
communicating the underlying economics of a business, forcing managers of these firms to use 
less appropriate alternatives, and thus resulting in a reduction in accounting quality.  
Second, IFRS are arguably more principles-based than domestic standards; they thus 
afford managers greater flexibility (Langmead and Soroosh 2009). For some important areas such 
as revenue recognition for multiple deliverables, the absence of implementation guidance would 
significantly increase discretion and allowable treatments depending upon how they are 
interpreted and implemented. Given managers’ incentives to exploit accounting discretion to their 
advantage (Leuz et al. 2003), the increase in discretion due to lack of implementation guidance is 
likely to lead to more earnings management and thus to lower accounting quality, ceteris paribus. 
Moreover, this concern applies not only to revenue recognition but also to footnote disclosures, 
which firms can provide in a more or less informative manner.  Thus, even if the standards 
themselves mandate superior accounting practices and require more disclosures, it is not clear 
whether firms implement these requirements in ways that make reported numbers more 
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informative.  
 
Incentives as a Key Determinant of Reporting Quality 
While reporting practices may be affected by accounting standards, they are also driven 
to a large extent by firms’ reporting incentives (Ball et al. 2000; Ball and Shivakumar 2006; 
Burgstahler et al. 2006; Hail et al. 2010a; Ahmed et al. 2013; Hansen et al. 2013, etc.). The extant 
literature recognizes that accounting standards offer managers substantial discretion because the 
application of standards involves considerable judgment. For example, accounting measurements 
rely on management’s private information and involve an assessment of the future, making them 
subjective representations of management’s information set. How managers use such reporting 
discretion is driven by their reporting incentives. On one hand, discretion allows managers to use 
their private information to produce reports that more accurately reflect firm performance and 
that are more informative to outside parties (e.g. Tucker and Zarowin 2006). On the other hand, 
whether managers use the discretion in this way depends upon their reporting incentives. 
Managers have incentives to obfuscate firm performance (e.g. Li 2008), to achieve certain 
earnings targets (Cohen et al. 2008), and to avoid debt covenant violations (Watts and 
Zimmermann 1986), among others. Thus, as long as differences in reporting incentives across 
firms exist, observed reporting behaviors will likely differ across firms.  
Reporting incentives are shaped by jurisdiction-level institutional factors such as legal 
systems, enforcement mechanisms, capital-market forces, and product market competition, as 
well as by firm-level characteristics such as compensation and financing arrangements, ownership 
structures, and governance mechanisms. While the extent to which the evidence is available 
differs across factors, recent empirical studies clearly support the notion that reporting incentives 
play a significant role in shaping observed reporting and disclosure practices (Ball et al. 2000; 
Fan and Wong 2002; Leuz et al. 2003; Haw et al. 2004; Burgstahler et al. 2006). In particular, 
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there are studies showing that reporting practices differ even for firms subject to the same 
accounting standards (Ball et al. 2003; Ball and Shivakumar 2005; Burgstahler et al. 2006; Lang 
et al. 2006). Hence, the effects of IFRS adoption may be limited if a firm’s institutional 
environment and firm-level incentives remain unchanged (Ball 2006; Soderstrom and Sun 2007; 
Hail et al. 2010a; Brüggemann et al. 2012). 
The role of reporting incentives in shaping reporting practices underscores the 
significance of this study. In particular, the IFRS adoption in Canada provides a setting that is the 
closest possible model to that of the U.S. To the extent that reporting incentives are shaped by 
jurisdiction-level institutional factors, and that institutional factors in Canada are similar to those 
in the U.S., studying the Canadian experience can potentially shed significant light on how the 
U.S. should incorporate IFRS into its accounting system. 
 
Complementarities among elements of countries’ institutional frameworks 
 Accounting standards are one of many important institutional elements (e.g., legal 
system, banking system, taxation system, standards bodies, etc.) affecting a country’s financial 
reporting practices.16 In a well-functioning economy, these elements are likely to be 
complementary to one another (Hail et al. 2010a). The notion of complementarities implies that 
countries with different sets of institutional factors are likely to select different accounting 
standards and that diversity in accounting standards is an expected outcome of diversity across 
countries’ institutional infrastructures. For example, consider two financial systems (e.g., Leuz 
2010; Hail et al. 2010a): In the first, firms rely heavily on public debt or equity markets in raising 
capital, and corporate ownership is dispersed and is largely in the hands of consumers that invest 
their savings directly or indirectly via mutual funds in public debt or equity markets. Thus, 
                                                 
16 A country’s institutions include the public and private human-made organizations and conventions that 
shape economic behaviors. These institutions include the legal system, banking system, taxation system, 
regulatory and enforcement agencies, industry associations, standards bodies, networks of professionals, 
etc. 
28 
 
 
 
investors are at arm’s length from firms and do not have privileged access to information. In such 
a system, corporate disclosure is crucial, as it enables investors to monitor their financial claims 
and exercise their rights. I, therefore, expect that the financial reporting system focus on outside 
investors, ensuring that they are reasonably well informed and, hence, willing to invest in the 
public debt and in equity markets. 
In contrast, consider a second financial system in which firms establish close 
relationships with banks and other financial intermediaries, in which firms rely heavily on 
internal financing rather than raise capital in public equity or debt markets, and in which 
corporate ownership is concentrated. In this system, the key parties have privileged access to 
information through their relationships, and information asymmetries are resolved primarily via 
private channels, rather than through public disclosure (e.g., Ball et al. 2000). In such a system, 
the role of accounting is not so much to publicly disseminate information, but rather to facilitate 
relationship-based financing, for instance, by limiting the claims of outside shareholders to 
dividends, which protects creditors and promotes internal financing. The key point is that the two 
hypothetical financial systems are likely to have very different reporting regimes, including very 
different accounting standards. 
 The notion of institutional complementarities emphasizes the significance of this study. 
Changes in accounting standards cannot be considered in insolation from other elements of 
institutional infrastructures. The existence of complementarities implies that changing one 
element may make the system (or economy) as a whole worse off even when the element itself 
improves along a particular quality dimension. Thus, it is not obvious that a country should adopt 
a new set of accounting standards even if this set is unambiguously “better” than the existing one. 
Institutional fit should be taken into consideration. Therefore, to the extent that Canada and the 
U.S. are similar, it is important to study the effects of IFRS adoption in Canada to be able to draw 
relevant conclusions for U.S. settings.  
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2.3.2. Empirical Evidence 
In addition to the above theoretical arguments, there are empirical studies that 
specifically compare the reporting outcomes under IFRS and U.S. GAAP, respectively.17 First, 
several studies analyze the properties of reported accounting numbers in settings where firms 
could choose between IFRS and U.S. GAAP for financial reporting purposes.18 These studies 
(e.g. Bartov et al. 2005; Van der Meulen et al. 2007) find that earnings and book value differ little 
in terms of value relevance, timeliness, or earnings management. In line with this argument, there 
is little evidence that markets or investors view the outcomes differently. Holding institutional 
features constant, Leuz (2003) finds similar market liquidity and information asymmetry across 
IFRS and U.S. GAAP firms. More recently, Lin et al. (2012) examine whether accounting quality 
changed following a switch from U.S. GAAP to IFRS. Using a sample of German high tech firms 
that transitioned to IFRS from U.S. GAAP in 2005, the authors find that accounting numbers 
under IFRS generally exhibit more earnings management, less timely loss recognition, and less 
value relevance compared to those under U.S. GAAP. Their findings indicate that the application 
of U.S. GAAP generally resulted in greater accounting quality than did the application of IFRS, 
and that a transition from U.S. GAAP to IFRS reduced accounting quality. The paper provides the 
earliest evidence on the consequences of a switch from U.S. GAAP to IFRS.  
A second set of studies investigates foreign firms that are cross-listed in the United 
States. These firms prepare financial statements in accordance with IFRS and are subject to SEC 
oversight. Prior to 2008, these firms were required to provide reconciliation to U.S. GAAP. This 
IFRS to U.S. GAAP reconciliation of foreign firms provides a direct comparison of reporting 
outcomes under IFRS and U.S. GAAP. Studies that take advantage of this setting yield mixed 
results as to whether U.S. GAAP or IFRS accounting numbers are of higher quality. In many 
                                                 
17 There are extensive literature review papers on the effects of IFRS adoption around the world. Please see 
Brüggemann et al. (2012) and Soderstrom & Sun (2007), among others.  
18 Examples of such settings were the German New Market stock exchange and the Swiss stock exchange 
following the 1991 revision of the laws on Companies Limited by Shares. 
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cases, the earnings properties across the two standards are indistinguishable (e.g. Harris and 
Muller 1999; Gordon et al. 2012; Barth et al. 2012). Meanwhile, Lang et al. (2006) find that 
reconciled U.S. GAAP numbers from Form 20-F filings seem to be subject to more earnings 
management, to exhibit lower associations with share prices, and to be less timely in recognizing 
losses than are numbers prepared by U.S. firms. However, Leuz (2006) suggest that the findings 
are likely to reflect the influence of cross-listed firms’ home-country reporting incentives, or of 
incentives stemming from the act of reconciliation itself. Similarly, Barth et al. (2012) directly 
compare IFRS and U.S. earnings across a matched sample of non-U.S. and U.S. firms, and find 
evidence that IFRS numbers are of lower quality. Again, it is unclear how this evidence should be 
interpreted because firms outside the U.S. are generally subject to different reporting incentives, 
and it is thus possible that those firms exhibit different properties from do U.S. firms, even under 
the same set of standards. Consistent with this view, Lang et al. (2003) show that firms’ local 
GAAP reporting improves around U.S. cross-listings, likely reflecting a change in reporting 
incentives when firms become exposed to the U.S. institutional environment.  
While informative, the results of the studies above may not be generalizable to the U.S. 
for at least three reasons. First, these studies are subject to self-selection bias because firms 
choose to voluntarily report under IFRS (e.g., Barth et al. 2008) or to voluntarily cross-list in the 
U.S. (e.g., Lang et al. 2006). For example, Barth et al. (2008) find a decrease in earnings 
management (smoothing) following firms’ voluntary early adoption of IAS/IFRS over the 1994-
2003 period. However, Christensen et al. (2008) find that the post-adoption decrease for German 
firms in earnings management (smoothing) is confined to early-adopter firms that had incentives 
to improve the transparency of reporting earnings numbers (for example, to raise external 
capital). Relative to early-adopting firms, they find evidence of a modest increase in earnings 
management (smoothing) for those firms that waited until IFRS became mandatory in Germany. 
In addition, using a broader sample of firms from the European Union (EU) and other parts of the 
world that adopted IFRS after they became mandatory in 2005, Ahmed et al. (2013) find a 
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significant increase in earnings management (smoothing) following IFRS adoption relative to a 
control sample of firms from countries that did not adopt IFRS standards (largely U.S. firms and 
Japanese firms). Both Ahmed et al. (2013) and Christensen et al. (2008) attribute differences in 
their findings relative to Barth et al. (2008) to firms’ incentives to adopt (self-selection bias) 
rather than to the effects of IFRS standards per se.19  
Further, it is difficult to draw inferences from a sample of foreign, predominantly 
European, firms that face a different environment than do North America firms. For example, 
most countries in the European Union have a civil law legal origin, the exceptions being Ireland 
and the United Kingdom. Ball et al. (2000) document that legal origin is a co-determinant of 
earnings quality. Similarly, Burnet et al. (2011) find that earnings attributes vary with legal 
origin. Given that the United States is classified as a common law country (La Porta et al. 1998), 
the applicability to U.S. firms of inferences regarding the effects of IFRS adoption from a sample 
of firms located in civil law countries such as Germany may be limited.  
Finally, IFRS have changed dramatically between the early, voluntary adoption period 
and the later, mandatory adoption period, particularly from 2003 to 2005 when the IASB made 
compromises to win endorsement (without carve-outs) of IAS/IFRS standards from EU member 
countries (Capkun et al. 2012). In particular, more than one third of the existing standards at that 
time (14 of 34 IAS standards) were revised and six new standards (IFRS) were introduced, all of 
which became effective in 2005. Since then, many more standards have been revised and issued 
(e.g., IFRS 8: Operating Segments, IFRS 3: Business Combinations; IFRS 10: Consolidated 
Financial Statements). If IFRS have changed significantly overtime, their effects may have 
changed accordingly. Thus, the results of studies that examine the 2003 version of IFRS or the 
2005 version of IFRS may no longer be the same. In particular, Capkun et al. (2012) hypothesize 
                                                 
19 In a follow-up study, Capkun et al. (2012) suggest that self-selection bias is not the only reason for the 
differences between the findings in Barth et al. (2008) and those in Christensen et al. (2008) and Ahmed et 
al. (2013). Rather, Capkun et al. (2012) indicate that the 2004-2005 change in IFRS standards plays a 
bigger role in explaining the differences between the two sets of findings. 
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that the 2005 version of IFRS allows firms greater flexibility in choosing among alternative 
accounting treatments. In fact, they find that greater flexibility under the current IFRS reporting 
regime has led to greater earnings management (smoothing).  
To mitigate these generalizability concerns, I study a recent sample of IFRS adopting 
firms based in Canada that, like the U.S., is a common law country. Additionally, since U.S. 
regulators have historically designated Canada as being the most similar to the U.S. in accounting 
standards and in enforcement procedures, any inferences based on a sample of Canadian firms are 
more likely to carry over to U.S. firms than are those in prior studies.  
 
2.3.3. Canadian GAAP and U.S. GAAP 
Prior to 2008, U.S. listed, foreign private issuers choosing to report their primary 
financial statements under the accounting standards of their home country or IFRS were required 
to reconcile, i.e., quantify and explain to investors what their accounting income and 
shareholders' equity would have been under U.S. GAAP. However, since U.S. GAAP and 
Canadian GAAP and disclosure requirements are similar, the U.S. and Canadian securities 
regulators agreed to a multijurisdictional disclosure system (MJDS) specifically exempting 
Canadian firms that report under Canadian GAAP and that list in the U.S. from the reconciliation 
requirement. Through the MJDS, Canadian regulators also accepted U.S. GAAP. This means that 
Canadian firms are permitted to report under either U.S. GAAP or Canadian GAAP (some 
Canadian firms voluntarily report under both). Investigating the reporting quality of the two 
accounting regimes, Webster and Thornton (2005) find no overall difference in accrual quality 
between Canadian firms reporting under Canadian GAAP and U.S. firms reporting under U.S. 
GAAP. On March 4, 2008, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission exempted non-U.S-
based firms that report under IFRS from reconciliation. So as Canadian firms switch to IFRS, 
they will retain the exemption from reconciliation requirements. 
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Notwithstanding the previous arguments, minor differences in accounting rules between 
U.S. GAAP and Canadian GAAP do exist. However, these differences do not tend to be 
significant. Bandyopadhyay, Hanna, and Richardson (1994) investigate a sample of firms that 
were listed both on the Toronto and a U.S. stock exchange between 1983 and 1989. Some of the 
main sources of differences in accounting rules pertain to foreign exchange gains or losses on 
foreign long-term debt, early extinguishment of debt, extraordinary items, and interest 
capitalization of self- constructed assets. Overall, they find that earnings scaled by market 
capitalization are 2% lower under U.S. GAAP than Canadian GAAP; however, the differences 
are not significant.  
 
2.4. Hypotheses Development 
2.4.1. Overall effects of IFRS adoption 
In this section, I discuss several arguments about the effects of IFRS adoption on 
earnings quality. Some arguments suggest significant changes in earnings quality (in either 
direction) around the adoption of IFRS while others point towards small or negligible effects.  
Arguments suggesting that the IFRS adoption yields significant improvements in 
earnings quality often rely on the premise that IFRS are arguably more principles-based than 
domestic accounting standards. Thus, accounting numbers under IFRS seem to better reflect a 
firm’s underlying economics than those under domestic standards. For example, IFRS permits 
fair value accounting that may better reflect the underlying economics. However, the prediction 
depends on whether the assets are sellable or have a market (Linsmeier 2013). 
In addition, the IASB have taken steps to remove allowable accounting alternatives and 
to require accounting measurements that better reflect a firm’s economic position and 
performance (IASC 1989; Barth et al. 2008) and that limit management’s opportunistic discretion 
in determining accounting amounts (Ashbaugh and Pincus 2001; Barth et al. 2008) and, thereby, 
also enhance earnings quality. Consistent with this view, Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) develop a 
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rational model predicting that tighter accounting standards limit management’s discretion and, 
thus, improve earnings quality.  
Next, there are also arguments that IFRS adoption may degrade earnings quality. The 
IASB have taken steps to remove allowable accounting alternatives, thereby reducing the amount 
of discretion given to managers. Thus, earnings quality may decrease because such reduction in 
the degree of reporting discretion possibly makes it harder for managers to convey private 
information through financial statements. Particularly, IFRS could eliminate those accounting 
alternatives that are most appropriate for communicating the underlying economics of a business, 
forcing managers of these firms to use less appropriate alternatives, and thus resulting in a 
reduction in accounting quality.  
In addition, IFRS are arguably more principles-based than domestic standards; they thus 
afford managers greater flexibility (Langmead and Soroosh 2009). For some important areas such 
as revenue recognition for multiple deliverables, the absence of implementation guidance would 
significantly increase discretion and allowable treatments depending upon how they are 
interpreted and implemented. Given managers’ incentives to exploit accounting discretion to their 
advantage (Leuz et al. 2003), the increase in discretion due to lack of implementation guidance is 
likely to lead to more earnings management and thus to lower accounting quality, ceteris paribus.  
Finally, it is also possible that IFRS adoption per se may have small or even negligible 
effects on earnings quality. The evidence in several recent studies points to a limited role of 
accounting standards in determining observed reporting quality, and in contrast, highlights the 
importance of firms’ reporting incentives (e.g. Ball et al. 2000; Ball and Shivakumar 2006; 
Burgstahler et al. 2006; Hail et al. 2010a; Ahmed et al. 2013; Hansen et al. 2013, Daske et al. 
2013). Every single set of accounting standards (IFRS or other local GAAPs) offers managers 
substantial discretion because the application of standards involves considerable judgment and 
the use of private information (Hail et al. 2010a, Hail et al. 2010b, Daske et al. 2008, Daske et al. 
2013). How firms use this discretion is likely to depend on their reporting incentives. While some 
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firms may have incentives to report transparently, others may not. These incentives are shaped by 
many factors, including countries’ legal institutions, various market forces, and firms’ operating 
characteristics. For example, Hail et al. (2010a) suggest that the strength of the legal enforcement 
(e.g., the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002) in the U.S. limit managers’ incentives to engage in 
questionable financial reporting activities, even when standards allow greater reporting discretion. 
Thus, the reporting incentive argument questions the notion that changing the standards alone 
improves or deteriorates the reported accounting numbers. 
Given the above discussions, whether IFRS adoption improves earnings quality is 
ultimately an empirical question. As a result, the first hypothesis is stated in the null form as 
follows: 
H1: Earnings quality of Canadian firms does not change significantly after the adoption. 
 
2.4.2. Differential effects of IFRS adoption 
While it is probably difficult to predict the overall effects of IFRS, I expect cross-
sectional variation in the extent to which the IFRS adoption impacts earnings quality. I therefore 
focus on settings in which the effects of adopting IFRS are expected to be more pronounced. 
First, as previously discussed, the extant literature documents the significance of incentives for 
transparent reporting (e.g. Ball et al. 2000; Ball and Shivakumar 2006; Burgstahler et al. 2006; 
Hail et al. 2010a; Ahmed et al. 2012; Hansen et al. 2013, Daske et al. 2013) in determining the 
reporting outcome. In an attempt to examine how changes in accounting rules interact with 
reporting incentives in shaping reporting outcomes, I identify “serious adopters” and “label 
adopters” following Daske et al. (2013). “Serious adopters” refer to firms that are committed to 
transparent reporting while “label adopters” do not have incentives to pursue transparent 
reporting strategies.20 I classify “serious adopters” and “label adopters” based on three proxies of 
                                                 
20 Technically, only firms registered with the SEC were allowed to choose between U.S. GAAP and IFRS 
by Canadian securities regulators. However, firms had a de facto choice because firms could, though at 
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reporting incentives, i.e., reporting incentives (based on firm characteristics), reporting behaviors 
(accruals over cash flow), and reporting environment (analyst coverage). I examine these “serious 
adopters” and “label adopters” separately. 
Next, I examine areas in which the SEC and FASB have expressed concerns in the 
recently released final staff report in July 2012 about the lack of IFRS implementation guidelines 
for certain industries, notably extractive industries and insurance industries. In addition, the lack 
of specific rules could be problematic for industries with high litigation risk. Thus, I study high-
litigation-risk industries. 
I also examine areas in which differences between IFRS and U.S. GAAP are still 
significant, fair value accounting and R&D expenditures. In addition, I expect the convergence 
benefits to be more pronounced in industries where many foreign firms have already adopted 
IFRS. Hence, I investigate industries in which IFRS adoption is widespread. 
Finally, prior research suggests that negative earnings have different valuation properties 
from positive earnings (Collins et al. 1999, Ndubizu and Sanchez 2007). Thus, I also examine 
earnings quality of loss firms and profitable firms separately before and after the adoption. 
 
2.4.2.1. Serious adopters vs. label adopters 
The extant literature documents the significance of reporting incentives (e.g. Ball et al. 
2000; Ball and Shivakumar 2006; Burgstahler et al. 2006; Hail et al. 2010a; Ahmed et al. 2013; 
Hansen et al. 2013, Daske et al. 2013) in shaping reporting outcomes. For example, Hail et al. 
(2010a) argue that IFRS adoption is unlikely to have major impact on reporting quality as well as 
substantial capital market benefits due to the impact of reporting incentives on those outcomes, 
even when IFRS are viewed as superior to U.S. GAAP. The rationale behind their arguments is 
that to the extent that firms optimize their reporting strategies, they are expected to resist 
                                                                                                                                                 
some cost, register with the SEC and report with U.S. GAAP. In fact, some firms elected to list in the U.S. 
to be able to use U.S. GAAP. 
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mandated changes that are not in their interest by exploiting the flexibility inherent in the 
standards. If managers have incentives to pursue transparent reporting, they can always disclosure 
more than required to achieve their optimal reporting strategies. It is difficult to force firms to 
reduce their reporting quality below their optimal level. On the other hand, if managers have 
incentives to obfuscate accounting information and the current accounting standards (e.g., 
Canadian GAAP) do not allow them to reach their optimal reporting strategies, to the extent that 
IFRS is a lower quality set of accounting standards managers may take advantage of the greater 
discretion under IFRS and thus earnings quality may deteriorate. However, if IFRS is a better set 
of accounting standards, earnings quality of firms may improve after the adoption. 
Consistent with this reporting incentive argument, Hansen et al. (2013) study the changes 
in earnings informativeness of firms cross-listed in the U.S. after the SEC relaxes the 
reconciliation requirement in non-U.S. firms’ SEC filings. They partition their sample into two 
groups based on managers’ incentives to provide informative disclosures. They find a significant 
increase in the information content of their earnings for firms with incentives to be more 
informative after the SEC relaxes the reconciliation in non-U.S. firms cross-listed in the U.S. 
because those firms likely increases the informativeness of their reported earnings with the 
elimination of the constraint to minimize the gap between the two sets of reporting incomes. On 
the other hand, they find no significant change in information content of earnings for firms 
without such incentives.  
Daske et al. (2013) argue that the observed economic consequences around IFRS 
adoptions depend on management’s reporting incentives, including the underlying motivations 
for the accounting change, rather than the change in accounting standards per se. They attempt to 
distinguish firms with incentives for transparent reporting, i.e., “serious adopters”, from firms 
without such incentives, i.e., “label adopters”. Ball (2001, 2006) puts forth the notion that a lot of 
firms adopt IFRS merely in name without making material changes to their reporting policies. In 
Ball (2001, 2006) spirit, “label adopters” are firms that adopt IFRS in name without making 
38 
 
 
 
material changes to their reporting policies. “Serious adopters”, on the other hand, adopt IFRS as 
part of a broader strategy to increase their commitment to transparency. In other words, these 
“serious adopters” are serious about the change in their reporting strategy (which includes but is 
not necessarily limited to IFRS adoption) for transparency while “label adopters” are not. They 
find that “serious adopters” are associated with an increase in liquidity and a decline in cost of 
capital, whereas “label adopters” are not, which suggests that investors do not react to firms that 
adopt IFRS in name.  
Given the above discussions, I argue that to the extent that the IFRS adoption affects 
earnings quality, those effects are likely to vary with management’ reporting incentives. 
Particularly, whether or not IFRS is a better set of accounting standards than Canadian GAAP 
should not bear strong consequences on earnings quality of “serious adopters” given their desire 
to provide transparent accounting numbers to investors. On the other hand, earnings quality of 
“label adopters” is likely to vary more with the strength of the accounting standards. If IFRS is a 
better set of accounting standards than Canadian GAAP, it is likely that earnings quality of these 
firms improves following the adoption. Nevertheless, if IFRS is a worse set of accounting 
standards, it is likely that these “label adopters” will see reduced earnings quality following the 
adoption. In either case, “serious adopters” are likely to see less variation in their earnings quality 
than do “label adopters” following the adoption. As a result, the hypothesis is stated as follows: 
H2: Earnings quality changes to a lesser degree after the adoption for “serious 
adopters” than it does for “label adopters”. 
 
2.4.2.2. Extractive industries, insurance industries, and high-litigation-risk industries 
 Even though IFRS and U.S. GAAP have become increasingly similar (Hail et al. 2010a), 
some significant differences exist. The SEC and FASB have expressed concerns about the lack of 
implementation guidance for certain industries, notably extractive and insurance industries. The 
SEC reiterates the concern in the recent final staff report issued in July 2012. The underlying 
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reason for the concern is that investors might lose important information currently available under 
U.S. GAAP due to this lack of implementation guidance. If the lost accounting information is 
relevant, then the IFRS adoption may affect these industries in a different manner from it does to 
other industries. In particular, given that managers have incentives to engage in opportunistic 
behaviors (Leuz et al. 2013), the lack of implementation guidance may be detrimental to 
accounting information. If IFRS is a worse set of accounting standards than Canadian GAAP, 
then earnings quality of firms in those industries may decline to a greater degree than earnings 
quality of firms in other industries. On the other hand, if IFRS is a better set of accounting 
standards than Canadian GAAP, then firms in extractive industries and insurance industries may 
still have higher earnings quality after the adoption but the magnitude of the change is likely to be 
smaller when compared to firms in other industries. Hence, the hypotheses related to these 
industries are stated as follows: 
  H3: Earnings quality declines to a greater degree or improves to a lesser degree for 
firms in extractive industries than it does for firms in non-extractive industries. 
H4: Earnings quality declines to a greater degree or improves to a lesser degree for 
firms in insurance industries than it does for firms in non-insurance industries. 
 
The lack of implementation guidance under IFRS may prove to be an issue for firms in 
industries with high litigation risk. Lack of implementation guidance means a greater discretion 
for managers. Thus, they will have to rely more on their own judgment when interpreting IFRS, 
which could result in more legal challenges to their decisions (Joos and Leung 2013). To avoid 
this, firms might make overly conservative accounting choices (Hail et al. 2010a) that reduce the 
informativeness of financial reporting, leading to less value relevant accounting information. In 
fact, Joos and Leung (2013) report that investors of firms in industries with high litigation risk 
react negatively to events that increase the likelihood of adopting IFRS in the U.S. This suggests 
that investors do not prefer the lack of implementation guidance in these industries. Similar to 
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firms in extractive and insurance industries, the lack of implementation guidance in high-
litigation-risk industries can manifest in two ways. It could be a greater decline in earnings 
quality for firms in these industries. Or, it could be a smaller increase in earnings quality. Given 
the above arguments, the hypothesis related to high-litigation-risk industries is stated as follows: 
H5: Earnings quality declines to a greater degree or improves to a lesser degree for 
firms in high-litigation-risk industries than it does for firms in low-litigation-risk industries. 
 
2.4.2.3. Fair value accounting 
Fair value accounting is also an area that IFRS and U.S. GAAP (and Canadian GAAP) 
differ significantly. For example, financial statements under IFRS are prepared on a modified 
historical cost basis, with a growing emphasis on fair value, while such statements under 
Canadian GAAP are prepared on a historical cost basis with limited use of fair value (KPMG 
2010). That is, IFRS allows revaluation (up or down) of many items such as property, plant and 
equipment, financial instruments, intangibles, biological assets while U.S. GAAP does so in only 
a limited number of areas, including financial instruments and stock-based compensation.  
Ball (2006) argues that fair value accounting rule aim to incorporate more-timely 
information about economic gains and losses on securities, derivatives and other transactions into 
the financial statements. Also, fair value accounting attempts to incorporate more-timely 
information about contemporary economic losses (“impairments”) on long-term tangible and 
intangible assets. Thus, it seems that fair value accounting incorporates more information into 
financial statements. More information usually makes accounting numbers, e.g., earnings, more 
informative. In line with this argument, Barth et al. (2012) argue that fair value accounting 
reduces the possibility of discretionary earnings management, given that all gains and losses are 
immediately recognized.  
At the same time, fair value accounting comes with a large magnitude of flexibility in 
determining gains/losses. Dechow et al. (2010) provide evidence that managers use the discretion 
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afforded by fair-value accounting rules to manage the size of reported securitization gains. In 
particular, managers use the ambiguity allowed in discount rate choice to influence these gains. 
Also, Barth et al. (2012) also indicate that fair value accounting seems to enhance volatility of 
accounting numbers; hence, makes it hard it to predict and less informative as a result. In general, 
there are arguments supporting fair value accounting and there are arguments that oppose fair 
value accounting.  
Moreover, Linsmeier (2013) suggests firms likely rely on fair value accounting to 
different degrees because of the nature of their assets. In particular, he suggests that nonfinancial 
assets (PP&E and intangible assets) are less likely to be sold than financial assets. The reason is 
that it is more difficult to extract those assets to sell and they do not have a secondary market; 
hence, reporting of unrealized gains/losses on these nonfinancial assets in income is less likely to 
provide relevant information; unrealized gains/losses would merely reverse if the asset is held to 
the end of its useful life.  The takeaway of this argument is that firms have different demands for 
fair value accounting due to their different asset structures; thus, the impact of fair value 
accounting is not easy to predict even if fair value accounting has impact on accounting quality. 
As a result, the hypothesis is stated at the null form: 
H6: Earnings quality changes similarly for firms with intense use of fair value 
accounting and for firms with minimal use of fair value accounting after the adoption. 
 
2.4.2.4. R&D expenditures 
The debate whether to capitalize or expense internally generated intangible investments 
has generated mixed arguments. Lev et al. (2006) suggest that firms choose to expense internally 
generated intangible investments due to the conservatism principle. Specifically, conservative 
accounting counters managers’ prevalent optimism. Plus, conservative accounting is appropriate 
given the generally high level of uncertainty associated with the outcome of intangible 
investments.  
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However, there is a significant body of literature that documents the benefits of 
capitalizing over expensing intangible expenditures in providing more information to investors. 
Aboody and Lev (1998) study the relevance to investors of public information on software 
capitalization. They find that annually capitalized development costs are positively associated 
with stock returns. They also document the cumulative software asset reported on the balance 
sheet is associated with stock prices. Furthermore, software capitalization is associated with 
subsequent reported earnings. They do not find support for the view that the judgment involved in 
software capitalization decreases the quality of reported earnings. This finding weakens the 
argument that capitalization of R&D involves a significant amount of discretion; therefore, may 
deteriorate financial statement quality.  
In fact, Chamber, Jennings, and Thompson (2012) argue that substantial managerial 
discretion is likely to be a necessary (though not sufficient) ingredient of any alternative R&D 
accounting scheme that is capable of producing economically significant financial reporting 
benefits. In particular, they investigate the extent to which potential financial reporting benefits 
from capitalizing and amortizing R&D costs depend on increasing the level of discretion 
permitted to financial statement preparers. They examine the impact of alternative accounting 
schemes for R&D costs on the extent to which earnings and book values jointly explain the 
observed distribution of share prices. One alternative requires firms to capitalize and amortize 
R&D outlays, but provides them with no more discretion than that permitted under current rules. 
The other alternatives reflect increasing discretion over which R&D costs are recognized as assets 
and the periods over which these assets are amortized. They find that ability to explain the 
distribution of share prices increases with discretion.  
 In line with those arguments, Lev et al. (2005) capitalize R&D expenditures and derive 
adjusted equity book values and earnings using simple amortization techniques (straight line over 
assumed industry-specific useful lives). They find that such adjustments increase the association 
of book values/earnings with contemporaneous stock prices (and future earnings). They conclude 
43 
 
 
 
that capitalization and amortization of R&D provides information not fully reflected in stock 
prices.  
Similarly, Mohd (2005) find that information asymmetry is significantly lower for firms 
that capitalize (capitalizers) than for those who expense (expensers) software development. He 
finds that investors' uncertainty about the future benefits of software development costs is 
reduced when firms capitalize these costs. 
Therefore, given the mounting evidence as to the benefits of capitalization of R&D 
expenditures, the hypothesis is stated as follows: 
H7: Earnings quality declines to a lesser degree or improves to a greater degree for 
R&D intensive firms than it does for non-R&D intensive firms after the adoption.  
 
2.4.2.5. IFRS predominant industries 
I expect convergence benefits to be more pronounced in industries where many non- 
Canadian peer firms have already adopted IFRS (IFRS predominant industries). Widespread 
adoption of IFRS in a particular industry may be an indication that the benefits of adopting these 
standards are greater, resulting in a larger proportion of non-Canadian firms adopting IFRS. 
These benefits could be that IFRS is a set of accounting standards that fits those industries the 
most. In fact, IFRS are better developed for some industries than for others. As previously 
discussed, IFRS does not contain enough implementation guidance for some industries such as 
extractive, insurance, investment, etc. KPMG (2009-2010) report on IFRS in Canadian firms 
indicates that IRS represents change in the language of business at the transactional and reporting 
levels. Some industries have embedded this language completely in their operations. Firms in 
these industries can manage the impact of IFRS far better than do others with little experience and 
familiarity with the new rules. As a consequence, the latter firms would have more assessment 
noise as in Ndubizu and Sanchez (2007) sense. However, the direction of the impact of IFRS is 
ex-ante unclear. Therefore, the hypothesis is stated in the null form as follows: 
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H8: Earnings quality changes similarly for firms in IFRS predominant industries and for 
firms in non-IFRS predominant industries after the adoption. 
 
2.4.2.6. Negative earnings firms vs. Positive earnings firms 
Collins et al. (1999) find an anomalous significant negative price - earnings relations 
using the simple earnings capitalization model for U.S. firms that report losses. When Collins et 
al. (1999) augment the simple earnings capitalization model with book value of equity, the 
coefficient on earnings for loss firms becomes insignificant. This anomaly implies that negative 
earnings are not informative about future operating performance. It also suggests that negative 
earnings have different valuation properties from positive earnings measured using U.S. GAAP. 
Collins et al. (1999) find that the market relies on book value as a proxy for expected future 
normal earnings for loss firms in the US. Because profits and losses appear to have different 
valuation properties, the hypothesis is stated as follows: 
H9: Earnings quality changes differently for negative earnings firms and for positive 
earnings firms after the adoption. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1. Earnings quality proxies 
Earnings quality is a multi-dimensional concept (Francis et al. 2006 and Dechow et al. 
2010). The choice of an earnings quality proxy will depend on the research question posed and 
the availability of data and estimation models. In this paper, I attempt to use a wide range of 
earnings quality proxies commonly used in prior research in order to capture different aspects of 
earnings quality.  
Dichev et al. (2013) survey 169 CFOs of public companies and in-depth interviews of 12 
CFOs and two standard setters. They find that CFOs believe that, above all, high-quality earnings 
are sustainable and repeatable. Specific characteristics of high quality earnings include consistent 
reporting choices, backed by cash flows, and absence of one-time items and long-term estimates. 
Thus, the first group of earnings quality measures that I focus on is indicative of sustainable, 
repeatable, and backed-by-cash flows earnings. They are earnings persistence and predictability, 
cash flow predictability, accruals quality (the ability of accruals to map to cash flows), persistence 
of earnings components (accruals, change in cash flows, cash distribution to debt holders, and 
cash distribution to equity holders). 
The second group of earnings quality measures I examine in this paper captures the value 
relevance of earnings because it is a direct proxy for earnings quality (Holthausen and Verecchia 
1988, Liu and Thomas 2000). Following Dechow et al. (2010), I employ two measures of value 
relevance in this paper, i.e. adjusted R2 from the earnings-return model, and adjusted R2 from the 
earnings-price model. 
The last group of earnings quality measures includes earnings smoothness, conservatism, 
and timeliness. These measures are commonly used in prior research to proxy for earnings quality 
(Leuz et al. 2003; Basu 1997; Dechow et al. 2010). 
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3.1.1. Earnings sustainability 
Earnings persistence and predictability 
Earnings persistence is usually considered by accounting researchers, analysts, and 
standard-setters as a proxy for earnings quality for the following reason. If firm A has a more 
persistent earnings stream than firm B, in perpetuity, then (i), in firm A, current earnings is a 
more useful summary measure of future performance; and (ii) annuitizing current earnings in firm 
A will give smaller valuation errors than annuitizing current earnings in firm B. Thus, higher 
earnings persistence is of higher quality when the earnings measure is value relevant. Follow 
Dechow et al. (2010), I use a simple model specification to estimates earnings persistence: 
 ܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏ௜,௧ାଵ ൌ 	ߚ଴ ൅	ߚଵܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ (1)
where Earningsi,t is net income before extraordinary items of firm i in year t divided by total 
assets. A higher ߚଵ indicates a more persistent earnings stream while values close to zero reflect 
transitory earnings. The adjusted R2 from the regression is interpreted as earnings predictability. 
Large (small) values of predictability suggest more (less) predictable earnings.  
 
Persistence of earnings components  
Dechow et al. (2008) argue that the higher persistence of the cash component of earnings 
is entirely due to the subcomponent related to equity, i.e., cash distribution to equity holders. 
Following Dechow et al. (2008), I decompose earnings into several components: accruals, change 
in retained cash, cash distribution to debt holders, and cash distribution to equity holders.  
The Dechow et al. (2008) model starts with the balance sheet identity: 
 ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ	ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ ൌ 	ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ	ܮܾ݈݅ܽ݅݅ݐ݅݁ݏ ൅ ܱݓ݊݁ݎݏ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ (2)
They next distinguish operating assets and liabilities from financial assets and liabilities. 
The most common financial assets is the balance of cash and short-term investments (CASH) 
while the most common financial liability is debt (DEBT), giving us:  
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ܥܣܵܪ ൅ ܱ݌݁ݎܽݐ݅݊݃	ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ
ൌ 	ܦܧܤܶ ൅ ܱ݌݁ݎܽݐ݅݊݃ ܮܾ݈݅ܽ݅݅ݐ݅݁ݏ ൅ ܱݓ݊݁ݎݏ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ 
(3)
By rearranging terms and taking differences, Dechow et al. (2008) show the relationship 
between changes in net operating assets and changes in financing items as follows: 
 ∆ܱܰܣ ൌ ∆ܦܧܤܶ ൅ ∆ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ െ ∆ܥܣܵܪ (4)
The changes in net operating assets represent the accruals component of earnings for a 
given year.21 Assuming clean surplus and equal amounts of interest accruals and interest 
payments, the difference between income and accruals will equal the sum of the changes in 
retained cash, distribution to debt holders, and distribution to equity holders: 
 ܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏ െ ܣܿܿݎݑ݈ܽݏ ൌ ∆ܥܣܵܪ ൅ ܦܫܵܶ_ܦ ൅ ܦܫܵܶ_ܧܳ  (5)
The above relationship shows that free cash flows (Earnings-Accruals) can be retained as 
financial assets or distributed to debt or equity holders. Specifically, DIST_D, DIST_EQ, and 
ΔCASH refer to cash distributions to debt holders, cash distributions to equity holders, and change 
in retained cash, respectively. This relationship also shows that firms can choose either to retain 
part of the free cash flows (FCF) to increase financial assets (ΔCASH) or to distribute part of the 
free cash flows (DIST). 
Following Dechow et al. (2008), I first decompose earnings into accruals (which include 
long-term accruals) and free cash flows. I further decompose free cash flows into retained cash 
(ΔCASH), cash distribution to debt holders (DIST_D), and distribution to equity holders 
(DIST_EQ). Each component varies in its degree of susceptibility to measurement errors. Due to 
estimations, deferrals, allocations, and valuations related to accruals, managers‘ subjectivity is 
likely to play a significant role in the measurement of accruals (Richardson et al. 2005). Further, 
changes in retained cash are susceptible to window-dressing, as well as to the standard agency 
problem of free cash flows (Dechow et al., 2008; Hartford, 1999; Jensen, 1986). Therefore, 
                                                 
21 Change in net operating assets is a comprehensive measure of accruals which includes both working 
capital and long-term operating accruals. 
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accruals and change in retained cash are likely to be affected to a greater extent by measurement 
error in a given reporting period (pre-adoption or post-adoption). 
 
Cash flow predictability 
Investors tend to view performance measures that are useful in predicting future cash 
flows as being more desirable (FASB 2002; Barton et al. 2010). Consistent with this view, 
Dichev et al. (2013) suggest that earnings backed by cash flows is of higher quality. I estimate 
earnings’ ability to predict one-period-ahead cash flows as the adjusted R2 from the regression 
below: 
 ܥܨ ௜ܱ,௧ାଵ ൌ 	ߚ଴ ൅	ߚଵܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ (6)
where CFO is cash flow from operation and Earnings are net income. Both are scaled by 
contemporaneous total assets. 
Accrual Quality 
In this paper, I use the accrual quality measure proposed in Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
relating current accruals to past, current, and future cash flows from operations: 
 ܣܿܿݎݑ݈ܽݏ௜,௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܥܨ ௜ܱ,௧ାଵ ൅ ߚଶܥܨ ௜ܱ,௧ ൅ ߚଷܥܨ ௜ܱ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߝ௜,௧  (7)
where 
Accrualsi,t = firm i’s current accruals in year t. 
 = Total accruals, defined as the change in noncash assets less the change in 
nondebt liabilities 
CFOi,t = Cash flows from operations of firm i in year t over total assets. 
While accruals employed in Dechow and Dichew (2002) is the firm’s total current 
accruals measured as (ΔCurrent_Assets – ΔCurrent_Liabilities – ΔCash – 
ΔDebt_in_Current_Liabilities), where Δ represents change, I use total accruals because measures 
of working capital are not uniformly reported under both IFRS and U.S. GAAP (IASB 2008b).  
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Similar to Dechow and Dichev (2002), I define accrual quality as the standard deviation of the 
estimated residuals. For ease of interpretation, I multiply the result by negative one, so higher 
value of the standard deviation indicates higher accruals quality. 
 
3.1.2. Value relevance 
Following Barth et al. (2008), I construct my value relevance measures based on the 
explanatory power of regressions of stock price on equity book value and net income (price 
model), and stock return on net income and change in net income (return model). In addition, I 
use “per share” variables in the Ndubizu and Sanchez (2007) sense to control for scale effects.  
My first value relevance measure, Price is based on the explanatory from a regression of 
stock price, P, on net income before extraordinary items per share, EPS, and book value of equity 
per share, BVE. In particular, my first value relevance measure is the adjusted R2 from the below 
equation. 
 ௜ܲ,௧ ൌ 	ߚଵܧܲ ௜ܵ,௧ ൅ ߚଶܤܸܧ௜,௧ ൅ ɛ௜,௧  (8)
Following prior research, to ensure accounting information is in the public domain, P is 
stock price six months after fiscal year end (Lang et al. 2003, 2006; Barth et al. 2008).  
My second value relevance measure, Return, is the adjusted R2 from the below regression 
of annual stock return, Return, on net income and change in net income, deflated by total assets.  
 ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௧ ൌ 	ߚ଴ 	൅		ߚଵܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߚଶ∆ܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ɛ௜,௧  (9)
For both measures of value relevance, higher value of the adjusted R2 indicates that earnings is 
more value relevant.  
 
 
 
 
 
50 
 
 
 
3.1.3. Other earnings quality measures 
Earnings smoothness 
Following Leuz et al. (2003), I measure earnings smoothness using the ratio of the 
standard deviation of net income to the standard deviation of cash flows from operations, both 
scaled by contemporaneous total assets. For ease of interpretation, I multiply the result by 
negative one, so that increases in smoothness reflect decreases in the variation of net income 
compared to operating cash flows (i.e., “smoother” net income). Lang et al. (2006) suggest that 
this proxy partially controls for firm-specific factors related to the underlying volatility of the 
cash flow stream. 
Smooth earnings may be the product of earnings management, resulting in a loss of 
informativeness in reported earnings (Leuz et al. 2003). However, smoothness can also be viewed 
as a positive attribute of accounting numbers to the extent that it results from managers using 
their private information about future earnings to offset short-term fluctuations (Demski 1998; 
Tucker and Zarowin 2006). 
 
Conservatism and timeliness 
More conservative accounting is likely viewed by investors to be more credible because 
it is in consistent with managers’ incentives (Mercer 2004). Specifically, LaFond and Watts 
(2008) argue that conservatism makes accounting more informative by counteracting managers’ 
incentives to overstate earnings. On the other hand, Francis et al. (2004) suggest that 
conservatism introduces a bias into the accounting system and could therefore reduce the 
information content of financial statements. 
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Following Basu (1997), I measure conservatism as the asymmetric timeliness coefficient, 
ߚଷ, from the regression of net income on proxies for good and bad news:22 
 ܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏ௜,௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௧ ൅ ߚଶܰ݁݃ܽݐ݅ݒ݁௜,௧ ൅ ߚଷܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௧ ൈ
ܰ݁݃ܽݐ݅ݒ݁௜,௧ ൅ ɛ௜  
(10)
Where Earnings is net income scaled by contemporaneous total assets, Return is the 
unadjusted buy and hold return on the stock for the firm’s fiscal year, and Negative is an indicator 
equal to 1 if Return < 0, and 0 otherwise. The subscripts i and t denote firm and year. Larger 
values of ߚଷ indicate that net income capture bad news regarding the firm in a timelier manner.  
 Following Ball et al. (2000) and Barton et al. (2010), I measure Timeliness using the 
adjusted R2 from the above regression. Larger values of this measure reflect more timely 
information. In contrast to conservatism, which focuses on the speed with which bad news is 
recognized in the accounting system; timeliness measures the ability of the accounting system to 
reflect both good and bad news quickly. The timely reflection of economic events affecting the 
firm increases the relevance of accounting information, since information received after a 
decision is made is by definition not relevant. Further, Francis et al. (2004) argue that timeliness 
also increases the reliability of information.  
 
3.2. Research design 
3.2.1. Sample selection 
My sample includes active Canadian firms with fiscal year data beginning on or after 
January 1, 2011 in Compustat. I collect financial data and prices from Compustat North American 
                                                 
22 Basu (1997) also introduces an alternative model of conservatism that is not based on stock return as 
summaried in Dechow et al. (2010). 
 ∆ܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏ௜,௧ ൌ
ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܰ݁݃ܽݐ݅ݒ݁௜,௧ ൅ ߚଶ∆ܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଷܰ݁݃ܽݐ݅ݒ݁௜,௧ ൈ ∆ܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ɛ௜  
where ∆Earnings୧,୲ is the change in income from year t-1 to t, scaled by beginning book value of total 
assets, and Negative is an indicator variable equal to one if ∆Earnings୧,୲ିଵ is negative. If bad news is 
recognized on a more timely basis than good news, negative earnings changes will be less persistent and 
will tend to reverse more than positive earnings changes. This translates into a prediction that ߚଷ<0.  
52 
 
 
 
Annual. The initial sample includes 1,445 firms. I exclude companies that delay the IFRS 
adoption.23 Next, I exclude firms that are acquired, go bankrupt, or change their fiscal year end 
(which delays adoption until later in 2011). My final sample consists of 1,245 firms that had to 
choose between IFRS and U.S. GAAP. Of these 1245 firms, 77 adopted U.S. GAAP and 1168 
adopted IFRS. The sample period is from 2006 to 2013.24 While most firms adopt IFRS in the 
fiscal year on or after January 1, 2001, some firms adopt IFRS earlier. However, the early 
adopters constitute only a very small portion of the total sample.  
[insert Table 1 here] 
Table 1, Panel A through F, show the distribution of the full sample, the industry 
classification, the sample breakdown based on the adoption decisions (IFRS or U.S. GAAP) 
conditional on U.S. listing status and previous accounting standards, the sample breakdown based 
on adoption year, and firm-year observation breakdown based on fiscal year. Panel A shows the 
sample selection process. The initial sample includes 1,445 firms. I exclude 110 companies that 
delay the IFRS adoption. Next, I exclude 44 firms that change fiscal year end within two years of 
the adoption year. Firms that are formed within two years of the adoption year are also excluded. 
Finally, I delete 34 firms that are acquired, go bankrupt, or go private. My final sample consists 
of 1,245 firms that had to choose between IFRS and U.S. GAAP.  
Panel B describes the adoption of IFSR and U.S. GAAP conditional on U.S. listing status 
(in the year before the adoption year) and previous accounting standards (Canadian GAAP or 
U.S. GAAP). Of the total sample, 1035 domestic firms which previously reported under Canadian 
GAAP are required by the AsCB to begin reporting under IFRS in the first quarter of 2011 while 
210 cross-listed are allowed to choose between IFRS and U.S. GAAP.2526 47 out of these 210 
                                                 
23 The AcSB allowed investment companies, insurance companies, and rate-regulated entities to delay 
adoption of IFRS until fiscal years beginning on or after January 1, 2014 (2013 for rate-regulated entities). 
24 The sample period starts in 2006 because the AcSB announced on January 10, 2006 that Canada would 
adopt IFRS as of the fiscal year on or after January 01, 2011.  
25 Due to delayed International Accounting Standards Board (IASB)’s projects involving investment 
companies, insurance contracts, and accounting for rate-regulated entities, the AsSB allowed investment 
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firms that are registered with the SEC previously reported under U.S. GAAP. After January 01, 
2011, 44 of these companies continued to report under U.S. GAAP. Out of the remaining 163 
cross-listed firms that previously reported under Canadian GAAP, 31 firms voluntarily choose 
U.S. GAAP over IFRS perhaps because these firms differ in the perceived benefits and costs of 
their choice of accounting standards (Burnett et al. 2013). In particular, they find firms more 
likely to choose IFRS are larger, in the developmental stage, have more R&D expenditures, fewer 
U.S. operations or fewer U.S. shareholders. Further, the likelihood of IFRS adoption decreases if 
stockholders' equity under U.S. GAAP exceeds Canadian GAAP in the year before IFRS 
adoption. 
Panel C shows the industry classification (based on two-digit SIC codes) of the full 
sample. The sample is concentrated in mining industries (about 50%), manufacturing (20%). The 
rest is fairly and evenly distributed among transportation and utilities, services, agriculture, 
construction, finance, whole trade and retail trade, and public administration.  
Panel D shows the sample breakdown based on adoption year. Most firms adopt IFRS or 
U.S. GAAP in the fiscal year of 2011 and 2012, consistent with the fact that the AcSB requires 
Canadian firms to make their choice on the fiscal year that starts on or after January 01, 2011. 
Meanwhile, there are only 5 adopters in 2009 and 12 in 2010. Finally, the distribution of firm 
years is shown in Panel E. 
 
3.2.2. Benchmark sample 
To control for general economic trends unrelated to IFRS adoption, I compare changes in 
earnings quality for IFRS/U.S. GAAP adopters to changes in these measures for a benchmark 
                                                                                                                                                 
companies, insurance companies, and rate-regulated entities to delay IFRS adoption until fiscal years 
beginning on or after January 1, 2014 (2013 for re-regulated entities). 
26 Domestic firms are identified based on their filing status with the SEC the year before the adoption year. 
For example, a firm which adopts IFRS in fiscal year 2011 is a domestic firm if it is not cross-listed in the 
U.S. at the end of fiscal year 2010. If that firm is cross-listed in the U.S. at the end of fiscal year 2010, it is 
identified as a cross-listed firm. 
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sample from the U.S. which do not change accounting standards during my sample period. I 
select all U.S. firms with available data and in the same industries as my sample. I limit the 
benchmark sample to U.S. firms due to the similarities between the institutional factors in the 
U.S. and their counterparts in Canada. Because most Canadian firms switch accounting standards 
in the fiscal year on or after 2011, I define 2011 as the first year of the post-adoption period for 
the control sample depending on the firm’s fiscal year end.  
 
3.2.3. Difference-in-differences tests   
Following prior research (Lang, Raedy, and Yetman 2003; Leuz 2003; Lang, Raedy, and 
Wilson 2006; and Barth et al. 2008), I construct my earnings quality proxies based on cross-
sectional data. I interpret differences in various summary statistics (e.g., ratios, standard 
deviations, and regression adjusted R2 values) relating to the proxies between two samples of 
firms being compared as evidence of differences in earnings quality. This approach to comparing 
earnings quality measures for two groups of firms assumes that the measures within each group 
are drawn from the same distribution, and that the measures for firms in different groups are 
potentially drawn from different distributions. To the extent that firms within each group differ in 
earnings quality as captured by each earnings quality measure, the variance of the measure’s 
distributions will be larger, thereby making it difficult to detect significant differences in 
summary statistics between the groups.27 
To test whether earnings quality of one group changes after the adoption, I first estimate 
each earnings quality proxy cross-sectional for this group and the control group separately in the 
                                                 
27 An alternative approach, used in some prior research (Dechow 1994; Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki 2003) is 
to base comparisons on alternative measures constructed using a time series of firm-specific data. Data 
limitations (especially in the post-adoption period) preclude this approach because it requires a time series 
of observations for each firm that is not overlapping for the pre- and post-adoption periods. Even if this 
approach were feasible, it is unclear whether this approach would result in more reliable inferences because 
firm-specific measure would likely be based on a small number of observations, limiting the power and 
introducing estimation error. This approach also requires assuming the intertemporal stationarity of each 
measure. 
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pre-adoption and the post-adoption. I expect to see changes in each earnings quality measure for 
each treatment group but not or to a lesser extent for the control group. Control group firms are 
included to control for changes overtime that would affect all firms similarly from the pre- to the 
post-adoption period. I test for significance in the differences (the difference-in-differences) using 
a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (the difference-in-differences). For 
each test, I randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other 
type of firm, depending on the test. For example, when comparing Canadian GAAP firms and 
IFRS firms, I assign firm observations as either Canadian GAAP or IFRS firms. I then calculate 
the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms (the treatment group and 
the control group) in the proxy that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain the empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. 
Another advantage of this approach is that it can be used for all of the proxies, even those with 
unknown distributions (e.g., adjusted R2).  
With the exception of the tests for the persistence of earnings components, for which I 
test for significance of regression coefficients, I test for differences in each earnings quality 
measure (i.e., earnings persistence, earnings predictability, cash flow predictability, accruals 
quality, value relevance, earnings smoothness, and conservatism and timeliness) based on this 
difference-in-differences approach. For the test of the overall effects of IFRS adoption, I rely on 
the benchmark sample (i.e., the sample of U.S. firms) to run this difference-in-differences test. 
However, for subsample tests, I evaluate the effects of IFRS adoption using each firm as its own 
control whenever possible. I first compute the change for the treatment firms and for the control 
firms from before to after the regulatory change. Then, I compare the change in each earnings 
quality proxy for the treatment firms to the change in persistence of each earnings component for 
the control firms.  
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3.2.4. Cross-sectional test of persistence of earnings components 
In order to test the overall effects of IFRS adoption on the persistence of each earnings 
component, I interact each component of earnings with an indicator variable (POST), which takes 
a value of 1 if the observation is in the post-adoption period, and 0 otherwise. If the coefficients 
of the interaction terms are positive, then the persistence of earnings components improves 
following the adoption. On the other hand, if those coefficients are negative, then the persistence 
of earnings components declines in the post-adoption period. Specifically, I employ the following 
regression specifications in the test of overall effects of IFRS adoption: 
 ܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏ௧ାଵ ൌ ߚଵܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏ௧ ൅ ߚଶܱܲܵܶ ൅ ߚଷܱܲܵܶ ∗ ܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏ௧ ൅ ߝ௧ାଵ	 (11)
 
ܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏ௧ାଵ ൌ ߚଵܣܿܿݎݑ݈ܽݏ௧ ൅ ߚଶܨܥܨ௧ ൅ ߚଷܱܲܵܶ ൅ ߚସܱܲܵܶ ∗ ܣܿܿݎݑ݈ܽݏ௧
൅ ߚହܱܲܵܶ ∗ ܨܥܨ௧ ൅ ߝ௧ାଵ  
(12)
 
ܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏ௧ାଵ ൌ ߚଵܣܿܿݎݑ݈ܽݏ௧ ൅ ߚଶ∆ܥܣܵܪ௧ ൅ ߚଷܦܫܵ ௧ܶ ൅ ߚସܱܲܵܶ ൅ ߚହܱܲܵܶ
∗ ܣܿܿݎݑ݈ܽݏ௧ ൅ ߚ଺ܱܲܵܶ ∗ ∆ܥܣܵܪ௧ ൅ ߚ଻ܱܲܵܶ ∗ ܦܫܵ ௧ܶ ൅ ߝ௧ାଵ 
(13)
 
ܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏ௧ାଵ ൌ ߚଵܣܿܿݎݑ݈ܽݏ௧ ൅ ߚଶ∆ܥܣܵܪ௧ ൅ ߚଶܦܫܵܶ_ܦ௧ ൅ ߚଷܦܫܵܶ_ܧܳ௧
൅ ߚସܱܲܵܶ ൅ ߚହܱܲܵܶ ∗ ܣܿܿݎݑ݈ܽݏ௧ ൅ ߚ଺ܱܲܵܶ ∗ ∆ܥܣܵܪ௧
൅ ߚ଻ܱܲܵܶ ∗ ܦܫܵܶ_ܦ௧ ൅ ߚ଼ܱܲܵܶ ∗ ܦܫܵܶ_ܧܳ௧ ൅ ߝ௧ାଵ 
(14)
I compute earnings and its components from Compustat as follows (Compustat 
mnemonics are shown in parentheses): Accruals is change in non-cash assets less change in non-
debt liabilities deflated by total assets [(ΔAT- ΔCHE) - (ΔLT-ΔDLC-ΔDLTT)]; Earnings is 
income before extraordinary items deflated by total assets; Free Cash Flows (FCF) is income less 
total accruals; DIST is the net capital distribution to debt and equity holders, which includes 
distribution to debt holders and equity holders -1×[ΔDTC+ΔDLTT+(ΔAT-ΔLT-IB)]. DIST_D is 
the capital distribution to debt holders -1×(ΔDLC+ΔDLTT), and DIST_EQ is the net capital 
distribution to equity holders -1× (ΔAT-ΔLT-IB). All of the above variables are deflated by 
contemporaneous total assets. I winsorize each deflated component of earnings at 5% and 95% 
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levels to eliminate the influence of extreme outliers. All regressions include industry and year 
fixed effects to control for industry effects and year effects that may have clouded the results 
otherwise.  
For subsample analyses, I augment equation (14) by adding a set of interaction terms 
between each component of earnings with an indicator variable (TREATMENT), which takes a 
value of 1 if the observation is in the subsample of interest, 0 otherwise. Specifically, I employ 
the following regression. 
 
ܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏ௧ାଵ ൌ ߚଵܣܿܿݎݑ݈ܽݏ௧ ൅ ߚଶ∆ܥܣܵܪ௧ ൅ ߚଷܦܫܵܶ_ܦ௧ ൅ ߚସܦܫܵܶ_ܧܳ௧
൅ ߚହܱܲܵܶ ൅ ߚ଺ܱܲܵܶ ∗ ܣܿܿݎݑ݈ܽݏ௧ ൅ ߚ଻ܱܲܵܶ ∗ ∆ܥܣܵܪ௧
൅ ߚ଼ܱܲܵܶ ∗ ܦܫܵܶ_ܦ௧ ൅ ߚଽܱܲܵܶ ∗ ܦܫܵܶ_ܧܳ௧
൅ ߚଵ଴ܴܶܧܣܶܯܧܰܶ ൅ ߚଵଵܴܶܧܣܶܯܧܰܶ ∗ ܣܿܿݎݑ݈ܽݏ௧
൅ ߚଵଶܴܶܧܣܶܯܧܰܶ ∗ ∆ܥܣܵܪ௧ ൅ ߚଵଷܴܶܧܣܶܯܧܰܶ ∗ ܦܫܵܶ_ܦ௧
൅ ߚଵସܴܶܧܣܶܯܧܰܶ ∗ ܦܫܵܶ_ܧܳ௧ ൅ ߝ௧ାଵ 
(15)
 For example, when I evaluate the effects of IFRS on the persistence of earnings 
components for firms in the extractive industries, TREATMENT will take a value 1 for firms in 
the extractive industries, 0 otherwise.  In addition, when I test the effects of IFRS adoption on one 
component of earnings (e.g., accruals), I test the significance of ߚ଺, ߚଵଵ, and the sum of ߚ଺ and 
ߚଵଵ, respectively. 
 
3.2.5. Subsample Analyses  
Prior studies document that reporting incentives play a significant role in shaping 
reporting outcomes. Daske et al. (2013) attempt to classify firms with incentives for transparent 
reporting as “serious adopters” and firms without such incentives as “label adopters” using three 
proxies, reporting incentives (based on firm characteristics), reporting behaviors, and reporting 
environments. In this paper, I classify firms into either “serious adopters” or “label adopters” 
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using the methodology proposed and employed by Daske et al. (2013). In particular, I construct 
three main proxies to partition the IFRS firms into “serious” and “label adopters”.  
“Serious adopters” are firms that experience substantial increases in their reporting 
incentives around the adoption year. These firms are likely to make major improvements to their 
reporting strategy. In contrast, there could be firms that adopt IFRS without material changes or 
even decreases in reporting incentives.  They are classified as “label adopters”. Since reporting 
incentives are unobservable, I create three distinct proxies for the underlying construct: two focus 
on the determinants of firms’ incentives (and hence are input-based); one relies on firms’ actual 
reporting behavior as a result of firms’ incentives (and hence is output-based).  
The first partitioning variable, reporting incentives, reflects observable firm 
characteristics. Economic theory suggests that larger, more profitable firms with greater financing 
needs and growth opportunities, and more international operations have stronger incentives for 
transparent reporting to outside investors. I measure the Reporting Incentives variable as the first 
and primary factor (out of three that are retained) when applying factor analysis to the following 
five firm attributes: firm size (natural log of the US$ market value), financial leverage (total 
liabilities over total assets), profitability (return on assets), growth opportunities (book-to-market 
ratio), and internationalization (foreign sales over total sales). The factor exhibits all the expected 
loadings (i.e., increasing in size, leverage, profitability, growth, and foreign sales).  
The second partitioning variable, reporting behavior, relies on a simple accrual-based 
characterization of actual reporting. Sloan (1996), Xie (2001), Dechow et al. (2008) or Bradshaw, 
Richardson, and Sloan (2001) show that the decomposition of earnings into accruals and 
operating cash flow as well as extreme accruals contain important information. Furthermore, the 
ratio of accruals to cash flows has been shown to produce plausible earnings management 
rankings for firms around the world (Leuz et al. 2003; Wysocki 2009). Following Leuz et al. 
(2003), I compute the Reporting Behavior variable as the ratio of the absolute value of accruals to 
the absolute value of cash flows (multiplied by –1 so that higher values indicate more transparent 
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reporting). Scaling by the operating cash flow serves as a performance adjustment (Kothari, 
Leone, and Wasley 2005). I estimate accruals as the difference between net income before 
extraordinary items and the cash flow from operations or, if unavailable, compute them following 
the balance sheet approach in Dechow et al. (2008).   
The idea behind the third partitioning variable, reporting environment, is to capture 
external changes affecting firms’ reporting incentives, such as the scrutiny by analysts and 
financial markets. Lang and Lundholm (1996) show that analyst coverage is related to more 
transparent reporting. Evidence in Lang, Lins, and Miller (2003) and Yu (2008) suggests a 
monitoring role of financial analysts, for instance, in curbing earnings management. I compute 
the Reporting Environment variable as the natural log of the number of analysts following the 
firm (plus one). For firms without coverage in I/B/E/S I set analyst following to zero. A nice 
feature of this variable is that it does not rely on accounting information, and is free of 
mechanical accounting effects that likely occur around the switch to a new set of accounting 
standards.  
Next, to reduce measurement errors and allow for the possibility that incentives change 
slowly over time, I compute the rolling average (over the years t, t − 1, t − 2, relative to the year t 
of IFRS adoption) for each reporting variable. Higher values indicate stronger incentives for 
transparent reporting. Then, I compute changes in the reporting variables around IFRS adoption 
by subtracting the rolling average in year t − 1 (computed over the years t − 3 to t − 1) from the 
rolling average in year t + 2 (computed over the years t   to t + 2 or t + 1 depending on the number 
of years of data available in the post-adoption period). I then use the distribution of the changes 
around IFRS adoption (with each firm represented once) to classify firms with above median 
changes as “serious adopters” and with below median changes as “label adopters”. 
As discussed in section 2.3.2, I also study the effects of IFRS adoption in several other 
subsamples based on industries. I first identify industries using their SIC codes. In particular, 
extractive industries are those with two-digit SIC codes of 13 or 29 (Hand 2003) whereas 
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insurance industries are those with two-digit SIC codes of 63 or 64 (Fama and French 1997). 
High-litigation-risk industries are those with SIC codes in 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, 
5200-5961, 7371-7379, or 8731-8734 (Kasznik and Lev 1995; Matsumoto  2002; and Field et al. 
2005). 
Furthermore, to identify firms with intense use of fair value assets, I break down the 
sample into quintiles based on the amount of fair value assets (scaled by contemporaneous total 
assets) in three years before the adoption year. Firms in the top quintile are those with intense use 
of fair value accounting while those in the bottom quintile are with those with minimal use of fair 
value accounting.  
Similarly, I partition the sample into R&D intensive firms and non-R&D intensive firms 
using the same methodology. Particularly, I also break down the sample into quintiles based on 
the amount of R&D expenditures (scaled by contemporaneous total assets) in three years before 
the adoption year. Firms in the top quintile are R&D intensive firms while those in the bottom 
quintile are non-R&D intensive firms.  
Next, I identify industries in which the IFRS adoption is expected to result in convergent 
benefits. These industries have able to integrate IFRS into the transactional levels (KPMG 2009-
2010). Thus, I expect these benefits to be most pronounced in industries where a majority of firms 
apply IFRS. To assess this, I look at accounting standards that are applied by peer firms in the 
same industry on a worldwide basis. I use the Global Vantage database to determine the 
accounting standards used by peers. Global industry peers are selected from Global Vantage by 
ranking firms on market capitalization in two-digit SIC groups. For the 30 largest firms in each 
industry group, I determine the statistical mode of the accounting standards and classify an 
industry as ‘‘IFRS-predominant’’ if IFRS is the most commonly used standard among these 30 
firms.  
Finally, prior studies have documented that losses and profits likely have different 
valuation properties. In fact, several papers report that the value relevance shifts from earnings to 
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book values in the presence of losses (Collins et al., 1997, 1999), with book value being more 
value relevant than earnings for loss firms. This implies that negative earnings are not informative 
about future operating performance. Similarly, Ndubizu and Sanchez (2007) find that U.S. GAAP 
is more timely, conservative, and informative about the expected future normal earnings for loss 
firms than IAS, earlier version of IFRS, in emerging countries. Hence, I evaluate negative 
earnings firms and positive earnings firms separately in this paper.   
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CHAPTER 4: EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 2 contains univariate statistics for firm characteristics and components 
of earnings. Similar to the distribution in Dechow et al. (2008), the mean and median for accruals 
and for change in retained cash are positive whereas the mean and median for DIST_D and 
DIST_EQ negative. This suggests that firms increased their assets through both retention of 
earnings (Accruals and ΔCASH), and issuance of equity (DIST_EQ). However, the median 
amount of debt raised from debt holders is zero. Panel B of Table 2 shows a similar pattern in the 
pre-adoption period. In the post adoption period, while the pattern holds for Accruals, DIST_D, 
DIST_EQ, the mean and the median of retained cash (ΔCASH) are negative, suggesting that 
more firms might experience cash flow problems, consistent with the fact that earnings seems to 
decline in the post-adoption period as shown in Panel B of Table 2. Similarly, ROA also declines 
throughout the sample period.  
[insert Table 2 here] 
 Panel B also shows that firms seem to get slightly larger overtime. Total assets of firms 
seem to be larger after the adoption than before the adoption. The market capitalization of the 
sample does not seem to change significantly. This difference could be resulted from the heavier 
use fair value assets after the adoption. Meanwhile, there seems to be more analysts following 
firms after the adoption than before the adoption, a more information indicator of more quality 
after IFRS adoption. Also, few firms seem to have foreign operations throughout my sample 
period.  
 Panel C of Table 3 shows Spearman (Pearson) correlation coefficients above (below) the 
diagonal line. Accruals are strongly negatively associated with cash distributions to debt holders 
(DIST_D) (coefficient of -0.32) and, to a greater extent, to cash distributions to equity holders 
(DIST_EQ) (coefficient of -0.39). This pattern happens both in the pre-adoption period (Panel D) 
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and in the post-adoption period. Such associations are slightly different from the findings from 
Dechow et al. (2008). They find that while accruals are significantly and negatively associated 
with cash distributions, the association is driven more by distribution to debt holders (DIST_D) 
than it is by distribution to equity holds (DIST_EQ). However, the associations between earnings 
and its components (Accruals, ΔCASH, DIST_EQ, and DIST_D) are consistent with Dechow et 
al. (2008). Specifically, earnings is positively and significantly associated with accruals, and to a 
greater degree with DIST_EQ. In addition, stock price (P) and Return are positively and 
significantly associated with earnings but to a greater extent in the post-adoption period than in 
the pre-adoption period, suggesting an improvement in value relevance. Other notable 
associations include the positive correlation coefficients between BIG4 and log(Total Assets) and 
log(Market Value), suggesting larger firms are more likely to retain big 4 auditors.   
 
4.2. Overall effects of IFRS adoption on earnings quality 
To test the overall effects of the IFRS adoption on earnings quality, I run three separate 
analyses. First, I attempt to examine whether earnings quality of all Canadian sample firms 
improves following the adoption to assess the average effects of the adoption. Second, I analyze 
earnings quality of Canadian firms that switch from Canadian GAAP to IFRS in an attempt to 
isolate the effects of IFRS from those of U.S. GAAP because some Canadian firms switch from 
Canadian GAAP to U.S. GAAP. Third, I strive to directly compare earnings quality under IFRS 
to that under U.S GAAP using only post-adoption firm-year observations. The purpose of the 
third analysis is two-fold. On one hand, it aims to again isolate the effects of U.S. GAAP from 
those of IFRS. On the other hand, this analysis relies on each firm before the adoption being its 
own control firm, therefore, partially control for firm characteristics and pre-adoption differences. 
[insert Table 3 here] 
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The results of the first analysis are reported in Table 3. These results address hypothesis 
one. Panel A and Panel B of Table 3 describe the results on earnings sustainability.28 Panel C 
shows results on value relevance of earnings whereas Panel D exhibits the results on other 
earnings quality proxies (earnings smoothness, conservatism, and timeliness). Panel A suggests 
that accruals quality decline after the adoption but the change is not significant. Other earnings 
quality measures in Panel A do not vary significant following the adoption. Simultaneously, 
Panel B shows that the coefficients of POSTxAccruals and POSTXDIST_D are positive and 
significant at the 1% level, suggesting that earnings persistence, on average, improves after the 
adoption. Meanwhile, the coefficients of POSTxΔCASH and POSTxDIST_EQ are not 
significant; suggesting that the improvement in earnings persistence is driven mostly by 
improvements in the persistence of retained cash and the persistence of cash distribution to debt 
holders (DIST_D). Dechow et al. (2008) suggest that firms are likely to pay off debts with 
transitory free cash flow because cash flow distribution to equity holders has more signaling 
value than does cash distribution to debt holders. The authors also indicate that firms are more 
likely to finance persistent losses through issuing equity than borrowing because debt holds are 
less likely to lend to firms with sustained losses. The finding that IFRS improves cash 
distributions to debt holders indicates the likely positive effects of IFRS on transitory free cash 
flows. They suggest that perhaps more principles-based accounting standards are not necessarily 
harmful to accounting standards. In addition, the tightened version of IFRS seems to benefit 
firms. 
In addition, earnings seem to be more value relevant in the post-adoption period (Panel 
C); however, only the Price metric is significant. Other measures of earnings quality do not seem 
to change significantly (Panel D). Taken all together, the findings seem to suggest that earnings 
quality improves slightly following the IFRS adoption, particularly in the persistence of accruals, 
                                                 
28 Earnings sustainability refers to two characteristics of earnings, repeatable and backed by cash flows. 
Measures that reflect earnings sustainability include earnings persistence, earnings predictability, cash flow 
predictability and persistence of earnings components. 
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the persistence of cash distribution to debt holders (DIST_D), and value relevance. The 
improvement in earnings quality could perhaps occur because IFRS is a set of principles-based 
accounting standards relative to domestic standards, i.e., Canadian GAAP. It could also happen 
because the IASB has tightened IFRS overtime and the current version of IFRS seems to be 
beneficial. 
[insert Table 4 here] 
The results of the second analysis are presented in Table 4. These results attempt to tease 
out the effects of IFRS from those of U.S. GAAP because some firms opted to U.S. GAAP rather 
than IFRS. In terms of earnings sustainability, Panel A indicates no significant change in earnings 
persistence, earnings predictability, cash flow predictability, and accruals quality. However, Panel 
B suggests that the persistence of accruals and cash distribution to debt holders (DIST_D) 
increase significantly after the adoption. In particular, the coefficient of Accruals increases from 
0.4827 (significant at the 1% level) before the adoption to 0.6368 (the sum of the coefficients of 
Accruals and POSTxAccruals) (also significant at the 1% level). The coefficient of DIST_D 
increases from 0.4666 before the adoption to 0.8285 (sum of the coefficients of DIST_D and 
POSTxDIST_D) after the adoption and both are significant at the 1% level. The findings in Panel 
A and B are consistent with those in Panel A and B of Table 3. They seem to indicate that 
earnings quality, on average, improves in the post-adoption period. Specifically, the improvement 
in earnings quality following the adoption is driven by the group of IFRS adopters. The results 
here lend additional support to the arguments that IFRS as a more principles-based and more 
tightened set of accounting standards is beneficial.  
Concurrently, Panel C reveals that value relevance of earnings does not change 
significantly following the adoption while Panel D indicates that earning quality after the 
adoption also seems to be more timely. In particular, timeliness for the treatment firms increases 
after the adoption while the same measure for control firms does not change after the adoption. 
The finding about improved timeliness in the post-adoption period seems to provide more 
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credibility to the likelihood that IFRS is a better set of accounting standards than Canadian 
GAAP.  
[insert Table 5 here] 
Table 5 describes the results of the third analysis. This analysis, as previously discussed, 
is intended to, again, further isolate the effects of U.S. GAAP from those of IFRS due to the fact 
that some firms adopted U.S. GAAP instead of IFRS. The analysis seeks to strengthen findings 
found in Table 3 and 4. Panel A shows that, in the pre-adoption period, earnings persistence and 
cash flow predictability of Canadian firms adopting U.S. GAAP are significantly higher than 
earnings persistence and cash flow predictability of those adopting IFRS. In contrast, the trend 
reverses in the post-adoption period, i.e., earnings persistence and cash flow predictability are 
significantly higher for IFRS adopters than for U.S. GAAP adopters. These findings suggest that 
earnings persistence and predictability for Canadian firms adopting IFRS improve significantly 
relative to Canadian firms adopting U.S. GAAP. These results are consistent with findings from 
Table 3 and 4 that earnings quality improves following the adoption and the improvement is 
likely driven by the group of firms that adopted IFRS.  
Panel B shows that the coefficient of IFRSxAccruals is positive and significant at the 1% 
level, suggesting that earnings persistence improves after the adoption and that such improvement 
is driven mostly by the improvement in the persistence of accruals. However, the coefficients of 
IFRSxΔCASH, IFRSxDIST_D, and IFRSxDIST_EQ are positive but not significant.  
Panel C and D display value relevance and other earnings quality proxies before and after 
the adoption. The results in Panel C indicate that earnings under IFRS is more value relevant than 
earnings under U.S. GAAP. Both Price and Return metrics for firms adopting IFRS are higher 
when compared to firms adopting U.S. GAAP. The differences as well as the difference-in-
differences are significantly at the 1% level. Similarly, Panel D shows that timeliness of IFRS 
earnings seems to be higher relative to timeliness of U.S. GAAP earnings. The difference and the 
difference-in-differences are significant at the 1% level. Thus, the results in this table suggest that 
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IFRS adoption is associated with an improvement in earnings quality for IFRS adopters relative 
to earnings quality for U.S. GAAP adopters. Finally, this finding is consistent across the majority 
of earnings quality proxies. 
In sum, the findings in Table 3, 4, and 5 demonstrate that the IFRS adoption is associated 
with an improvement in earnings quality for Canadian sample firms. The improvement is more 
noticeable for sustainable and repeatable measures of earnings quality. Dichev et al. (2013) 
suggest that these metrics are identified by executives as the most important characteristics of 
earnings. The board members surveyed in the paper also share similar views. The analyses on 
value relevance show that investors believe that IFRS is some context provides more value 
relevant information when compared to Canadian GAAP or U.S. GAAP.  
 
4.3. Differential effects of IFRS adoption 
4.3.1. Serious adopters vs. Label adopters 
Prior research has documented the significance of reporting incentives (e.g. Ball et al. 
2000; Ball and Shivakumar 2006; Burgstahler et al. 2006; Hail et al. 2010a; Ahmed et al. 2012; 
Hansen et al. 2013, Daske et al. 2013) in shaping reporting outcomes. Therefore, I attempt to 
examine how the IFRS adoption interacts with firms’ reporting incentives in determining 
reporting quality. Following Daske et al. (2013), I classify firms as “serious adopters” if they 
have stronger incentives to report more transparently and as “label adopters” if they are less 
committed to transparent reporting. In particular, I partition the sample into “serious adopters” 
and “label adopters” using three measures (“reporting incentives”, “reporting behaviors”, and 
“reporting environment”) developed by Daske at el. (2013) and perform two analyses (difference-
in-differences and cross-sectional tests) for the “serious adopters” group with the “label adopters” 
being the control group. The results using reporting incentives as a partitioning variable are 
reported in Table 6 while those using reporting behaviors and reporting environments are 
reporting in Table 7 and 8, respectively.  
68 
 
 
 
[insert Table 6 here] 
 Table 6 presents the results of tests on “serious adopters” with “label adopters” as a 
control sample using “reporting incentives” as a partitioning variable. Panel A and B describe the 
results of earnings sustainability. Panel A indicates some differences between the two groups, 
“serious adopters” and “label adopters”, but the difference-in-differences are not significant 
across all measures (earnings persistence, earnings predictability, cash flow predictability, and 
accruals quality).  
Simultaneously, Panel B suggests that persistence of accruals (accruals) improves after 
the adoption for “label adopters” but not for “serious adopters”. In particular, the coefficient of 
POSTxAccruals is 0.1550 (significant at the 1% level); but the coefficient of SERIOUS 
ADOPTERS xAccruals is -0.1347 (significant at the 1% level). The sum of these two coefficients 
is not significantly different from zero, suggesting that the persistence of accruals does not 
change for “serious adopters” following the adoption. Meanwhile, the results indicate that the 
persistence of cash distribution to debt holders (DIST_D) improves for both “serious adopters” 
and “label adopters” following the adoption. Specifically, the coefficients of POSTxDIST_D and 
SERIOUS ADOPTERSxDIST_D are 0.3631 and -0.1941 and are significant at the 1% level and 
at the 5% level, respectively. The sum of these two coefficients is significantly different from 
zero at the 1% level, suggesting that the improvement is more robust for “label adopters”. 
 The results in Panel C reveal that there is no statistically significant difference in value 
relevance between the two groups, suggesting the effects of IFRS adoption on value relevance are 
similar for “serious adopters” and “label adopters”.  
Panel D demonstrates that timeliness improves for “label adopters” whereas it does not 
change significantly for “serious adopters”. The difference-in-differences is significant at the 1% 
level. However, there is no statistically significant difference in earnings smoothness and 
conservatism between the two groups.  
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 Taken all together, the results in Table 6 show that earnings quality improves for “label 
adopters” following the adoption but not for “serious adopters”. The results seem to support the 
second hypothesis that earnings quality changes more for “label adopters” relative to “serious 
adopters”. The likely reason is that “serious adopters”, firms with stronger incentives for 
transparency, are less affected by accounting standards whereas “label adopters”, firms with 
weaker incentives for transparency, are more likely to be affected by accounting standards.  
[insert Table 7 here] 
Table 7 shows the results of analyses on “serious adopters” with “label adopters” as a 
control sample using “reporting behaviors” as a partitioning variable. Similar to Panel A in Table 
6, Panel A in this table depicts some minor differences between the two groups, “serious 
adopters” and “label adopters”, but the difference-in-differences are not significant across 
measures (earnings persistence, earnings predictability, cash flow predictability, and accruals 
quality). 
Nevertheless, Panel B reveals that the coefficients of POSTxDIST_D and SERIOUS 
ADOPTERSxDIST_D are significant at the 1% level and the 5% level, respectively. However, 
the coefficient of SERIOUS ADOPTERSxDISD_D is negative while the coefficient of 
POST_DIST_D is positive. Further, the sum of the two coefficients is greater than zero and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. These results suggest that whereas persistence of cash 
distribution to debt holders improves after the adoption for both “serious adopters” and “label 
adopters", the improvement is stronger for “label adopters”. 
The results in Panel C demonstrate that value relevance (the Price metric) drops slightly 
for “serious adopters” but improves for “label adopters” after the adoption. The difference-in-
differences is significant at the 1% level even though the changes are not statistically significant. 
Simultaneously, Panel D show that timeliness and conservatism improve for “label adopters” and 
“serious adopters” overtime but the change is only statistically significantly for “label adopters”. 
Earnings smoothness does not seem to differ significantly between the two groups.  
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Taken all together, the results in this table, similar to those in Table 6, seem to support 
hypothesis two that earnings quality improves more for “label adopters” relative to “serious 
adopters”. The implication of these results is that “serious adopters” are less likely to be affected 
by accounting standards than are “label adopters”. The IFRS adoption seems to benefit “label 
adopters” more than it does to “serious adopters”. 
[insert Table 8 here] 
Table 8 shows the results of analyses on “serious adopters” with “label adopters” as a 
control sample using “reporting environment” as a partitioning variable. Unlike the two previous 
tables, this table shows significant differences in earnings persistence, earnings predictability, 
cash flow predictability, and accruals quality (Panel A). Particularly, earnings persistence and 
earnings predictability significantly improve for “label adopters” but not for “serious adopters”. 
Similarly, accruals quality significantly declines for “serious adopters” after the adoption but it 
only slightly improves for “label adopters”. However, cash flow predictability significantly 
improves for “serious adopters” but slight drops for “label adopters” even though the drop is not 
statistically significant.  These results suggest that earnings quality seems to improve more for 
“label adopters” relative to “serious adopters” following the adoption. 
The results in Panel B reveal that the coefficients of POSTxΔCASH (0.0920) and 
SERIOUS ADOPTERSxΔCASH (-0.1136) are statistically significant at the 10% level and the 
5% level, respectively. Furthermore, the sum of the two coefficients (POSTxΔCASH + 
SERIOUS ADOPTERSxΔCASH) is not statistically different from zero. This finding suggests 
that the persistence of cash distribution to debt holders improves for “label adopters” in the post 
adoption period but not for “serious adopters”. Also, the results do not suggest significant 
improvement on persistence of other earnings components. The finding in Panel A and B indicate 
that earnings sustainability improves more for “label adopters” when compared to “serious 
adopters”. 
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Panel C indicates some improvements in value relevance (the Price metric) for both 
“serious adopters” and “label adopters” following the adoption. While the improvements are 
statistically significant at the 1% level, the difference-in-differences is not significant. Similarly, 
Panel D suggests some improvement in timelines for “serious adopters” as well as “label 
adopters”. The improvements are significant, but the difference-in-differences is not significant. 
The results in Panel C and D suggest that both groups of firms experience similar change in value 
relevance and timeliness following the adoption.  
The findings in Table 8, consistent with those from Table 6 and 7, support the second 
hypothesis that earnings quality improves more for “label adopters” in the post-adoption period 
relative to “serious adopters”. The results are particularly strong for persistence of earnings 
components.  
Taken all together, the findings in Table 6, 7, and 8 suggest that firms with stronger 
incentives for transparency, i.e., “serious adopters”, are less likely to be affected by accounting 
standards relative to firms with weaker incentives for transparency, i.e., “label adopters”. In 
particular, firms with strong incentives for transparency are likely to provide high quality 
accounting information regardless of accounting standards. On the other hand, firms with weak 
incentives for transparency are likely to be limited by accounting standards. A superior set of 
accounting standards is likely to limit those firms’ ability to provide low quality accounting 
information. The findings are robust with different classifications of reporting incentives, 
including firm characteristics-based incentives, reporting behaviors, and reporting environment.29  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29 I also use alternative measures of reporting environment, Big 4 auditors, to partition the sample into 
“serious adopters”, i.e., those with Big 4 auditors, and “label adopters”, i.e., those with non-big 4 auditors 
and run the analyses again. The results are similar. 
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4.3.2. Extractive industries, insurance industries, and high-litigation-risk industries 
[insert Table 9 here] 
Table 9 describes the results of analyses when partitioning the sample into firms in 
extractive industries and firms in non-extractive industries. Panel A and B present the results of 
earnings sustainability. The results in Panel A suggest that earnings persistence improves 
(significant at the 5% level) for non-extractive firms in the post-adoption period relative to 
extractive firms. Meanwhile, earnings predictability significantly declines for extractive firms but 
not for non-extractive firms. The difference-in-differences is significant at the 10% level. Also, 
accruals quality declines for extractive firms following the adoption relative to non-extractive 
firms. Panel B presents the results of the persistence of earning components. The coefficient of 
POSTxAccruals (0.1534) is positive and significant at the 1% level but the coefficient of 
EXTRACTIVExAccruals (-0.1499) is negative and significant at the 1% level. The sum of the 
two coefficients is positive and significantly different from zero at the 1% level. The results 
suggest that while the persistence of accruals improves, on average, in the post-adoption period, it 
improves to a lesser degree for extractive firms relative to non-extractive firms. The coefficients 
of EXTRACTIVExΔCASH, EXTRACTIVExDIST_D, and EXTRACTIVExDIST_EQ are not 
significant. 
 The results in Panel A and B suggest that, on average, earnings sustainability improves to 
a lesser degree for extractive firms following the adoption when compared to non-extractive 
firms. Dichev et al. (2013) documents that earnings sustainability is the most frequently 
mentioned phrase that reflects high quality earnings by executives. Therefore, the findings that 
the IFRS adoption improves earnings sustainability less for extractive firms relative to non-
extractive firms underscore the concern by the SEC and FASB about the lack of implementation 
guidance in extractive industries by pointing the likely negative effects of IFRS adoption on one 
the most important aspects of earnings quality. These findings seem to support hypothesis three 
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that earnings quality improves to a lesser degree for extractive firms relative to non-extractive 
firms. 
Simultaneously, Panel C does not indicate significant changes in value relevance between 
extractive firms and non-extractive firms throughout the sample period. However, Panel D 
indicates that earnings smoothness improves for non-extractive firms following the adoption 
while it slightly deteriorates for extractive firms. Nevertheless, the difference-in-differences is not 
significant. Meanwhile, timeliness improves to a greater degree for non-extractive firms relative 
to extractive firms in the post-adoption period. Panel D also suggests that conservatism improves 
to a greater degree for extractive firms than it does for non-extractive firms in the post-adoption 
period. However, the change is statistically significant for the extractive group, but not for the 
non-extractive group. Despite the result for conservatism, these findings in Panel D suggest that 
earnings quality of extractive firms decline more after the adoption relative to non-extractive 
firms. They, in turn, reiterate the concern by the SEC and the FASB about the lack of 
implementation guidance in extractive industries. 
Taken together, the results in Table 9 support hypothesis three. Depending upon the 
measures of earnings quality, earnings quality either improves less for extractive firms relative to 
non-extractive firms or declines more for extractive firms in comparison to non-extractive firms. 
The findings lend support to the concern by the SEC and the FASB about the lack of 
implementation guidance in extractive industries if the U.S. adopts IFRS. 
[insert Table 10 here] 
Table 10 shows the results of analyses for firms in insurance industries and those in non-
insurance industries. Panel A depicts that earnings persistence, earnings predictability, and 
accruals quality seem to improve slightly for insurance firms following the adoption relative to 
non-insurance firms. The differences for all three measures are significant at the 1% level but the 
difference-in-differences is only significantly (at the 1% level) for earnings persistence. In 
addition, Panel B indicates that there is no difference between the persistence of earnings 
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components for insurance firms and that for non-insurance firms throughout the sample period. 
The coefficients of interaction terms between INSURANCE and earnings components are all 
negative but not significant. The results in these panels suggest that earnings sustainability 
improves for insurance firms but not non-insurance. These findings do not support hypothesis 
four that earnings quality decreases more (or improve less) for firms in insurance industries 
relative to firms in non-insurance industries; thereby weakening the concern by the SEC and the 
FASB about the lack of implementation guidance in these industries. 
However, Panel C suggests that value relevance of earnings (both Price and Return 
metrics) declines for firms in insurance industries following the adoption in comparison to firms 
in non-insurance industries. These results do not support hypothesis four. Simultaneously, Panel 
D indicates that firms in insurance industries observe greater improvement in earnings 
smoothness and conservatism relative to firms in non-insurance industries. Nonetheless, firms in 
insurance industries observe a decline in timeliness in the post-adoption period while their 
counterparts in non-insurance industries see a slight improvement. These results offer a mixed 
picture as to the effects of IFRS adoption on other measures of earnings quality. In particular, the 
results on earnings smoothness and conservatism seem to support hypothesis four while those on 
timelines do not.  
To summarize, the IFRS adoption seems to bring about mixed changes in earnings 
quality to firms in insurance industries relative to those in non-insurance industries.  Some results 
(value relevance, earnings smoothness, and conservatism) support hypothesis four, which, in turn, 
lends support to the concern by the SEC and the FASB about the lack of implementation 
guidance in these industries. However, other results (earnings sustainability, timeliness) do not 
support hypothesis four; therefore, weaken the concern by the SEC and the FASB. These results, 
however, suggest that the effects of IFRS adoption are not uniform across measures of earnings 
quality.  
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The mixed results as to the effects of IFRS adoption on insurance industries are perhaps 
because of (1) the selection bias related to insurance firms that adopted IFRS and/or (2) the 
concern by the SEC and the FASB about the lack of implementation guidance in insurance 
industries being unwarranted. Even though most Canadian firms were required to adopt IFRS in 
the fiscal year on or after January 1, 2011, insurance firms are allowed to delay the adoption for 
another two years. Despite that, some firms still opted to adopting early. Amed et al. (2013) 
suggest that selection bias may exist around voluntary adoptions and that perhaps explains the 
mixed results of analyses on insurance firms. In addition, it is also possible that the lack of 
implementation guidance in insurance industries is not an issue and that firms in those industries 
are not greatly affected by such lack of implementation guidance. It is not possible at this moment 
to decide which reason prevails due to data limitation. Researchers and standard setters, therefore, 
should interpret findings as to insurance industries cautiously.  
[insert Table 11 here] 
Table 11 describes the results of analyses on firms in high-litigation-industries with firms 
in low-litigation-risk industries being a control sample. Panel A and B present the results of 
earnings sustainability proxies. Panel A reveals that firms in high-litigation-risk industries have 
lower accruals quality (significant at the 1% level) in the post-adoption period while those in low-
litigation-risk industries have a slightly improved (but not statistically significant) accruals 
quality. Results on other measures (earnings persistence, earning predictability, and cash flow 
predictability) are not statistically significant. Panel B presents the results of the persistence of 
earning components. The coefficient of POSTxAccruals (0.1587) is positive and significant at the 
1% level while that of HI_LITxAccruals (-0.2379) is negative and significant at the 1% level. The 
sum of these two coefficients is negative and significantly different from zero at the 1% level. 
Similarly, the coefficient of POSTxDIST_D (0.3574) is positive and significant at the 1% level 
but that of HI_LITxDIST_D (-0.2981) is negative and significant at the 1% level. The sum of 
these two coefficients is positive and significantly different from zero at the 1% level. The results 
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demonstrate that the persistence of accruals declines after the adoption for high-litigation-risk 
firms but it improves for low-litigation-risk firms. Meanwhile, the persistence of cash distribution 
to debt holders (DIST_D) improves to a lesser degree for high-litigation-risk firms following the 
adoption relative to firms in low-litigation-risk industries. These findings in Panel A and B 
support the notion that earnings quality declines to a greater degree in the post-adoption period 
for high-litigation-risk firms in comparison to low-litigation-risk firms; therefore, support 
hypothesis five. Hence, the IFRS adoption perhaps negatively effects earnings quality of high-
litigation-risk firms more than it does to low-litigation-risk firms. Such effects occur perhaps 
because firms perhaps choose overly conservative accounting methods due to the high litigation 
risk associated with the lack of implementation guidance. 
The results from Panel C and D also support hypothesis five, similar to those in Panel A 
and B. In particular, Panel C and D present that value relevance (the Return proxy) and timeliness 
decline for high-litigation-risk firms relative to low-litigation-risk firms. The results on other 
measures of earnings quality are not significant.  
Taken all together, Table 11 documents that earnings quality decline more for firms in 
high-litigation-risk industries when compared to firms in low-litigation-risk industries. These 
results support hypothesis five. Again, these findings are perhaps resulted from the overly 
conservative accounting methods chosen by firms facing high litigation risk that is associated 
with the lack of implementation guidance.  
 
4.3.3. Firms with intense use of fair value accounting 
Table 12 shows the results of analyses on firms with heavy use of fair value accounting 
(fair-value-accounting firms) using a group of firms with minimal use of fair value accounting 
(non-fair-value-accounting firms) as a control sample. To identify firms with heavy use of fair 
value accounting, I divide the sample of IFRS adopters that previously reported under Canadian 
GAAP into five quintiles based on the average amount of fair value assets (scaled by 
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contemporaneous total assets) in three years before the adoption. Firms with intense use of fair 
value accounting are those in the top quintile and firms with minimal use of fair value accounting 
are those in the bottom quintile.  
[insert Table 12 here] 
The results in Panel A indicate that accruals quality declines for non-fair-value-
accounting firms relative to fair-value-accounting firms. Results on earnings 
persistence/predictability, and cash flow predictability do not indicate significant differences 
between the two groups. In sum, Panel A suggests that earnings quality declines slightly more for 
non-fair-value-accounting firms relative to fair-value-accounting firms. 
Concurrently, Panel B demonstrates that the coefficient of POSTxAccruals (0.2755) is 
positive and significant at the 1% level. Also, the coefficient of FAIRVALUExAccruals (-0.2348) 
is negative and significant at the 1% level. The sum of these two coefficients is negative and 
significantly different from zero at the 1% level. In addition, the coefficient of POSTxDIST_D 
(0.6217) is positive and significant at the 1% level but that of FAIRVALUExDIST_D (-0.2981) is 
negative and significant at the 1% level. Additionally, the F-test reveals that the sum of these two 
coefficients is positive and significantly different from 0 at the 1% level. These findings indicate 
that the persistence of accruals improves more for non-fair-value-accounting firms following the 
adoption relative to fair-value-accounting firms. The same holds for the persistence of cash 
distribution to debt holders (DIST_D). The results in this panel suggest that earnings quality 
declines more for fair-value-accounting firms when compared to non-fair-value-accounting firms. 
Panel C reveals that value relevance (both Price and Return metrics) decrease in the post-
adoption period for fair-value-accounting firms in relation to non-fair-value-accounting firms. 
The difference and the difference-in-differences are significant at the 1% and 5% levels, 
respectively. Meanwhile, Panel D shows that conservatism and timeliness for fair-value-
accounting firms improves less in the post-adoption period relative to non-fair-value-accounting 
firms. The findings in these two panels suggest that earnings quality improves more for firms 
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with minimal use of fair value accounting in comparison to firms with heavy use of fair value 
accounting. 
Taken all together, the results in this table lend support to the idea that fair value 
accounting is harmful to accounting quality. In particular, even though there is evidence that 
suggests earnings quality (i.e., accounting quality) decline more for non-fair-value-accounting 
firms relative to fair-value-accounting firms, the evidence that demonstrates the opposite is 
overwhelming. Thus, the degree to which fair value accounting is allowed under IFRS is perhaps 
not beneficial in terms of earnings quality. 
 
4.3.4. R&D intensive firms  
Table 13 shows the results of analyses on R&D intensive firms with non-R&D intensive 
firms being a control sample. To identify R&D intensive firms, I divide the sample of IFRS 
adopters that previously reported under Canadian GAAP into five quintiles based on the average 
amount of R&D expenditures (scaled by contemporaneous total assets) in three years before the 
adoption. R&D intensive firms are those in the top quintile and non-R&D intensive firms are 
those in the bottom quintile. 
[insert Table 13 here] 
Panel A reveals that earnings predictability slightly improves (but not statistically 
significant) for R&D intensive firms relative to non-R&D intensive firms. The difference-in-
differences is significant at the 1% level. Similarly, accruals quality improves for R&D intensive 
firms but decreases for non-R&D intensive firms. However, the difference-in-differences is not 
significant. Earnings persistence and cash flow predictability do not change significantly 
following the adoption. In general, the results in this panel indicate that R&D intensive firms see 
slight improvement in earnings quality following the adoption while non-R&D intensive firms 
see a decline in earnings quality.  
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Panel B indicates that R&D intensive firms and non-R&D intensive firms are quite 
similar both before and after the adoption in terms of persistence of earnings components 
throughout the sample period.  
The results in Panel C suggest some changes in value relevance. The Price proxy 
decreases more for the non-R&D intensive group relative to the R&D intensive group. The 
difference-in-differences is significant at the 5% level. On the other hand, the Return proxy 
declines for R&D intensive firms in comparison to the non-R&D intensive group. However, the 
difference-in-differences is not significant. These results provide weak evidence that value 
relevance of R&D intensive firms improve more when compared to non-R&D intensive firms. 
The results in Panel D demonstrate that earnings smoothness improves for R&D intensive 
firms following the adoption but not for non-R&D intensive firms. The differences and the 
difference-in-differences are significant at the 1% level. Similarly, timeliness improves 
significantly (at 1% level) for R&D intensive firms. Non-R&D intensive firms also see a slight 
improvement in timeliness but the change is not statistically significant. Additionally, the 
difference-in-differences is not significant. These results suggest that earnings quality improve 
slightly for R&D intensive firms in the post-adoption period relative to non-R&D intensive firms.  
In summary, the results in this table support hypothesis seven, providing weak evidence 
that R&D intensive firms experience some improvements in earnings quality after the adoption in 
comparison to non-R&D intensive firms. The findings are consistent with prior studies (e.g., 
Aboody and Lev 1998; Chamber, Jennings, and Thompson 2012; Lev et al. 2006; and Mohd 
2005) that capitalization of R&D results in more informative earnings. Thus, the fact that IFRS 
allows the capitalization of internally generated intangible expenditures (e.g., R&D expenditures) 
seems to enhance earnings quality following the adoption. 
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4.3.5. IFRS predominant industries 
Table 14 describes the results of the analyses on industries that are expected to provide 
convergence benefits with firms in other industries as a control group. I expect these convergence 
benefits to be most pronounced in industries where a majority of firms apply IFRS. KPMG 
(2009) suggests that those industries are likely to adopt IFRS at the transactional level due to the 
widespread adoption of IFRS.  
To assess the widespread adoption of IFRS, I look at accounting standards that are 
applied by peer firms in the same industry on a worldwide basis. I use the Global Vantage 
database to determine the accounting standards used by peers. Global industry peers are selected 
from Global Vantage by ranking firms on market capitalization in two-digit SIC groups. For the 
30 largest firms in each industry group, I determine the statistical mode of the accounting 
standards and classify an industry as ‘‘IFRS-predominant’’ if IFRS is the most commonly used 
standard among these 30 firms. 
[insert Table 14 here] 
Panel A and B describe the sustainability aspect of earnings quality. In general, there are 
no significant differences in this aspect between firms in IFRS-predominant industries (IFRS-
predominant firms) and their counterparts in other industries (non-IFRS-predominant firms).  
Panel C shows that value relevance (the Price proxy) significantly improve for IFRS-
predominant firms following the adoption relative to non-IFRS-predominant firms. Also, the 
difference-in-differences is significantly at the 1% level. However, there is no significant 
difference in the Return proxy between the two groups before or after the adoption.  
The results in Panel D suggest that timeliness improves more for non IFRS-predominant 
firms in the post-adoption period relative to IFRS-predominant firms. However, earnings 
smoothness and conservatism do not change significantly between those two groups of firms. 
The results in this table are somewhat mixed and, therefore, do not support hypothesis 
eight. In particular, firms in industries with IFRS being the most common set of accounting 
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standards do not see significant change in the majority of earnings quality proxies with two 
exceptions: an improvement in value relevance (the Price metric) but a decline in timeliness. In 
short, the results in this table provide evidence suggesting that the widespread adoption of IFRS, 
i.e., perhaps the adoption of IFRS at the transactional level, does not necessarily result in an 
improvement in earnings quality. 
 
4.3.6. Negative earnings firms 
Since negative earnings and positive earnings have different valuation properties (Collins 
et al. 1999; Ndubizu and Sanchez 2007), I examine negative earnings firms and positive earnings 
firms separately to shed light on whether IFRS adoption affects those firms differently. 
[insert Table 15 here] 
Table 15 describes the results of the analyses for negative earnings firms and positive 
earnings firms. Panel A and Panel B show the results for earnings sustainability proxies. Panel A 
reveals that earnings persistence and accruals quality improve significantly for positive earnings 
firms but not for negative earnings firms. However, earnings predictability decreases for positive 
earnings firms relative to negative earnings firms. The difference-in-differences is also significant 
at the 1% level. Panel B depicts that the interaction terms between the persistence of all earnings 
components (accruals, retained cash, cash distribution to debt holders, and cash distribution to 
equity holders) and LOSS are positive and significant at the 1% level. However, only the 
interaction terms between persistence of accruals/cash distribution to debt holders and POST are 
positive and statistically significant (at the 1% level). Therefore, the results suggest that 
persistence of accruals (accruals) and persistence of cash distributions to debt improve more for 
negative earnings firms in the post-adoption period relative to positive earnings firms.  
At the same time, a quick look at Panel C suggests that value relevance (the Price metric) 
increases more for negative earnings firms in comparison to positive earnings firms in the post-
adoption period. The difference-in-differences is significant at the 1% level.  Lastly, Panel D 
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suggests that timeliness stays the same for negative earnings firms while declining for positive 
earnings firms in the post-adoption period. Plus, the difference-in-differences is significant at the 
1% level.  
In short, it seems like the IFRS adoption is associated with a greater improvement in 
earnings quality of loss firms than it does with earnings quality of profitable firms. 
 
4.4. Sensitivity analyses 
In this section, I test the sensitivity of my results to various measures of reporting 
incentives. I employ the same method used in three previous partitioning variables, i.e., reporting 
incentives, reporting behaviors, and reporting environment. First, I partition the sample into 
“serious adopters” and “label adopters” using each component of reporting incentives. Second, I 
partition the sample in “serious adopters” and “label adopters” using big 4 accounting firms and 
U.S. filing status as partitioning variables. In particular, I classify firms being audited by big 4 
accounting firms as “serious adopters” and the rest as “label adopters”. In addition, I classify 
firms cross-listed in the U.S. as “serious adopters” and domestic firms as “label adopters”.  
[insert Table 16 through 22 here] 
In general, I find that persistence of earnings components (Accruals and DIST_D) 
improves more for “label adopters” in the post-adoption period relative to “serious adopters”. 
However, the results as to other earnings measures are somewhat mixed. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper examines the effects of mandatory adoption of International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) in Canada on January 01, 2011 on earnings quality of Canadian 
firms.  In particular, this paper investigates whether earnings quality of Canadian firms 
deteriorates or improves after the IFRS adoption controlling for changes in macro-economic 
factors as well as firm characteristics.  
I analyze the effects IFRS adoption on three aspects of earnings quality, the sustainability 
of earnings (proxied by earnings persistence, earnings predictability, persistence of earnings 
components, cash flow predictability, and accruals quality), value relevance, and other common 
measures of earnings quality (earnings smoothness, conservatism, and timeliness).   
I find that earnings quality of Canadian firms, on average, improves following the 
adoption and the improvements are mostly driven not by U.S. adopters but by IFRS adopters, 
suggesting that IFRS has a positive impact on earnings quality. Partitioning the sample, I find that 
firms with incentives to transparent reporting have stable earnings quality throughout the sample 
period whereas firms without such incentives show an improvement in earnings quality following 
the adoption. I also find that earnings quality declines to a greater degree for firms in 
extractive/high-litigation-risk industries than it does for firms in non-extractive/low-litigation-risk 
industries. However, the results firms in insurance industries are somewhat mixed. They tend to 
support the point that the effects of IFRS are not uniform across all measures of earnings quality. 
Further analyses reveal that (1) earnings quality seems to deteriorate for firms with 
intense reliance on fair value accounting after the adoption but not for firms with minimal 
reliance on fair value accounting, that (2) R&D intensive firms see some weak improvements in 
earnings quality while non-R&D intensive firms see minimal changes in earnings quality in the 
post-adoption period, and that (3) IFRS adoption is associated with a greater improvement in 
earnings quality for loss firms than for profitable firms.  
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In conclusion, the findings suggest that standard setters and researchers should probably 
not consider the effects of IFRS in isolation of firms' reporting incentives and that the SEC and 
that the FASB's concerns about the lack of implementation guidance in extractive and high-
litigation-risk industries are warranted. 
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Table 1: Sample 
 
This table describes the sample selection process and the sample distribution used in this study. Panel A 
shows the sample selection process. Panels B through E show the breakdown of the final sample into the 
following subsamples: U.S. GAAP adoptions vs. IFRS adoptions conditional on U.S. cross-listing status 
(Panel B), industry classification (Panel C), adoption year (Panel D), and firm-year observations (Panel E). 
 
Panel A: Sample Selection 
 
Canadian firms in Compustat after the required adoption date (January 01, 2011) 1445
Less: 
Delayed adoption* 110
Change of fiscal year end within two years of the adoption year 44
Formed within two years of the adoption year 12
Bankrupt, went private, merged/acquired 34
Firms that must choose U.S. GAAP or IFRS 1245
Of the firms that must adopt U.S. GAAP or IFRS: 
U.S. GAAP 77
IFRS 1168
  1245
 
 
Panel B: Adoption of IFRS or US GAAP Conditional on US Listing Status and Previous 
Accounting Standard 
 
Accounting Standard 
Adopted 
Listed in US prior to 
adoption year 
Previous Accounting 
Standard U.S. GAAP IFRS Total 
No Canadian GAAP 0 1035 1035 U.S. GAAP 0 0 0 
Subtotal 0 1035 1035 
Yes Canadian GAAP 33 130 163 U.S. GAAP 44 3 47 
Subtotal 77 133 210 
Total 77 1168 1245 
 
* Rate-regulated entities are allowed to defer the adoption decision until fiscal year beginning on or after 
January 01, 2014.  
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Panel C: Industry Classification  
 
Industry Classification (Two digit SIC code) Total 
Mining (10-14) 641 
Manufacturing (20-39) 240 
Transportation and Utilities (40-49) 71 
Services (70-89) 89 
Others 204 
Total 1245 
 
"Others" consists of Agriculture (01-09), Construction (15-17), Finance (60-67), and Wholesale trade and Retail trade 
(50-59), and Public Administration (91-99). 
 
Panel D: Adoption by year 
 
Adoption year Firms 
2009 5 
2010 12 
2011 965 
2012 259 
Total  1245 
 
 
Panel E: Distribution of firm year observations for the full sample 
 
 
Year # of firm-year observations %
2006 940 11.71%
2007 1013 12.62%
2008 1072 13.65%
2009 1159 14.44%
2010 1243 15.59%
2011 1245 15.51%
2012 1183 14.74%
2013 172 2.14%
Total 8027 100%
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics and correlations (Spearman above the diagonal line and Pearson the diagonal 
line). Variables are defined as follows. Earnings: Income before extraordinary items; Accruals: change in net operating 
assets; FCF: free cash flows; DIST: distributions to debt and equity holders; DIST_D: distributions to debt holders; 
DIST_EQ: distribution to equity holders; RETURN: annual buy-and-hold stock return calculated starting 9 months 
before fiscal year end through 3  months after the fiscal year end; Log(MV): log of end of year market value of equity; 
LEV: Total liabilities divided by total assets; ROA: return on assets; BM: book value of equity divided by market value 
of equity, and % of foreign sale: percentage of foreign sales; BIG4: 1 for firms audited by big 4 accounting firms 
(PwC, Deloitte, KPMG, and E&Y), Analyst Coverage: number of analysts that cover firms during each fiscal year. All 
variables are winsorized at the 5% and 95% level.  
  
Accruals, FCF, ΔCASH, DIST, DIST_D and DIST_EQ (all scaled by total assets) are calculated as follows: 
 
Accruals  Change in noncash assets less change in non-debt liabilities.  
FCF  Income minus total accruals.  
DIST  Change in stockholders‘ equity + change in short-term and long term debt  
ΔCASH  Change in the balance of cash and short-term investments.  
DIST_D  Change in short term and long-term debt. Net distribution to debt holders.  
DIST_EQ Change in owners‘ equity including income. Net capital distribution to equity holders. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for all firm year observations combined 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev.
Lower 
Quartile Median 
Upper 
Quartile
Log(total assets) 8000 4.4865 2.4164 2.7810 4.3079 6.1890 
Earnings 7567 -0.1424 0.3173 -0.1878 -0.0280 0.0444 
ΔEarnings 6324 -0.0108 0.2165 -0.0657 -0.0004 0.0580 
Accruals 7555 0.0640 0.2514 -0.0488 0.0420 0.1872 
FCF 7551 -0.2061 0.3424 -0.3469 -0.1022 0.0265 
ΔCASH 7557 0.0120 0.1825 -0.0586 0.0001 0.0517 
DIST 7562 -0.2280 0.4105 -0.3240 -0.0615 0.0180 
DIST_D 7569 -0.0200 0.0899 -0.0324 0.0000 0.0045 
DIST_EQ 7563 -0.2030 0.3797 -0.2628 -0.0332 0.0107 
Log(market value) 7658 1.3512 0.6023 1.0348 1.4759 1.8008 
BM 7655 0.8434 0.7478 0.3154 0.6387 1.1367 
LEV 7997 0.3881 0.3072 0.1215 0.3311 0.5889 
ROA 7973 -0.1792 0.4061 -0.1878 -0.0313 0.0401 
% of foreign sales 8027 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Analysts Coverage 8027 2.5277 3.9255 0.0000 0.0000 4.0000 
BIG4 8027 0.6771 0.4676 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
EPS 7918 0.2651 0.7895 -0.0969 -0.0179 0.3070 
BVE 7964 3.8720 5.8656 0.1631 0.8650 5.3111 
P 7472 6.9140 10.9044 0.2800 1.4300 8.4500 
Return 7394 0.0438 0.6240 -0.4211 -0.0655 0.3310 
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Panel B: Descriptive statistics for observations pre and post-adoption periods. 
 
 Pre-adoption Post-adoption 
t-test z-test Variable N Mean Std. Dev.  Median  N Mean Std. Dev.  Median  
Log(total assets) 5633 4.4473 2.3846 4.2411 2367 4.5796 2.4885 4.5160 -2.1981** 2.3610** 
Earnings 5212 -0.1347 0.3093 -0.0258 2355 -0.1594 0.3336 -0.0357 3.0496*** -2.1969** 
ΔEarnings 4045 -0.0046 0.2135 0.0004 2279 -0.0218 0.2212 -0.0028 3.0114*** -2.5001** 
Accruals 5199 0.0790 0.2481 0.0515 2356 0.0308 0.2555 0.0244 7.6703*** -6.9138*** 
FCF 5198 -0.2148 0.3482 -0.1047 2353 -0.1868 0.3283 -0.0963 -3.3740*** 2.3343** 
ΔCASH 5200 0.0262 0.1881 0.0004 2357 -0.0195 0.1653 -0.0054 10.6601*** -10.0900*** 
DIST 5208 -0.2532 0.4287 -0.0723 2354 -0.1723 0.3610 -0.0393 -8.5036*** 6.5745*** 
DIST_D 5212 -0.0178 0.0892 0.0000 2357 -0.0248 0.0914 0.0000 3.0732*** -4.0169*** 
DIST_EQ 5208 -0.2298 0.3995 -0.0440 2355 -0.1438 0.3239 -0.0175 -9.9170*** 8.6300*** 
Log(market value) 5356 1.3639 0.5842 1.4776 2302 1.3215 0.6414 1.4683 2.7244*** -1.3691 
BM 5353 0.8055 0.7291 0.6010 2302 0.9315 0.7828 0.7526 -6.5911*** 7.2115*** 
LEV 5630 0.3802 0.3024 0.3195 2367 0.4069 0.3177 0.3567 -3.4823*** 3.0310*** 
ROA 5609 -0.1662 0.3884 -0.0302 2364 -0.2100 0.4437 -0.0338 4.1735*** -1.7438* 
% of foreign sales 5660 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 2367 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.5015 5.4765*** 
Analysts Coverage 5660 2.3283 3.8383 0.0000 2367 3.0046 4.0882 1.0000 -6.8804*** 8.0368*** 
BIG4 5660 0.6724 0.4694 1.0000 2367 0.6882 0.4633 1.0000 -1.3856 1.3782 
EPS 5570 0.2618 0.7818 -0.0190 2348 0.2730 0.8078 -0.0160 -0.5703 0.9447 
BVE 5603 3.8360 5.7468 0.8930 2361 3.9575 6.1390 0.8044 -0.8219 -2.7150*** 
P 5350 7.0806 10.8861 1.6300 2122 6.4940 10.9417 0.9100 2.0927** -8.7150*** 
Return 5177 0.1240 0.6617 0.0001 2217 -0.1435 0.4758 -0.2250 19.5803*** -15.6055*** 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels
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Panel C: Pairwise correlations (Spearman above diagonal line/Person below) for all observations combined 
 
Variable 
Log(Total 
Assets) Earnings 
ΔEarning
s Accruals ΔCASH DIST_D 
DIST_E
Q 
Log(Marke
t 
Value) BM BIG4 P Return 
Log(Total 
assets)  0.56*** 0.03** 0.12*** 0.12*** -0.09*** 0.35*** 0.88*** 0.24*** 0.53*** 0.79*** 0.16*** 
Earnings 0.57*** 0.31*** 0.22*** 0.18*** 0.05*** 0.45*** 0.49*** 0.15*** 0.3*** 0.59*** 0.28*** 
ΔEarnings 0.07*** 0.40*** 0.22*** 0.18*** 0.10*** -0.06*** 0.05*** -0.02 0.00 0.04*** 0.19*** 
Accruals 0.14*** 0.31*** 0.30*** 0.02** -0.32*** -0.39*** 0.19*** -0.03*** -0.01 0.13*** 0.07*** 
ΔCASH 0.05*** 0.11*** 0.21*** 0.07*** 0.03*** -0.25*** 0.19*** -0.11*** 0.04*** 0.19*** 0.27*** 
DIST_D -0.07*** 0.08*** 0.10*** -0.31*** 0.01 0.02 -0.07*** 0.03*** -0.02 -0.06*** 0.07*** 
DIST_EQ 0.36*** 0.49*** -0.03** -0.33*** -0.46*** 0.01 0.20*** 0.22*** 0.24*** 0.31*** 0.04*** 
Log(Marke
t value) 0.84*** 0.45*** 0.08*** 0.23*** 0.16*** -0.05*** 0.13***  -0.09*** 0.48*** 0.86*** 0.29*** 
BM 0.14*** 0.22*** 0.01 -0.04*** -0.13*** 0.07*** 0.25*** -0.17*** 0.09*** -0.05*** -0.23*** 
BIG4 0.51*** 0.28*** 0.02* 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.24*** 0.47*** 0.03** 0.45*** 0.10*** 
P 0.70*** 0.35*** 0.03** 0.05*** 0.03*** -0.05*** 0.25*** 0.60*** -0.13*** 0.33*** 0.38*** 
Return 0.06*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.08*** 0.25*** 0.07*** -0.06*** 0.20*** -0.25*** 0.04*** 0.15*** 
      ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels
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Panel D: Pairwise correlations (Spearman above diagonal line/Person below) for pre-adoption period 
 
Variable 
Log(Total 
Assets) Earnings ΔEarnings Accruals ΔCASH DIST_D DIST_EQ 
Log(Market 
Value) BM BIG4 P Return 
Log(Total 
assets)  0.54*** 0.01 0.06*** 0.07*** -0.08*** 0.38*** 0.87*** 0.26*** 0.52*** 0.79*** 0.08*** 
Earnings 0.55*** 0.27*** 0.16*** 0.13*** 0.05*** 0.50*** 0.47*** 0.16*** 0.29*** 0.58*** 0.20*** 
ΔEarnings 0.04*** 0.37*** 0.2*** 0.19*** 0.12*** -0.07*** 0.04** -0.05*** -0.01 0.01 0.19*** 
Accruals 0.08*** 0.25*** 0.27*** 0.03** -0.33*** -0.40*** 0.14*** -0.06*** -0.06*** 0.09*** 0.03** 
ΔCASH 0.010.65 0.07*** 0.21*** 0.09*** 0.05*** -0.28*** 0.16*** -0.14*** 0.01 0.14*** 0.25*** 
DIST_D -0.06*** 0.08*** 0.12*** -0.33*** 0.03** 0.02 -0.06*** 0.03** -0.01 -0.06*** 0.09*** 
DIST_EQ 0.37*** 0.51*** -0.05*** -0.36*** -0.50*** 0.01 0.20*** 0.25*** 0.26*** 0.35*** 0.01 
Log(Market 
value) 0.83*** 0.42*** 0.07*** 0.18*** 0.14*** -0.03** 0.12***  -0.09*** 0.46*** 0.86*** 0.23*** 
BM 0.15*** 0.19*** -0.04** -0.05*** -0.16*** 0.05*** 0.25*** -0.17*** 0.11*** -0.03** -0.25*** 
BIG4 0.51*** 0.27*** 0.01 -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.02 0.25*** 0.45*** 0.05*** 0.44*** 0.04*** 
P 0.72*** 0.35*** 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.03** 0.27*** 0.61*** -0.12*** 0.33*** 0.27*** 
Return 0.01 0.12*** 0.17*** 0.04*** 0.23*** 0.09*** -0.07*** 0.15*** -0.26*** 0.10 0.09*** 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels
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Panel E: Pairwise correlations (Spearman above diagonal line/Person below) for post-adoption period 
 
Variable 
Log(Total 
Assets) Earnings ΔEarnings Accruals ΔCASH DIST_D DIST_EQ 
Log(Market 
Value) BM BIG4 P Return 
Log(Total 
assets) 
 0.6*** 0.07*** 0.25*** 0.24*** -0.11*** 0.29*** 0.91*** 0.19*** 0.53*** 0.81*** 0.37*** 
Earnings 0.61***  0.38*** 0.34*** 0.28*** 0.05** 0.37*** 0.54*** 0.16*** 0.33*** 0.61*** 0.48*** 
ΔEarnings 0.12*** 0.46***  0.25*** 0.17*** 0.06*** -0.04* 0.07*** 0.04* 0.02 0.08*** 0.17*** 
Accruals 0.27*** 0.42*** 0.33***  -0.01 -0.31*** -0.34*** 0.28*** 0.04* 0.09*** 0.21*** 0.13*** 
ΔCASH 0.16*** 0.19*** 0.19*** -0.01  -0.03* -0.14*** 0.24*** -0.02 0.11*** 0.26*** 0.28*** 
DIST_D -0.08*** 0.08*** 0.06*** -0.29*** -0.05***  0.03 -0.10*** 0.04** -0.03 -0.08*** 0.01 
DIST_EQ 0.33*** 0.49*** 0.02 -0.23*** -0.30*** 0.01  0.20*** 0.13*** 0.19*** 0.28*** 0.14*** 
Log(Market 
value) 
0.86*** 0.49*** 0.10*** 0.32*** 0.19*** -0.08*** 0.16***  -0.08*** 0.53*** 0.87*** 0.43*** 
BM 0.12*** 0.27*** 0.05** 0.01*** -0.04* 0.10*** 0.24*** -0.15***  0.04* -0.06*** -0.13*** 
BIG4 0.53*** 0.32*** 0.04* 0.11*** 0.06*** -0.01 0.21*** 0.53*** -0.03  0.48*** 0.25*** 
P 0.67*** 0.34*** 0.06*** 0.13*** 0.10*** -0.08*** 0.21*** 0.57*** -0.13*** 0.31***  0.58*** 
Return 0.26*** 0.29*** 0.16*** 0.14*** 0.22*** -0.02 0.05** 0.32*** -0.18*** 0.19*** 0.34***  
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels 
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Table 3: Tests of Earnings Quality for Canadian Firms for Pre- and Post-Adoption Periods 
 
Panel A: Difference-in-differences tests for earnings sustainability 
 
 All Canadian firms  Control firms 
  Difference -in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) Measures of Earnings sustainability  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Earnings persistence  0.6879 0.7690 ? 0.0811  0.7919 0.7902 -0.0017  ? 0.0828 
     (-0.23)    (1.14)   (-0.56) 
Earnings predictability  0.4551 0.5042 ? 0.0490  0.6613 0.7044 0.0431  ? 0.0059 
     (-0.27)    (1.26)   (1.26) 
Cash flow predictability  0.5029 0.4881 ? -0.0149  0.5884 0.6193 0.0309  ? -0.0458 
    (-0.95)    (-1.00)   (-0.49) 
Accruals quality  -0.2300 -0.2658 ? -0.0358   -0.1558 -0.1019 0.0539  ? -0.0818** 
    (1.31)    (-0.52)   (2.04) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values are 
indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests for earnings sustainability for all Canadian firms and a control group of U.S. firms before and after the adoption. Pre-
adoption period includes firm-year observations from 2006 to the year before the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations starting on the 
adoption year onward. For most firms, the adoption year is the fiscal year starting on or after January 01, 2011.  
  
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, two a two-tailed 
test. 
 
Earnings persistence is the coefficient of earnings from the persistence regression (Earningst+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt). 
Earnings predictability is the adjusted R2 from the persistence regression (Earningst+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt).  
Cash flow predictability is the adjusted R2 from the regression of future cash flow from operation against current earnings (before extraordinary items) (CFOt+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt). 
Accruals Quality is the standard deviation of the residuals from the regression of accruals on future year, current year, and previous year’s cash flows from operations 
multiplied by -1 (Accrualst = β0 + β1CFOt-1 + β2CFOt + β3CFOt+1 + εt). 
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Panel B: Cross-sectional tests of sustainability of earnings components 
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        (1)     (2)     (3)     (4) 
Variables    Prediction Earningst+1 Earningst+1 Earningst+1 Earningst+1
Earningst   + 0.6397***    
    (57.09)    
Accrualst   +  0.5619*** 0.5145*** 0.4807*** 
     (34.49) (31.65) (28.95) 
FCFt   +  0.6053***   
     (50.39)   
ΔCASHt   +   0.6299*** 0.6292*** 
      (28.91) (28.47) 
DISTt   +   0.5308***  
      (48.11)  
DIST_Dt   +    0.4588*** 
       (10.78) 
DIST_EQt   +    0.5479*** 
       (46.89) 
POST   ? 0.0411** 0.0266 0.0248 0.0279 
    (2.50) (1.51) (1.38) (1.54) 
POST×Earningst   ? 0.0576**    
    (2.26)    
POST×Accrualst   ?  0.1306*** 0.1034*** 0.1234*** 
     (3.69) (2.92) (3.43) 
POST×FCFt   ?  0.0228   
     (0.82)   
POST×ΔCASHt   ?   0.0644 0.0589 
      (1.22) (1.11) 
POST×DISTt   ?   -0.0132  
      (-0.50)  
POST×DIST_Dt   ?    0.3319*** 
       (3.38) 
POST×DIST_EQt   ?    -0.0167 
       (-0.60) 
Industry fixed effects        Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects        Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
N    6324 6309 6309 6309 
Adj. R2    0.5010 0.4625 0.4446 0.4391 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. 
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This table above shows the persistence of accrual and cash flow components of earnings before and after the adoption 
for all Canadian firms. The four models in this panel show the decomposition of earnings into its components. The first 
model shows earnings persistence, the second model decomposes earnings into accruals and free cash flows. The third 
model decomposes free cash flows (FCF) into retained cash (ΔCASH) and distributions (DIST). Finally, the last model 
further decomposes distributions (DIST) into distribution to debt holders (DIST_D) and distribution to equity holders 
(DIST_EQ). The corresponding regression equations are shown for each table. This panel includes regressions with 
interactions of earnings components with an indicator variable (POST). POST takes a value of 1 for observations in the 
post adoption period.  Variables are defined as follows. Earnings: Net income before extraordinary items; Accruals: 
change in net operating assets [(ΔAT- ΔCHE) - ( ΔLT-ΔDLC-ΔDLTT)]; FCF: free cash flows (Earnings-Accruals); 
DIST: distributions to debt and equity holders -1× [ΔDTC+ΔDLTT+(ΔAT-ΔLT-IB)]; DIST_D: distributions to debt 
holders: -1× (ΔDLC+ΔDLTTT); and DIST_EQ: distribution to equity holders -1× (ΔAT-ΔLT-IB). All variables are 
scaled by total assets.  
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Panel C: Difference-in-differences test for value relevance 
  
 All Canadian firms  Control firms 
  Difference -in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) Measures of Value relevance  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Price  0.8078 0.8355 ? 0.0278***  0.7246 0.4332 -0.2914***  ? 0.3192*** 
     (2.86)    (6.83)   (-5.83) 
Return  0.0308 0.1053 ? 0.0745  0.0335 0.0673 0.0338  ? 0.0407 
     (0.58)    (-0.30)   (0.65) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values 
are indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests for value relevance for all Canadian firms and a control group of U.S. firms before and after the adoption. Pre-adoption 
period includes firm-year observations from 2006 to the year before the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations starting on the adoption year 
onward. For most firms, the adoption year is the fiscal year starting on or after January 01, 2011.  
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, using a two-
tailed test. 
 
Price model: Pricet = EPSt + BVEt +  εt 
Return model: Returnt = Earningst + ΔEarningst + εt 
Price is stock price six months after fiscal year end. EPS is earnings per share. BVE is book value per share. Return is cumulative return 9 months before fiscal year end 
to three months after fiscal year end. Earnings and ΔEarningst are scaled by total assets.  
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Panel D: Difference-in-differences test for other earnings quality measures 
 
 All Canadian firms  Control firms 
  Difference -in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) Measures of Earnings quality  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Earnings smoothness  -1.4310 -1.4643 ? -0.0333  -1.5320 -1.2994 0.2326  ? -0.2659 
     (-0.17)    (0.67)   (-0.38) 
Conservatism   0.4161 0.6600 ? 0.2439  0.6394 0.8852 0.2458*  ? -0.0019 
     (-0.38)    (-1.68)   (0.47) 
Timeliness  0.0750 0.1493 ? 0.0743  0.0819 0.1835 0.1016*  ? -0.0273* 
     (0.90)    (-1.68)   (-1.68) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values are 
indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests of earnings quality for all Canadian and a control group of U.S. firms before and after the adoption. Pre-adoption 
period includes firm-year observations from 2006 to the year before the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations starting on the adoption year 
onward. For most firms, the adoption year is the fiscal year starting on or after January 01, 2011.  
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, using a two-
tailed test. 
 
Earnings smoothness is the ratio of the standard deviation of net income before extraordinary items (scaled by assets) to the standard deviation of cash flows from 
operations (scaled by assets) multiplied by -1.  
Conservatism is the estimated coefficient of the interaction variable from the timeliness regression of annual earnings (before extraordinary items) on an indicator 
variable on an indicator variable equaling one if the company’s annual return is negative and zero otherwise, the company’s annual return, and the interaction of the 
annual return and the indicator variable. Timeliness is the adjusted R2 from that regression (Earningst = β0 + β1Returnt + β2 Negativet + β3 Returnst x Negativet + εt).  
Earnings is net income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets. Returns is cumulative return from nine months before fiscal year end to three months after fiscal 
year end.  
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Table 4: Tests of Earnings Quality for Pre- and Post-Adoption Periods for Firms That Switch From Canadian GAAP to IFRS 
 
Panel A: Difference-in-differences tests for earnings sustainability 
 
 
Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to 
IFRS  Control firms   
Difference 
-in 
-
differences 
(3 - 6) 
Measures of 
Earnings sustainability 
 Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred. 
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-
(4)  Pred.
             
Earnings persistence  0.6823 0.7859 ? 0.1036  0.7919 0.7902 -0.0017  ? 0.1052 
     (-0.92)    (1.14)   (-0.79) 
Earnings predictability  0.4437 0.5193 ? 0.0756  0.6613 0.7044 0.0431  ? 0.0325 
     (-0.83)    (1.26)   (0.20) 
Cash flow predictability  0.4925 0.4961 ? 0.0037  0.5884 0.6193 0.0309  ? -0.0273 
    (-0.80)    (-1.00)   (-0.40) 
Accruals quality  -1.7472 -1.2680 ? 0.4792  -0.1558 -0.1019 0.0539  ? 0.4253*** 
    (0.89)    (-0.52)   (4.26) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values 
are indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests for earnings sustainability before and after the adoption for Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS and a 
control group of U.S. firms. Pre-adoption period includes firm-year observations from 2006 to the year before the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year 
observations starting on the adoption year onward. For most firms, the adoption year is the fiscal year starting on or after January 01, 2011.  
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, two a two-tailed 
test. 
 
Earnings persistence is the coefficient of earnings from the persistence regression (Earningst+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt). 
Earnings predictability is the adjusted R2 from the persistence regression (Earningst+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt).  
Cash flow predictability is the adjusted R2 from the regression of future cash flow from operation against current earnings (before extraordinary items) (CFOt+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt). 
Accruals Quality is the standard deviation of the residuals from the regression of accruals on future year, current year, and previous year’s cash flows from operations 
multiplied by -1 (Accrualst = β0 + β1CFOt-1 + β2CFOt + β3CFOt+1 + εt). 
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Panel B: Cross-sectional tests of sustainability of earnings components 
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        (1)     (2)     (3)     (4) 
Variables    Prediction Earningst+1 Earningst+1 Earningst+1 Earningst+1
Earningst   + 0.6318***    
    (53.63)    
Accrualst   +  0.5569*** 0.5140*** 0.4827*** 
     (32.81) (30.36) (27.90) 
FCFt   +  0.5959***   
     (47.15)   
ΔCASHt   +   0.6179*** 0.6164*** 
      (27.20) (26.73) 
DISTt   +   0.5221***  
      (45.32)  
DIST_Dt   +    0.4666*** 
       (10.30) 
DIST_EQt   +    0.5387*** 
       (44.11) 
POST   ? 0.0493*** 0.0340* 0.0297 0.0330* 
    (2.84) (1.83) (1.57) (1.73) 
POST×Earningst   ? 0.0804***    
    (3.02)    
POST ×Accrualst   ?  0.1743*** 0.1348*** 0.1541*** 
     (4.71) (3.65) (4.10) 
POST ×FCFt   ?  0.0547*   
     (1.87)   
POST ×ΔCASHt   ?   0.0874 0.0832 
      (1.60) (1.51) 
POST ×DISTt   ?   0.0073  
      (0.26)  
POST ×DIST_Dt   ?    0.3619*** 
       (3.48) 
POST ×DIST_EQt   ?    0.0046 
       (0.16) 
Industry fixed effects        Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects        Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
N    5856 5847 5847 5847 
Adj. R2    0.4957 0.4577 0.4415 0.4355 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. 
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This table above shows the persistence of accrual and cash flow components of earnings before and after the adoption 
for Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS and a control group of U.S. firms. The four models in this 
panel show the decomposition of earnings into its components. The first model shows earnings persistence, the second 
model decomposes earnings into accruals and free cash flows. The third model decomposes free cash flows (FCF) into 
retained cash (ΔCASH) and distributions (DIST). Finally, the last model further decomposes distributions (DIST) into 
distribution to debt holders (DIST_D) and distribution to equity holders (DIST_EQ). The corresponding regression 
equations are shown for each table. This panel includes regressions with interactions of earnings components with an 
indicator variable (POST). POST takes a value of 1 for observations in the post adoption period.  Variables are defined 
as follows. Earnings: Net income before extraordinary items; Accruals: change in net operating assets [(ΔAT- ΔCHE) - 
( ΔLT-ΔDLC-ΔDLTT)]; FCF: free cash flows (Earnings-Accruals); DIST: distributions to debt and equity holders -1× 
[ΔDTC+ΔDLTT+(ΔAT-ΔLT-IB)]; DIST_D: distributions to debt holders: -1× (ΔDLC+ΔDLTTT); and DIST_EQ: 
distribution to equity holders -1× (ΔAT-ΔLT-IB). All variables are scaled by total assets. 
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Panel C: Difference-in-differences test for value relevance 
  
 Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS  Control firms 
  Difference -in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) Measures of Value relevance  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred. 
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Price  0.8249 0.8669 ? 0.0420  0.7246 0.5543 -0.1692***  + 0.2112*** 
     (-0.31)    (6.21)   (-6.06) 
Return  0.0315 0.1162 ? 0.0847  0.0335 0.0673 0.0338  + 0.0509 
     (0.0420)    (0.13)   (1.05) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values 
are indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests for value relevance before and after the adoption for Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS and a 
control group of U.S. firms. Pre-adoption period includes firm-year observations from 2006 to the year before the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year 
observations starting on the adoption year onward. For most firms, the adoption year is the fiscal year starting on or after January 01, 2011.  
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, using a two-
tailed test. 
 
Price model: Pricet = EPSt + BVEt +  εt 
Return model: Returnt = Earningst + ΔEarningst + εt 
Price is stock price six months after fiscal year end. EPS is earnings per share. BVE is book value per share. Return is cumulative return 9 months before fiscal year end 
to three months after fiscal year end. Earnings and ΔEarningst are scaled by total assets.  
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Panel D: Difference-in-differences test of other earnings quality measures 
 
 
Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to 
IFRS  Control firms 
  Difference -in 
-
differences 
(3 - 6) Measures of Earnings quality 
 Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred. 
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-
(4)  Pred.
             
Earnings smoothness  -1.4417 -1.4466 ? -0.0049  -1.5320 -1.2994 0.2326  + -0.2375 
     (0.05)    (0.16)   (-0.01) 
Conservatism   0.4282 0.6369 ? 0.2088  0.6394 0.8852 0.2458  + -0.0371 
     (0.40)    (0.73)   (0.01) 
Timeliness  0.0784 0.1542 ? 0.0758**  0.0819 0.1835 0.1016  + -0.0258 
    (2.14)    (0.77)   (0.77) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values are 
indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests of earnings quality before and after the adoption for Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS and a control 
group of U.S. firms. Pre-adoption period includes firm-year observations from 2006 to the year before the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year 
observations starting on the adoption year onward. For most firms, the adoption year is the fiscal year starting on or after January 01, 2011.  
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, using a two-
tailed test. 
 
Earnings smoothness is the ratio of the standard deviation of net income before extraordinary items (scaled by assets) to the standard deviation of cash flows from 
operations (scaled by assets) multiplied by -1.  
Conservatism is the estimated coefficient of the interaction variable from the timeliness regression of annual earnings (before extraordinary items) on an indicator 
variable on an indicator variable equaling one if the company’s annual return is negative and zero otherwise, the company’s annual return, and the interaction of the 
annual return and the indicator variable. Timeliness is the adjusted R2 from that regression (Earningst = β0 + β1Returnt + β2 Negativet + β3 Returnst x Negativet + εt).  
Earnings is net income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets. Returns is cumulative return from nine months before fiscal year end to three months after fiscal 
year end.  
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Table 5: Tests of Earnings Quality for US GAAP Adopters and IFRS Adopters 
 
Panel A: Difference-in-differences tests for earnings sustainability 
 
Post-adoption  Pre-adoption   Difference 
-in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) 
Measures of 
Earnings sustainability 
 
US GAAP 
Adopters 
(1) 
IFRS  
Adopters 
(2) Pred. 
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
US GAAP 
Adopters 
(4) 
IFRS  
Adopters 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred. 
             
Earnings persistence  0.4948 0.7861 ? 0.2913*  0.7623 0.6814 -0.0809**  ? 0.3721** 
     (1.89)    (-2.10)   (2.38) 
Earnings predictability  0.2193 0.5191 ? 0.2998***  0.6398 0.4432 -0.1966  ? 0.4963 
     (-4.71)    (-1.62)   (-1.62) 
Cash flow predictability  0.3571 0.4966 ? 0.1395***  0.6612 0.4918 -0.1694  ? 0.3089*** 
    (-3.31)    (0.36)   (-3.22) 
Accruals quality  -0.3419 -1.2668 ? -0.9249***  -0.5209 -1.7449 -1.2240***  ? 0.2992 
    (6.79)    (5.48)   (-0.32) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values are 
indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests for earnings sustainability in the post adoption period for a group of Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to 
IFRS and another group of Canadian firms that either switch from Can. GAAP to U.S. GAAP or stay with U.S. GAAP. These firms in the pre-adoption period act as a 
control sample. Pre-adoption period includes firm-year observations from 2006 to the year before the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations 
starting on the adoption year onward. For most firms, the adoption year is the fiscal year starting on or after January 01, 2011.  
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, two a two-tailed 
test. 
 
Earnings persistence is the coefficient of earnings from the persistence regression (Earningst+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt). 
Earnings predictability is the adjusted R2 from the persistence regression (Earningst+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt).  
Cash flow predictability is the adjusted R2 from the regression of future cash flow from operation against current earnings (before extraordinary items) (CFOt+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt). 
Accruals Quality is the standard deviation of the residuals from the regression of accruals on future year, current year, and previous year’s cash flows from operations 
multiplied by -1 (Accrualst = β0 + β1CFOt-1 + β2CFOt + β3CFOt+1 + εt). 
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Panel B: Cross-sectional tests of sustainability of earnings components 
 
11   tttt eEarningsIFRSIFRSEarningsEarnings                                                 (1) 
11   tttttt eFCFIFRSAccrualsIFRSIFRSFCFAccrualsEarnings          (2)                                        
1
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eDISTIFRSCASHIFRS
AccrualsIFRSIFRSDISTCASHAccrualEarnings                          (3)                                       
1
1
__
__




ttttt
ttttt
eEQDISTIFRSDDISTIFRSCASHIFRSAccrualsIFRS
IFRSEQDISTDDISTCASHAccrualsEarnings                                      
                                                                                                                                            (4) 
 
        (1)     (2)     (3)     (4) 
Variables    Prediction Earningst+1 Earningst+1 Earningst+1 Earningst+1
Earningst   + 0.5413***    
    (5.44)    
Accrualst   +  0.2281 0.2182 0.1390 
     (1.65) (1.54) (0.98) 
FCFt   +  0.4832***   
     (4.92)   
ΔCASHt   +   0.6769*** 0.6262** 
      (2.66) (2.49) 
DISTt   +   0.4547***  
      (4.45)  
DIST_Dt   +    0.1493 
       (0.38) 
DIST_EQt   +    0.5641*** 
       (4.72) 
IFRS   ? 0.0141 -0.0086 -0.0222 -0.0051 
    (0.38) (-0.21) (-0.52) (-0.12) 
IFRS×Earningst   ? 0.2053**    
    (2.01)    
IFRS×Accrualst   ?  0.5435*** 0.4993*** 0.5648*** 
     (3.82) (3.43) (3.85) 
IFRS×FCFt   ?  0.2103**   
     (2.06)   
IFRS×ΔCASHt   ?   0.2015 0.2462 
      (0.78) (0.96) 
IFRS×DISTt   ?   0.1663  
      (1.56)  
IFRS×DIST_Dt   ?    0.6394 
       (1.58) 
IFRS×DIST_EQt   ?    0.1154 
       (0.93) 
Industry fixed effects        Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects        Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
N    1114 1113 1113 1113 
Adj. R2    0.5379 0.5136 0.4934 0.4898 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. 
 
This table above shows the persistence of accrual and cash flow components of earnings in the post adoption period for 
a group of Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS and another group of Canadian firms that either switch 
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from Can. GAAP to U.S. GAAP or stay with U.S. GAAP. These firms in the pre-adoption period act as a control 
sample. The four models in this panel show the decomposition of earnings into its components. The first model shows 
earnings persistence, the second model decomposes earnings into accruals and free cash flows. The third model 
decomposes free cash flows (FCF) into retained cash (ΔCASH) and distributions (DIST). Finally, the last model further 
decomposes distributions (DIST) into distribution to debt holders (DIST_D) and distribution to equity holders 
(DIST_EQ). The corresponding regression equations are shown for each table. This panel includes regressions with 
interactions of earnings components with an indicator variable (POST). POST takes a value of 1 for observations in the 
post adoption period.  Variables are defined as follows. Earnings: Net income before extraordinary items; Accruals: 
change in net operating assets [(ΔAT- ΔCHE) - ( ΔLT-ΔDLC-ΔDLTT)]; FCF: free cash flows (Earnings-Accruals); 
DIST: distributions to debt and equity holders -1× [ΔDTC+ΔDLTT+(ΔAT-ΔLT-IB)]; DIST_D: distributions to debt 
holders: -1× (ΔDLC+ΔDLTTT); and DIST_EQ: distribution to equity holders -1× (ΔAT-ΔLT-IB). All variables are 
scaled by total assets. 
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Panel C: Difference-in-differences test for value relevance 
  
Post-adoption  Pre-adoption   Difference 
-in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) 
Measures of 
Value relevance 
 
US GAAP 
Adopters 
(1) 
IFRS  
Adopters 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
US GAAP  
Adopters 
(4) 
IFRS  
Adopters 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Price  0.5782 0.8669 ? 0.2887***  0.5915 0.8241 0.2326***  ? 0.0561*** 
     (-7.05)    (-4.35)   (-3.01) 
Return  0.0029 0.1160 ? 0.1131***  0.0120 0.0315 0.0195***  ? 0.0936*** 
     (-22.77)    (-12.18)   (-14.86) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values 
are indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests for value relevance in the post adoption period for a group of Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS and 
another group of Canadian firms that either switch from Can. GAAP to U.S. GAAP or stay with U.S. GAAP. These firms in the pre-adoption period act as a control 
sample. Pre-adoption period includes firm-year observations from 2006 to the year before the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations 
starting on the adoption year onward. For most firms, the adoption year is the fiscal year starting on or after January 01, 2011.  
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, using a two-
tailed test. 
 
Price model: Pricet = EPSt + BVEt +  εt 
Return model: Returnt = Earningst + ΔEarningst + εt 
Price is stock price six months after fiscal year end. EPS is earnings per share. BVE is book value per share. Return is cumulative return 9 months before fiscal year end 
to three months after fiscal year end. Earnings and ΔEarningst are scaled by total assets.  
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Panel D: Difference-in-differences test for other earnings quality measures 
 
Post-adoption  Pre-adoption   Difference 
-in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) 
Measures of 
Earnings quality 
 
US GAAP 
Adopters 
(1) 
IFRS  
Adopters 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
US GAAP 
Adopters 
(4) 
IFRS  
Adopters 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Earnings smoothness  -1.4103 -1.4564 ? -0.0461***  -1.3145 -1.4425 -0.1279**  ? 0.0818 
     (-2.65)    (-2.49)   (-1.06) 
Conservatism   0.7582 0.6368 ? -0.1214*  0.1494 0.4270 0.2776  ? -0.3990 
     (-1.85)    (-1.07)   (-1.10) 
Timeliness  0.0926 0.1541 ? 0.0615***  0.0251 0.0783 0.0532***  ? 0.0083*** 
    (-14.94)    (-13.18)   (-13.18) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values are 
indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests of earnings quality in the post adoption period for a group of Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS and 
another group of Canadian firms that either switch from Can. GAAP to U.S. GAAP or stay with U.S. GAAP. These firms in the pre-adoption period act as a control 
sample. Pre-adoption period includes firm-year observations from 2006 to the year before the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations 
starting on the adoption year onward. For most firms, the adoption year is the fiscal year starting on or after January 01, 2011.  
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, using a two-
tailed test. 
 
Earnings smoothness is the ratio of the standard deviation of net income before extraordinary items (scaled by assets) to the standard deviation of cash flows from 
operations (scaled by assets) multiplied by -1.  
Conservatism is the estimated coefficient of the interaction variable from the timeliness regression of annual earnings (before extraordinary items) on an indicator 
variable on an indicator variable equaling one if the company’s annual return is negative and zero otherwise, the company’s annual return, and the interaction of the 
annual return and the indicator variable. Timeliness is the adjusted R2 from that regression (Earningst = β0 + β1Returnt + β2 Negativet + β3 Returnst x Negativet + εt).  
Earnings is net income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets. Returns is cumulative return from nine months before fiscal year end to three months after fiscal 
year end.  
. 
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Table 6: Subsample Analysis – Serious Adopters Identified by Reporting Incentives 
 
Panel A: Difference-in-differences tests for earnings sustainability 
 
 Serious adopters  Label adopters 
  Difference -in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) 
Measures of 
Earnings sustainability  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Earnings persistence  0.5658 0.5007 ? -0.0651  0.6549 0.7854 0.1306  - -0.1956 
     (-0.45)    (0.45)   (-0.63) 
Earnings predictability  0.3951 0.2786 ? -0.1166  0.4264 0.4464 0.0200  - -0.1365 
     (-0.04)    (0.23)   (0.23) 
Cash flow predictability  0.3083 0.2383 ? -0.0700*  0.5074 0.3912 -0.1162*  - 0.0462 
    (-1.67)    (1.89)   (-1.49) 
Accruals quality  -0.2403 -0.2718 ? -0.0315***  -2.4035 -1.7230 0.6805  - -0.7120 
    (3.58)    (1.23)   (-1.16) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values 
are indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests for earnings sustainability before and after the adoption for all Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS 
broken down into two subsamples, serious adopters and label adopters. To identify serious adopters, I run factor analysis of observable firm characteristics, firm size 
(natural log of the US$ market value), financial leverage (total liabilities over total assets), profitability (return on assets), growth opportunities (book-to-market ratio), 
and internationalization (foreign sales over total sales) to get compute firms’ reporting incentives. Reporting incentives is the first and primary factor out of three factors 
retained from the factor analysis. I compute reporting incentives as a rolling average over the previous three years. Next, I subtract for each Canadian firm adopter the 
rolling average in the year before the adoption from the rolling average right after the adoption year relative to the year t of IFRS adoption. I then use the distribution of 
the changes of reporting incentives around IFRS adoption (which is based one value per firm) to classify firms with above median changes in reporting incentives as 
Serious Adopters and as label adopters otherwise. Pre-adoption period includes firm-year observations from 2006 to the year before the adoption year. Post-adoption 
period includes firm-year observations starting on the adoption year onward. For most firms, the adoption year is the fiscal year starting on or after January 01, 2011.  
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, two a two-tailed 
test. 
 
Earnings persistence is the coefficient of earnings from the persistence regression (Earningst+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt).  
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Earnings predictability is the adjusted R2 from the persistence regression (Earningst+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt).  
Cash flow predictability is the adjusted R2 from the regression of future cash flow from operation against current earnings (before extraordinary items) (CFOt+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt). 
Accruals Quality is the standard deviation of the residuals from the regression of accruals on future year, current year, and previous year’s cash flows from operations 
multiplied by -1 (Accrualst = β0 + β1CFOt-1 + β2CFOt + β3CFOt+1 + εt).  
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Panel B: Cross-sectional tests of sustainability of earnings components 
 
Variables    Prediction Earningst+1 
Accrualst   + 0.5323*** 
    (18.88) 
ΔCASHt   + 0.5715*** 
    (15.92) 
DIST_Dt   + 0.5788*** 
    (8.80) 
DIST_EQt   + 0.5335*** 
    (26.45) 
POST   ? 0.0174 
    (0.93) 
POST×Accrualst   ? 0.1550*** 
    (4.19) 
POST×ΔCASHt   ? 0.0899* 
    (1.66) 
POST×DIST_Dt   ? 0.3631*** 
    (3.55) 
POST×DIST_EQt   ? 0.0051 
    (0.18) 
SERIOUS ADOPTERS   - -0.0928*** 
    (-11.20) 
SERIOUS ADOPTERS ×Accrualst   - -0.1347*** 
    (-4.12) 
SERIOUS ADOPTERS ×ΔCASHt   - 0.0132 
    (0.31) 
SERIOUS ADOPTERS ×DIST_Dt   - -0.1941** 
    (-2.37) 
SERIOUS ADOPTERS ×DIST_EQt   - -0.0358 
    (-1.54) 
Industry fixed effects    Yes 
Year fixed effects    Yes 
N    5847 
Adj. R2    0.4549 
     
F-test: POST×Accrualst + SERIOUS ADOPTERSxAccruals = 0: F-value = 1.15 
F-test: POST×DIST_Dt + SERIOUS ADOPTERSxDIST_D = 0: F-value =  5.44*** 
 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. 
This table above shows the persistence of accrual and cash flow components of earnings before and after the adoption 
for Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS. The model in this panel shows the decomposition of earnings 
into its components, accruals, retained cash (ΔCASH), distribution to debt holders (DIST_D), and distribution to equity 
holders (DIST_EQ). This panel includes regressions with interactions of earnings components with two indicator 
variables (POST and SERIOUS ADOPTERS), respectively. POST takes a value of 1 for observations in the post 
adoption period.  SERIOUS ADOPTERS takes value 1 for serious adopters, 0 otherwise. To identify serious adopters, I 
first run factor analysis of observable firm characteristics, firm size (natural log of the US$ market value), financial 
leverage (total liabilities over total assets), profitability (return on assets), growth opportunities (book-to-market ratio), 
and internationalization (foreign sales over total sales). Reporting incentives as the first and primary factor out of three 
factors retained from the factor analysis. Next, I compute reporting incentives as a rolling average over the previous 
three years. I subtract for each Canadian firm adopter the rolling average in the year before the adoption from the 
rolling average right after the adoption year. I then use the distribution of the changes of reporting incentives around 
IFRS adoption (which is based one value per firm) to classify firms with above median changes in reporting incentives 
as Serious Adopters (coded as 1 ) and as label adopters (coded as 0). Variables are defined as follows. Earnings: Net 
income before extraordinary items; Accruals: change in net operating assets [(ΔAT- ΔCHE) - ( ΔLT-ΔDLC-ΔDLTT)]; 
FCF: free cash flows (Earnings-Accruals); DIST: distributions to debt and equity holders -1× [ΔDTC+ΔDLTT+(ΔAT-
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ΔLT-IB)]; DIST_D: distributions to debt holders: -1× (ΔDLC+ΔDLTTT); and DIST_EQ: distribution to equity holders 
-1× (ΔAT-ΔLT-IB). All variables are scaled by total assets.   
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Panel C: Difference-in-differences test for value relevance 
  
 Serious adopters  Label adopters   
Difference 
-in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) 
Measures of 
Value relevance  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Price  0.8123 0.8375 ? 0.0252  0.5044 0.3209 -0.1835***  - 0.2087  
     (-1.23)    (2.81)   (-0.71) 
Return  0.0308 0.1178 ? 0.0871  0.0235 0.0302 0.0067**  - 0.0804 
     (0.25)    (2.52)   (-1.12) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values 
are indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests for value relevance before and after the adoption for all Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS broken 
down into two subsamples, serious adopters and label adopters. To identify serious adopters, I run factor analysis of observable firm characteristics, firm size (natural log 
of the US$ market value), financial leverage (total liabilities over total assets), profitability (return on assets), growth opportunities (book-to-market ratio), and 
internationalization (foreign sales over total sales) to get compute firms’ reporting incentives. Reporting incentives is the first and primary factor out of three factors 
retained from the factor analysis. I compute reporting incentives as a rolling average over the previous three years. Next, I subtract for each Canadian firm adopter the 
rolling average in the year before the adoption from the rolling average right after the adoption year relative to the year t of IFRS adoption. I then use the distribution of 
the changes of reporting incentives around IFRS adoption (which is based one value per firm) to classify firms with above median changes in reporting incentives as 
Serious Adopters and as label adopters otherwise. Pre-adoption period includes firm-year observations from 2006 to the year before the adoption year. Post-adoption 
period includes firm-year observations starting on the adoption year onward. For most firms, the adoption year is the fiscal year starting on or after January 01, 2011.  
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, using a two-
tailed test. 
 
Price model: Pricet = EPSt + BVEt +  εt 
Return model: Returnt = Earningst + ΔEarningst + εt 
Price is stock price six months after fiscal year end. EPS is earnings per share. BVE is book value per share. Return is cumulative return 9 months before fiscal year end 
to three months after fiscal year end. Earnings and ΔEarningst are scaled by total assets.  
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Panel D: Difference-in-differences test for other earnings quality measures 
 
 Serious adopters  Label adopters   
Difference 
-in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) 
Measures of 
Earnings quality  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Earnings smoothness  -1.1005 -0.9403 ? 0.1602  -1.4956 -1.4925 0.0031  - 0.1571 
     (0.58)    (-0.54)   (0.76) 
Conservatism   0.2426 0.1629 ? -0.0797  0.2366 0.4898 0.2533  - -0.3330 
     (-0.12)    (0.74)   (-0.75) 
Timeliness  0.0816 0.1481 ? 0.0665  0.0149 0.0418 0.0269***  - 0.0396*** 
    (1.50)    (3.60)   (3.60) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values are 
indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests of earnings quality before and after the adoption for all Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS broken 
down into two subsamples, serious adopters and label adopters. To identify serious adopters, I run factor analysis of observable firm characteristics, firm size (natural log 
of the US$ market value), financial leverage (total liabilities over total assets), profitability (return on assets), growth opportunities (book-to-market ratio), and 
internationalization (foreign sales over total sales) to get compute firms’ reporting incentives. Reporting incentives is the first and primary factor out of three factors 
retained from the factor analysis. I compute reporting incentives as a rolling average over the previous three years. Next, I subtract for each Canadian firm adopter the 
rolling average in the year before the adoption from the rolling average right after the adoption year relative to the year t of IFRS adoption. I then use the distribution of 
the changes of reporting incentives around IFRS adoption (which is based one value per firm) to classify firms with above median changes in reporting incentives as 
Serious Adopters and as label adopters otherwise. Pre-adoption period includes firm-year observations from 2006 to the year before the adoption year. Post-adoption 
period includes firm-year observations starting on the adoption year onward. For most firms, the adoption year is the fiscal year starting on or after January 01, 2011.  
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, using a two-
tailed test. 
 
Earnings smoothness is the ratio of the standard deviation of net income before extraordinary items (scaled by assets) to the standard deviation of cash flows from 
operations (scaled by assets) multiplied by -1.  
Conservatism is the estimated coefficient of the interaction variable from the timeliness regression of annual earnings (before extraordinary items) on an indicator 
variable on an indicator variable equaling one if the company’s annual return is negative and zero otherwise, the company’s annual return, and the interaction of the 
annual return and the indicator variable. Timeliness is the adjusted R2 from that regression (Earningst = β0 + β1Returnt + β2 Negativet + β3 Returnst x Negativet + εt).  
Earnings is net income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets. Returns is cumulative return from nine months before fiscal year end to three months after fiscal 
year end.  
119 
 
 
Table 7: Subsample Analysis – Serious Adopters Identified by Reporting Behaviors 
 
Panel A: Difference-in-differences tests for earnings sustainability 
 
 Serious adopters  Label adopters 
  Difference -in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) Measures of Earnings sustainability  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Earnings persistence  0.6158 0.8098 ? 0.1940  0.7440 0.7188 -0.0252  - 0.2192 
     (0.54)    (0.44)   (-0.00) 
Earnings predictability  0.3593 0.6119 ? 0.2526  0.5419 0.4280 -0.1138  - 0.3665 
     (0.22)    (0.92)   (0.92) 
Cash flow predictability  0.3876 0.5681 ? 0.1805  0.5945 0.4343 -0.1602  - 0.3407 
    (0.45)    (0.88)   (-0.34) 
Accruals quality  -2.3266 -1.4091 ? 0.9175***  -0.4183 -0.9594 -0.5411***  - 1.4586 
    (2.82)    (7.16)   (-0.05) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values 
are indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests for earnings sustainability before and after the adoption for all Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS 
broken down into two subsamples, serious adopters and label adopters. To identify serious adopters, I rely on reporting behaviors defined as the ratio of the absolute 
value of accruals to the absolute value of cash flows (multiplied by -1 so that higher values indicate more transparent reporting). I compute reporting behaviors as a 
rolling average over the previous three years. Next, I subtract for each Canadian firm adopter the rolling average in the year before the adoption from the rolling average 
right after the adoption year. I then use the distribution of the changes of reporting behaviors around IFRS adoption (which is based one value per firm) to classify firms 
with above median changes in reporting behaviors as Serious Adopters and as label adopters otherwise. Pre-adoption period includes firm-year observations from 2006 to 
the year before the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations starting on the adoption year onward. For most firms, the adoption year is the 
fiscal year starting on or after January 01, 2011.  
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, two a two-tailed 
test. 
 
Earnings persistence is the coefficient of earnings from the persistence regression (Earningst+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt). 
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Earnings predictability is the adjusted R2 from the persistence regression (Earningst+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt).  
Cash flow predictability is the adjusted R2 from the regression of future cash flow from operation against current earnings (before extraordinary items) (CFOt+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt). 
Accruals Quality is the standard deviation of the residuals from the regression of accruals on future year, current year, and previous year’s cash flows from operations 
multiplied by -1 (Accrualst = β0 + β1CFOt-1 + β2CFOt + β3CFOt+1 + εt). 
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Panel B: Cross-sectional tests of sustainability of earnings components 
 
Variables    Prediction Earningst+1 
Accrualst   + 0.4671*** 
    (19.65) 
ΔCASHt   + 0.6499*** 
    (21.17) 
DIST_Dt   + 0.4221*** 
    (6.73) 
DIST_EQt   + 0.5642*** 
    (36.82) 
POST   ? 0.0331* 
    (1.74) 
POST×Accrualst   ? 0.1604*** 
    (4.26) 
POST×ΔCASHt   ? 0.0849 
    (1.54) 
POST×DIST_Dt   ? 0.3800*** 
    (3.65) 
POST×DIST_EQt   ? 0.0034 
    (0.11) 
SERIOUS ADOPTERS   - 0.0010 
    (0.12) 
SERIOUS ADOPTERS ×Accrualst   - 0.0134 
    (0.44) 
SERIOUS ADOPTERS ×ΔCASHt   - -0.0731* 
    (-1.80) 
SERIOUS ADOPTERS ×DIST_Dt   - -0.0707* 
    (-1.88) 
SERIOUS ADOPTERS ×DIST_EQt   - -0.0572*** 
    (-2.72) 
Industry fixed effects    Yes 
Year fixed effects    Yes 
N    5842 
Adj. R2    0.4374 
     
F-test: POST×DIST_Dt + SERIOUS ADOPTERSxDIST_D = 0: F-value = 7.15*** 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. 
 
This table above shows the persistence of accrual and cash flow components of earnings before and after the adoption 
for Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS. The model in this panel shows the decomposition of earnings 
into its components, accruals, retained cash (ΔCASH), distribution to debt holders (DIST_D), and distribution to equity 
holders (DIST_EQ). This panel includes regressions with interactions of earnings components with two indicator 
variables (POST and SERIOUS ADOPTERS), respectively. POST takes a value of 1 for observations in the post 
adoption period.  SERIOUS ADOPTERS takes value 1 for serious adopters, 0 otherwise. To identify serious adopters, I 
rely on reporting behaviors defined as the ratio of the absolute value of accruals to the absolute value of cash flows 
(multiplied by -1 so that higher values indicate more transparent reporting). I compute reporting behaviors as a rolling 
average over the previous three years. Next, I subtract for each Canadian firm adopter the rolling average in the year 
before the adoption from the rolling average right after the adoption year. I then use the distribution of the changes of 
reporting behaviors around IFRS adoption (which is based one value per firm) to classify firms with above median 
changes in reporting behaviors as serious adopters and as label adopters otherwise. Variables are defined as follows. 
Earnings: Net income before extraordinary items; Accruals: change in net operating assets [(ΔAT- ΔCHE) - ( ΔLT-
ΔDLC-ΔDLTT)]; FCF: free cash flows (Earnings-Accruals); DIST: distributions to debt and equity holders -1× 
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[ΔDTC+ΔDLTT+(ΔAT-ΔLT-IB)]; DIST_D: distributions to debt holders: -1× (ΔDLC+ΔDLTTT); and DIST_EQ: 
distribution to equity holders -1× (ΔAT-ΔLT-IB). All variables are scaled by total assets.  
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Panel C: Difference-in-differences test for value relevance 
  
 Serious adopters  Label adopters 
  Difference -in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) Measures of Value relevance  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Price  0.9194 0.8923 ? -0.027  0.5789 0.6421 0.0632  - -0.0903*** 
     (1.06)    (0.61)   (5.89) 
Return  0.0459 0.0899 ? 0.0441  0.0161 0.1263 0.1102  - -0.0662 
     (0.19)    (0.42)   (-0.17) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values 
are indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests for value relevance before and after the adoption for all Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS broken 
down into two subsamples, serious adopters and label adopters. To identify serious adopters, I rely on reporting behaviors defined as the ratio of the absolute value of 
accruals to the absolute value of cash flows (multiplied by -1 so that higher values indicate more transparent reporting). I compute reporting behaviors as a rolling 
average over the previous three years. Next, I subtract for each Canadian firm adopter the rolling average in the year before the adoption from the rolling average right 
after the adoption year. I then use the distribution of the changes of reporting behaviors around IFRS adoption (which is based one value per firm) to classify firms with 
above median changes in reporting behaviors as Serious Adopters and as label adopters otherwise. Pre-adoption period includes firm-year observations from 2006 to the 
year before the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations starting on the adoption year onward. For most firms, the adoption year is the fiscal 
year starting on or after January 01, 2011. 
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, using a two-
tailed test. 
 
Price model: Pricet = EPSt + BVEt +  εt 
Return model: Returnt = Earningst + ΔEarningst + εt 
Price is stock price six months after fiscal year end. EPS is earnings per share. BVE is book value per share. Return is cumulative return 9 months before fiscal year end 
to three months after fiscal year end. Earnings and ΔEarningst are scaled by total assets.  
 
124 
 
 
Panel D: Difference-in-differences test for other earnings quality measures 
 
 Serious adopters  Label adopters 
  Difference -in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) Measures of Earnings quality  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Earnings smoothness  -1.6115 -1.1568 ? 0.4547  -1.5320 -1.2994 0.2326  - 0.9527 
     (-0.87)    (0.67)   (-1.17) 
Conservatism   0.3484 0.5428 ? 0.1944  0.6394 0.8852 0.2458*  - -0.0627 
     (0.48)    (-1.68)   (0.59) 
Timeliness  0.0659 0.1323 ? 0.0664  0.0819 0.1835 0.1016*  - -0.0125 
    (1.16)    (-1.70)   (0.85) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values are 
indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests of earnings quality before and after the adoption for all Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS broken 
down into two subsamples, serious adopters and label adopters. To identify serious adopters, I rely on reporting behaviors defined as the ratio of the absolute value of 
accruals to the absolute value of cash flows (multiplied by -1 so that higher values indicate more transparent reporting). I compute reporting behaviors as a rolling 
average over the previous three years. Next, I subtract for each Canadian firm adopter the rolling average in the year before the adoption from the rolling average right 
after the adoption year. I then use the distribution of the changes of reporting behaviors around IFRS adoption (which is based one value per firm) to classify firms with 
above median changes in reporting behaviors as Serious Adopters and as label adopters otherwise. Pre-adoption period includes firm-year observations from 2006 to the 
year before the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations starting on the adoption year onward. For most firms, the adoption year is the fiscal 
year starting on or after January 01, 2011. 
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, using a two-
tailed test. 
 
Earnings smoothness is the ratio of the standard deviation of net income before extraordinary items (scaled by assets) to the standard deviation of cash flows from 
operations (scaled by assets) multiplied by -1.  
Conservatism is the estimated coefficient of the interaction variable from the timeliness regression of annual earnings (before extraordinary items) on an indicator 
variable on an indicator variable equaling one if the company’s annual return is negative and zero otherwise, the company’s annual return, and the interaction of the 
annual return and the indicator variable. Timeliness is the adjusted R2 from that regression (Earningst = β0 + β1Returnt + β2 Negativet + β3 Returnst x Negativet + εt).  
Earnings is net income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets. Returns is cumulative return from nine months before fiscal year end to three months after fiscal 
year end.  
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Table 8: Subsample Analysis – Serious Adopters Identified by Reporting Environment 
 
Panel A: Difference-in-differences tests for earnings sustainability 
 
 Serious adopters  Label adopters 
  Difference -in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) Measures of Earnings sustainability  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Earnings persistence  0.6439 0.7418 ? 0.0978  0.6918 0.8160 0.1242**  - -0.0264 
     (0.27)    (2.00)   (-0.98) 
Earnings predictability  0.4731 0.4259 ? -0.0471  0.4518 0.5048 0.0529*  - -0.1000* 
     (0.88)    (1.80)   (1.80) 
Cash flow predictability  0.4077 0.5491 ? 0.1413*  0.5227 0.4441 -0.0786  - 0.2199* 
    (-1.84)    (0.55)   (-1.67) 
Accruals quality  -0.2794 -0.2931 ? -0.0138**  -2.1103 -1.5446 0.5657  - -0.5794 
    (2.04)    (0.46)   (-0.41) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values are 
indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests for earnings sustainability before and after the adoption for all Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS 
broken down into two subsamples, serious adopters and label adopters. To identify serious adopters, I rely on reporting environment defined as the log of the number of 
analysts covering firms. I compute reporting environment as a rolling average over the previous three years. Next, I subtract for each Canadian firm adopter the rolling 
average in the year before the adoption from the rolling average right after the adoption year. I then use the distribution of the changes of reporting environment around 
IFRS adoption (which is based one value per firm) to classify firms with above median changes in reporting environment as Serious Adopters and as label adopters 
otherwise. Pre-adoption period includes firm-year observations from 2006 to the year before the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations 
starting on the adoption year onward. For most firms, the adoption year is the fiscal year starting on or after January 01, 2011. 
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, two a two-tailed 
test. 
 
Earnings persistence is the coefficient of earnings from the persistence regression (Earningst+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt). 
Earnings predictability is the adjusted R2 from the persistence regression (Earningst+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt).  
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Cash flow predictability is the adjusted R2 from the regression of future cash flow from operation against current earnings (before extraordinary items) (CFOt+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt). 
Accruals Quality is the standard deviation of the residuals from the regression of accruals on future year, current year, and previous year’s cash flows from operations 
multiplied by -1 (Accrualst = β0 + β1CFOt-1 + β2CFOt + β3CFOt+1 + εt). 
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Panel B: Cross-sectional tests of sustainability of earnings components 
 
Variables    Prediction Earningst+1 
Accrualst   + 0.4542*** 
    (23.74) 
ΔCASHt   + 0.6112*** 
    (23.34) 
DIST_Dt   + 0.4507*** 
    (8.51) 
DIST_EQt   + 0.5374*** 
    (39.97) 
POST   ? 0.0177 
    (0.94) 
POST×Accrualst   ? 0.1336*** 
    (3.59) 
POST×ΔCASHt   ? 0.0920* 
    (1.69) 
POST×DIST_Dt   ? 0.3512*** 
    (3.42) 
POST×DIST_EQt   ? 0.0036 
    (0.12) 
SERIOUS ADOPTERS   - 0.0761*** 
    (8.95) 
SERIOUS ADOPTERS ×Accrualst   - -0.0141 
    (-0.39) 
SERIOUS ADOPTERS ×ΔCASHt   - -0.1136** 
    (-2.47) 
SERIOUS ADOPTERS ×DIST_Dt   - 0.0107 
    (0.13) 
SERIOUS ADOPTERS ×DIST_EQt   - -0.0604** 
    (-2.39) 
Industry fixed effects    Yes 
Year fixed effects    Yes 
N    5842 
Adj. R2    0.3090 
     
F-test: POST×ΔCASHt + SERIOUS ADOPTERSxΔCASH = 0: F-value = 1.05  
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. 
 
This table above shows the persistence of accrual and cash flow components of earnings before and after the adoption 
for Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS. The model in this panel shows the decomposition of earnings 
into its components, accruals, retained cash (ΔCASH), distribution to debt holders (DIST_D), and distribution to equity 
holders (DIST_EQ). This panel includes regressions with interactions of earnings components with two indicator 
variables (POST and SERIOUS ADOPTERS), respectively. POST takes a value of 1 for observations in the post 
adoption period. SERIOUS ADOPTERS takes value 1 for serious adopters, 0 otherwise. To identify serious adopters, I 
rely on reporting behaviors defined as the ratio of the absolute value of accruals to the absolute value of cash flows 
(multiplied by -1 so that higher values indicate more transparent reporting). I compute reporting behaviors as a rolling 
average over the previous three years. Next, I subtract for each Canadian firm adopter the rolling average in the year 
before the adoption from the rolling average right after the adoption year. I then use the distribution of the changes of 
reporting behaviors around IFRS adoption (which is based one value per firm) to classify firms with above median 
changes in reporting behaviors as serious adopters and as label adopters otherwise. Variables are defined as follows. 
Earnings: Net income before extraordinary items; Accruals: change in net operating assets [(ΔAT- ΔCHE) - ( ΔLT-
ΔDLC-ΔDLTT)]; FCF: free cash flows (Earnings-Accruals); DIST: distributions to debt and equity holders -1× 
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[ΔDTC+ΔDLTT+(ΔAT-ΔLT-IB)]; DIST_D: distributions to debt holders: -1× (ΔDLC+ΔDLTTT); and DIST_EQ: 
distribution to equity holders -1× (ΔAT-ΔLT-IB). All variables are scaled by total assets.  
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Panel C: Difference-in-differences test for value relevance 
  
 Serious adopters  Label adopters 
  Difference -in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) Measures of Value relevance  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Price  0.7497 0.8557 ? 0.1060***  0.8573 0.8929 0.0356***  - 0.0704 
     (-8.35)    (-6.67)   (0.28) 
Return  0.0238 0.1218 ? 0.0979  0.0312 0.0979 0.0666  - 0.0313 
     (-0.20)    (0.97)   (-0.75) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values 
are indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests for value relevance before and after the adoption for all Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS broken 
down into two subsamples, serious adopters and label adopters. To identify serious adopters, I rely on reporting environment defined as the log of the number of analysts 
covering firms. I compute reporting environment as a rolling average over the previous three years. Next, I subtract for each Canadian firm adopter the rolling average in 
the year before the adoption from the rolling average right after the adoption year. I then use the distribution of the changes of reporting environment around IFRS 
adoption (which is based one value per firm) to classify firms with above median changes in reporting environment as Serious Adopters and as label adopters otherwise. 
Pre-adoption period includes firm-year observations from 2006 to the year before the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations starting on the 
adoption year onward. For most firms, the adoption year is the fiscal year starting on or after January 01, 2011. 
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, using a two-
tailed test. 
 
Price model: Pricet = EPSt + BVEt +  εt 
Return model: Returnt = Earningst + ΔEarningst + εt 
Price is stock price six months after fiscal year end. EPS is earnings per share. BVE is book value per share. Return is cumulative return 9 months before fiscal year end 
to three months after fiscal year end. Earnings and ΔEarningst are scaled by total assets.  
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Panel D: Difference-in-differences test for other earnings quality measures 
 
 Serious adopters  Label adopters 
  Difference -in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) Measures of Earnings quality  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Earnings smoothness  -1.2131 -1.1485 ? 0.0646  -1.4624 -1.4739 -0.0116  - 0.0762 
     (0.34)    (-0.43)   (0.55) 
Conservatism   0.2716 0.3372 ? 0.0656  0.4582 0.7711 0.3129  - -0.2473 
     (-0.81)    (0.36)   (-0.69) 
Timeliness  0.0708 0.1521 ? 0.0814***  0.0630 0.1348 0.0718*  - 0.0096 
    (2.82)    (1.88)   (1.38) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values are 
indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests of earnings quality before and after the adoption for all Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS broken 
down into two subsamples, serious adopters and label adopters. To identify serious adopters, I rely on reporting environment defined as the log of the number of analysts 
covering firms. I compute reporting environment as a rolling average over the previous three years. Next, I subtract for each Canadian firm adopter the rolling average in 
the year before the adoption from the rolling average right after the adoption year. I then use the distribution of the changes of reporting environment around IFRS 
adoption (which is based one value per firm) to classify firms with above median changes in reporting environment as Serious Adopters and as label adopters otherwise. 
Pre-adoption period includes firm-year observations from 2006 to the year before the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations starting on the 
adoption year onward. For most firms, the adoption year is the fiscal year starting on or after January 01, 2011. 
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, using a two-
tailed test. 
 
Earnings smoothness is the ratio of the standard deviation of net income before extraordinary items (scaled by assets) to the standard deviation of cash flows from 
operations (scaled by assets) multiplied by -1.  
Conservatism is the estimated coefficient of the interaction variable from the timeliness regression of annual earnings (before extraordinary items) on an indicator 
variable on an indicator variable equaling one if the company’s annual return is negative and zero otherwise, the company’s annual return, and the interaction of the 
annual return and the indicator variable. Timeliness is the adjusted R2 from that regression (Earningst = β0 + β1Returnt + β2 Negativet + β3 Returnst x Negativet + εt).  
Earnings is net income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets. Returns is cumulative return from nine months before fiscal year end to three months after fiscal 
year end.  
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Table 9: Subsample Analysis - Extractive Industries 
 
Panel A: Difference-in-differences tests for earnings sustainability 
 
 Extractive industries  Non-extractive industries 
  Difference -in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) Measures of Earnings sustainability  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Earnings persistence  0.6221 0.6693 ? 0.0472  0.6880 0.7764 0.0884*  - -0.0411 
     (-0.03)    (1.77)   (-0.45) 
Earnings predictability  0.3370 0.2543 ? -0.0828**  0.4685 0.5446 0.0761  - -0.1589* 
     (2.12)    (1.56)   (1.85) 
Cash flow predictability  0.2779 0.3254 ? 0.0474  0.5270 0.5135 -0.0135  - 0.0609 
    (0.86)    (-0.43)   (0.96) 
Accruals quality  -0.3544 -0.3809 ? -0.0265***  -1.7916 -1.2976 0.4940  - -0.5205 
    (6.89)    (-0.21)   (0.64) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values are 
indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests for earnings sustainability before and after the adoption for Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS 
broken down into two subsamples, extractive industries (two digit SIC codes are 13 or 29) and the rest. Pre-adoption period includes firm-year observations from 2006 to 
the year before the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations starting on the adoption year onward. For most firms, the adoption year is the 
fiscal year starting on or after January 01, 2011. 
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, two a two-tailed 
test. 
 
Earnings persistence is the coefficient of earnings from the persistence regression (Earningst+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt). 
Earnings predictability is the adjusted R2 from the persistence regression (Earningst+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt).  
Cash flow predictability is the adjusted R2 from the regression of future cash flow from operation against current earnings (before extraordinary items) (CFOt+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt). 
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Accruals Quality is the standard deviation of the residuals from the regression of accruals on future year, current year, and previous year’s cash flows from operations 
multiplied by -1 (Accrualst = β0 + β1CFOt-1 + β2CFOt + β3CFOt+1 + εt). 
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Panel B: Cross-sectional tests of sustainability of earnings components 
 
Variables    Prediction Earningst+1 
Accrualst   + 0.4609*** 
    (25.36) 
ΔCASHt   + 0.6152*** 
    (25.65) 
DIST_Dt   + 0.4813*** 
    (10.00) 
DIST_EQt   + 0.5408*** 
    (42.68) 
POST   ? 0.0325* 
    (1.71) 
POST×Accrualst   ? 0.1534*** 
    (4.08) 
POST×ΔCASHt   ? 0.0868 
    (1.58) 
POST×DIST_Dt   ? 0.3506*** 
    (3.38) 
POST×DIST_EQt   ? 0.0059 
    (0.20) 
EXTRACTIVE   - 0.0001 
    (0.25) 
EXTRACTIVE ×Accrualst   - -0.1499*** 
    (-3.11) 
EXTRACTIVE ×ΔCASHt   - 0.0368 
    (0.51) 
EXTRACTIVE ×DIST_Dt   - -0.0509 
    (-0.42) 
EXTRACTIVE ×DIST_EQt   - -0.0072 
    (-0.18) 
Industry fixed effects    Yes 
Year fixed effects    Yes 
N    5847 
Adj. R2    0.4374 
 
F-test: POST×Accrualst + EXTRACTIVExAccruals = 0: F = 3.32*** 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. 
 
This table above shows the persistence of accrual and cash flow components of earnings before and after the adoption 
for Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS. The model in this panel shows the decomposition of earnings 
into its components, accruals, retained cash (ΔCASH), distribution to debt holders (DIST_D), and distribution to equity 
holders (DIST_EQ). This panel includes regressions with interactions of earnings components with two indicator 
variables (POST and EXTRACTIVE), respectively. POST takes a value of 1 for observations in the post adoption 
period.  EXTRACTIVE takes a value of 1 for observations for firms in extractive industries (two digit SIC codes are 13 
or 29), 0 otherwise. Variables are defined as follows. Earnings: Net income before extraordinary items; Accruals: 
change in net operating assets [(ΔAT- ΔCHE) - ( ΔLT-ΔDLC-ΔDLTT)]; FCF: free cash flows (Earnings-Accruals); 
DIST: distributions to debt and equity holders -1× [ΔDTC+ΔDLTT+(ΔAT-ΔLT-IB)]; DIST_D: distributions to debt 
holders: -1× (ΔDLC+ΔDLTTT); and DIST_EQ: distribution to equity holders -1× (ΔAT-ΔLT-IB). All variables are 
scaled by total assets.  
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Panel C: Difference-in-differences test for value relevance 
  
 Extractive industries  Non-extractive industries 
  Difference -in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) Measures of Value relevance  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Price  0.6949 0.7571 ? 0.0622  0.8243 0.8386 0.0143  - 0.0478 
     (-0.71)    (-0.28)   (-0.20) 
Return  0.0013 0.0979 ? 0.0966  0.0367 0.1066 0.0699  - 0.0293 
     (1.43)    (0.04)   (1.61) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values 
are indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests for value relevance before and after the adoption for all Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS broken 
down into two subsamples, extractive industries (two digit SIC codes are 13 or 29) and the rest. Pre-adoption period includes firm-year observations from 2006 to the 
year before the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations starting on the adoption year onward. For most firms, the adoption year is the fiscal 
year starting on or after January 01, 2011.  
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, using a two-
tailed test. 
 
Price model: Pricet = EPSt + BVEt +  εt 
Return model: Returnt = Earningst + ΔEarningst + εt 
Price is stock price six months after fiscal year end. EPS is earnings per share. BVE is book value per share. Return is cumulative return 9 months before fiscal year end 
to three months after fiscal year end. Earnings and ΔEarningst are scaled by total assets.  
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Panel D: Difference-in-differences test for other earnings quality measures 
 
 Extractive industries  Non-extractive industries 
  Difference -in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) Measures of Earnings quality  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Earnings smoothness  -1.7454 -2.2945 ? -0.5491  -1.4242 -1.3423 0.0819***  - -0.6311 
     (-1.58)    (-3.41)   (-0.90) 
Conservatism   0.2577 0.4444 ? 0.1867*  0.4549 0.6768 0.2219  - -0.0352* 
     (-1.87)    (-0.06)   (-1.71) 
Timeliness  0.0708 0.1326 ? 0.0618*  0.0769 0.1540 0.0771*  - -0.0153 
    (1.65)    (1.67)   (0.84) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values are 
indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests for earnings sustainability before and after the adoption for Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS 
broken down into two subsamples, extractive industries (two digit SIC codes are 13 or 29) and the rest. Pre-adoption period includes firm-year observations from 2006 to 
the year before the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations starting on the adoption year onward. For most firms, the adoption year is the 
fiscal year starting on or after January 01, 2011.  
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, using a two-
tailed test. 
 
Earnings smoothness is the ratio of the standard deviation of net income before extraordinary items (scaled by assets) to the standard deviation of cash flows from 
operations (scaled by assets) multiplied by -1.  
Conservatism is the estimated coefficient of the interaction variable from the timeliness regression of annual earnings (before extraordinary items) on an indicator 
variable on an indicator variable equaling one if the company’s annual return is negative and zero otherwise, the company’s annual return, and the interaction of the 
annual return and the indicator variable. Timeliness is the adjusted R2 from that regression (Earningst = β0 + β1Returnt + β2 Negativet + β3 Returnst x Negativet + εt).  
Earnings is net income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets. Returns is cumulative return from nine months before fiscal year end to three months after fiscal 
year end.  
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Table 10: Subsample Analysis - Insurance Industries 
 
Panel A: Difference-in-differences tests for earnings sustainability 
 
 Insurance industries  Other industries   
Difference 
-in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) 
Measures of 
Earnings sustainability  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Earnings persistence  0.5367 1.2405 ? 0.7038***  0.6906 0.7706 0.0801  - 0.6237*** 
     (-3.77)    (0.26)   (-3.80) 
Earnings predictability  0.3667 0.6088 ? 0.2420***  0.4536 0.5022 0.0486  - 0.1935 
     (-4.89)    (1.05)   (1.05) 
Cash flow predictability  0.4402 0.4582 ? 0.0180  0.5035 0.4871 -0.0163  - 0.0344 
    (-0.71)    (1.04)   (-0.86) 
Accruals quality  -0.1478 -0.0855 ? 0.0623***  -1.7010 -1.2373 0.4638  - -0.4015 
    (7.39)    (0.37)   (-0.05) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values are 
indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests for earnings sustainability before and after the adoption for Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS 
broken down into two subsamples, insurance industries (two digit SIC code is 63 or 64) and the rest. Pre-adoption period includes firm-year observations from 2006 to 
the year before the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations starting on the adoption year onward. For most firms, the adoption year is the 
fiscal year starting on or after January 01, 2011.  
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, two a two-tailed 
test. 
 
Earnings persistence is the coefficient of earnings from the persistence regression (Earningst+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt). 
Earnings predictability is the adjusted R2 from the persistence regression (Earningst+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt).  
Cash flow predictability is the adjusted R2 from the regression of future cash flow from operation against current earnings (before extraordinary items) (CFOt+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt). 
Accruals Quality is the standard deviation of the residuals from the regression of accruals on future year, current year, and previous year’s cash flows from operations 
multiplied by -1 (Accrualst = β0 + β1CFOt-1 + β2CFOt + β3CFOt+1 + εt). 
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Panel B: Cross-sectional tests of sustainability of earnings components 
 
Variables    Prediction Earningst+1 
Accrualst   + 0.4829*** 
    (27.86) 
ΔCASHt   + 0.6176*** 
    (26.71) 
DIST_Dt   + 0.4656*** 
    (10.24) 
DIST_EQt   + 0.5390*** 
    (44.10) 
POST   ? 0.0329* 
    (1.73) 
POST×Accrualst   ? 0.1537*** 
    (4.09) 
POST×ΔCASHt   ? 0.0827 
    (1.50) 
POST×DIST_Dt   ? 0.3625*** 
    (3.49) 
POST×DIST_EQt   ? 0.0044 
    (0.15) 
INSURANCE   - 0.0002 
    (0.35) 
INSURANCE×Accrualst   - -0.1350 
    (-0.38) 
INSURANCE ×ΔCASHt   - -0.2560 
    (-0.67) 
INSURANCE ×DIST_Dt   - -0.0310 
    (-0.04) 
INSURANCE ×DIST_EQt   - -0.0825 
    (-0.14) 
Industry fixed effects    Yes 
Year fixed effects    Yes 
N    6309 
Adj. R2    0.4391 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in 
parentheses. 
 
This table above shows the persistence of accrual and cash flow components of earnings before and after the adoption 
for Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS. The model in this panel shows the decomposition of earnings 
into its components, accruals, retained cash (ΔCASH), distribution to debt holders (DIST_D), and distribution to equity 
holders (DIST_EQ). This panel includes regressions with interactions of earnings components with two indicator 
variables (POST and INSURANCE), respectively. POST takes a value of 1 for observations in the post adoption 
period.  INSURANCE takes a value of 1 for observations for firms that are in insurance industries (two digit SIC code 
is 63 or 64), 0 otherwise. Variables are defined as follows. Earnings: Net income before extraordinary items; Accruals: 
change in net operating assets [(ΔAT- ΔCHE) - ( ΔLT-ΔDLC-ΔDLTT)]; FCF: free cash flows (Earnings-Accruals); 
DIST: distributions to debt and equity holders -1× [ΔDTC+ΔDLTT+(ΔAT-ΔLT-IB)]; DIST_D: distributions to debt 
holders: -1× (ΔDLC+ΔDLTTT); and DIST_EQ: distribution to equity holders -1× (ΔAT-ΔLT-IB). All variables are 
scaled by total assets.  
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Panel C: Difference-in-differences test for value relevance 
  
 Insurance industries  Other industries 
  Difference -in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) 
Measures of 
Value relevance  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Price  0.9792 0.9579 ? -0.0214***  0.6185 0.6278 0.0092**  - -0.0306*** 
     (18.80)    (2.15)   (8.17) 
Return  0.0128 0.0006 ? -0.0122***  0.0310 0.1031 0.0721  - -0.0843*** 
     (9.69)    (-0.20)   (9.66) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values 
are indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests for value relevance before and after the adoption for all Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS broken 
down into two subsamples, insurance industries (two digit SIC code is 63 or 64) and the rest. Pre-adoption period includes firm-year observations from 2006 to the year 
before the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations starting on the adoption year onward. For most firms, the adoption year is the fiscal year 
starting on or after January 01, 2011.  
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, using a two-
tailed test. 
 
Price model: Pricet = EPSt + BVEt +  εt 
Return model: Returnt = Earningst + ΔEarningst + εt 
Price is stock price six months after fiscal year end. EPS is earnings per share. BVE is book value per share. Return is cumulative return 9 months before fiscal year end 
to three months after fiscal year end. Earnings and ΔEarningst are scaled by total assets.  
 
139 
 
 
 
Panel D: Difference-in-differences test for other earnings quality measures 
 
 Insurance industries  Other industries 
  Difference -in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) Measures of Earnings quality  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Earnings smoothness  -0.7076 -0.6782 ? 0.0294***  -1.4295 -1.4493 -0.0198**  - 0.0492** 
     (-2.87)    (-2.16)   (-2.32) 
Conservatism   0.0953 0.2597 ? 0.1644***  0.4139 0.6589 0.2449***  - -0.0805*** 
     (4.66)    (4.57)   (3.97) 
Timeliness  0.1091 0.0129 ? -0.0962***  0.0739 0.1457 0.0718  - -0.1680 
    (8.01)    (0.76)   (0.76) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values are 
indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests for earnings sustainability before and after the adoption for Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS 
broken down into two subsamples, insurance industries (two digit SIC code is 63 or 64) and the rest. Pre-adoption period includes firm-year observations from 2006 to 
the year before the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations starting on the adoption year onward. For most firms, the adoption year is the 
fiscal year starting on or after January 01, 2011.  
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, using a two-
tailed test. 
 
Earnings smoothness is the ratio of the standard deviation of net income before extraordinary items (scaled by assets) to the standard deviation of cash flows from 
operations (scaled by assets) multiplied by -1.  
Conservatism is the estimated coefficient of the interaction variable from the timeliness regression of annual earnings (before extraordinary items) on an indicator 
variable on an indicator variable equaling one if the company’s annual return is negative and zero otherwise, the company’s annual return, and the interaction of the 
annual return and the indicator variable. Timeliness is the adjusted R2 from that regression (Earningst = β0 + β1Returnt + β2 Negativet + β3 Returnst x Negativet + εt).  
Earnings is net income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets. Returns is cumulative return from nine months before fiscal year end to three months after fiscal 
year end.  
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Table 11: Subsample Analysis - Litigious Industries 
 
Panel A: Difference-in-differences tests for earnings sustainability 
 
 Litigious industries  Other industries   
Difference 
-in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) 
Measures of 
Earnings sustainability  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Earnings persistence  0.7416 1.3158 ? 0.5742  0.6743 0.7244 0.0501  - 0.5241 
     (-0.13)    (0.91)   (-0.38) 
Earnings predictability  0.5575 0.6954 ? 0.1379  0.4319 0.4851 0.0532  - 0.0847 
     (-0.44)    (0.56)   (0.56) 
Cash flow predictability  0.6315 0.5924 ? -0.0391  0.4679 0.4885 0.0206  - -0.0597 
    (-0.12)    (-0.19)   (-0.05) 
Accruals quality  -0.3564 -0.4503 ? -0.0939***  -1.7770 -1.2814 0.4956  - -0.5894 
    (10.10)    (-0.53)   (1.63) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values 
are indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests for earnings sustainability before and after the adoption for Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS 
broken down into two subsamples, litigious industries (SIC codes are 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, 5200-5961, 7371-7379) and the rest. Pre-adoption period 
includes firm-year observations from 2006 to the year before the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations starting on the adoption year 
onward. For most firms, the adoption year is the fiscal year starting on or after January 01, 2011.  
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, two a two-tailed 
test. 
 
Earnings persistence is the coefficient of earnings from the persistence regression (Earningst+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt). 
Earnings predictability is the adjusted R2 from the persistence regression (Earningst+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt).  
Cash flow predictability is the adjusted R2 from the regression of future cash flow from operation against current earnings (before extraordinary items) (CFOt+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt). 
Accruals Quality is the standard deviation of the residuals from the regression of accruals on future year, current year, and previous year’s cash flows from operations 
multiplied by -1 (Accrualst = β0 + β1CFOt-1 + β2CFOt + β3CFOt+1 + εt) 
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Panel B: Cross-sectional tests of sustainability of earnings components 
 
Variables    Prediction Earningst+1 
Accrualst   + 0.4965*** 
    (27.51) 
ΔCASHt   + 0.6093*** 
    (25.16) 
DIST_Dt   + 0.5062*** 
    (10.65) 
DIST_EQt   + 0.5281*** 
    (40.70) 
POST   ? 0.0338* 
    (1.78) 
POST×Accrualst   ? 0.1587*** 
    (4.23) 
POST×ΔCASHt   ? 0.0929* 
    (1.69) 
POST×DIST_Dt   ? 0.3574*** 
    (3.45) 
POST×DIST_EQt   ? 0.0091 
    (0.31) 
HI-LIT   - -0.0845*** 
    (-2.98) 
HI-LIT ×Accrualst   - -0.2379*** 
    (-4.45) 
HI-LIT ×ΔCASHt   - 0.0309 
    (0.49) 
HI-LIT ×DIST_Dt   - -0.2981** 
    (-2.28) 
HI-LIT ×DIST_EQt   - -0.0906*** 
    (-2.71) 
Industry fixed effects    Yes 
Year fixed effects    Yes 
N    5847 
Adj. R2    0.4405 
     
F-test: POST×Accrualst + HI-LITxAccruals = 0: F = 6.31*** 
F-test: POST×DIST_Dt + HI-LITxDIST_D = 0: F = 6.22*** 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. 
 
This table above shows the persistence of accrual and cash flow components of earnings before and after the adoption 
for Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS. The model in this panel shows the decomposition of earnings 
into its components, accruals, retained cash (ΔCASH), distribution to debt holders (DIST_D), and distribution to equity 
holders (DIST_EQ). This panel includes regressions with interactions of earnings components with two indicator 
variables (POST and Hi-LIT), respectively. POST takes a value of 1 for observations in the post adoption period.  HI-
LIT takes a value of 1 for observations for firms that are in litigious industries (SIC codes are 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 
3600-3674, 5200-5961, 7371-7379), 0 otherwise. Variables are defined as follows. Earnings: Net income before 
extraordinary items; Accruals: change in net operating assets [(ΔAT- ΔCHE) - ( ΔLT-ΔDLC-ΔDLTT)]; FCF: free cash 
flows (Earnings-Accruals); DIST: distributions to debt and equity holders -1× [ΔDTC+ΔDLTT+(ΔAT-ΔLT-IB)]; 
DIST_D: distributions to debt holders: -1× (ΔDLC+ΔDLTTT); and DIST_EQ: distribution to equity holders -1× (ΔAT-
ΔLT-IB). All variables are scaled by total assets.  
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Panel C: Difference-in-differences test for value relevance 
  
 Litigious industries  Other industries 
  Difference -in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) 
Measures of 
Value relevance  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Price  0.6793 0.7122 ? 0.0329  0.8186 0.8479 0.0293  - 0.0036 
     (0.01)    (-0.40)   (0.23) 
Return  0.0542 0.0071 ? -0.0471***  0.0281 0.1351 0.1070  - -0.1541*** 
     (8.20)    (0.01)   (7.52) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values 
are indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests for value relevance before and after the adoption for all Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS broken 
down into two subsamples, litigious industries (SIC codes are 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, 5200-5961, 7371-7379) and the rest. Post-adoption period includes 
firm-year observations starting on the adoption year onward. For most firms, the adoption year is the fiscal year starting on or after January 01, 2011.  
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, using a two-
tailed test. 
 
Price model: Pricet = EPSt + BVEt +  εt 
Return model: Returnt = Earningst + ΔEarningst + εt 
Price is stock price six months after fiscal year end. EPS is earnings per share. BVE is book value per share. Return is cumulative return 9 months before fiscal year end 
to three months after fiscal year end. Earnings and ΔEarningst are scaled by total assets.  
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Panel D: Difference-in-differences test for other earnings quality measures 
 
 Litigious industries  Other industries   
Difference 
-in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) 
Measures of 
Earnings quality 
 Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Earnings smoothness  -1.1916 -1.2535 ? -0.0619*  -1.5628 -1.5594 0.0034  - -0.0653* 
     (-1.74)    (0.87)   (-1.91) 
Conservatism   0.7132 0.6850 ? -0.0282  0.3895 0.6510 0.2615  - -0.2897 
     (0.22)    (1.24)   (-0.07) 
Timeliness  0.0965 0.0487 ? -0.0478***  0.0741 0.1745 0.1004*  - -0.1482* 
    (6.99)    (1.93)   (1.93) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values are 
indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests for earnings sustainability before and after the adoption for Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS 
broken down into two subsamples, litigious industries (SIC codes are 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, 5200-5961, 7371-7379) and the rest. Post-adoption period 
includes firm-year observations starting on the adoption year onward. For most firms, the adoption year is the fiscal year starting on or after January 01, 2011.  
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, using a two-
tailed test. 
 
Earnings smoothness is the ratio of the standard deviation of net income before extraordinary items (scaled by assets) to the standard deviation of cash flows from 
operations (scaled by assets) multiplied by -1.  
Conservatism is the estimated coefficient of the interaction variable from the timeliness regression of annual earnings (before extraordinary items) on an indicator 
variable on an indicator variable equaling one if the company’s annual return is negative and zero otherwise, the company’s annual return, and the interaction of the 
annual return and the indicator variable. Timeliness is the adjusted R2 from that regression (Earningst = β0 + β1Returnt + β2 Negativet + β3 Returnst x Negativet + εt).  
Earnings is net income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets. Returns is cumulative return from nine months before fiscal year end to three months after fiscal 
year end.  
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Table 12: Subsample Analysis – Firms with Intense Use of Fair Value Accounting 
 
Panel A: Difference-in-differences tests for earnings sustainability 
 
 Firms with intense use of fair value accounting  Firms with minimal use of fair value accounting   
Difference 
-in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) 
Measures of 
Earnings sustainability 
 Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred. 
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred. 
             
Earnings persistence  0.6020 1.0139 ? 0.4118  0.7152 0.7215 0.0063  ? 0.4056 
     (-0.62)    (-0.71)   (0.12) 
Earnings predictability  0.3832 0.5449 ? 0.1618  0.4602 0.4509 -0.0094  ? 0.1711 
     (-0.06)    (0.30)   (0.30) 
Cash flow predictability  0.5340 0.4866 ? -0.0474**  0.3869 0.2095 -0.1773**  ? 0.1300 
    (2.24)    (2.56)   (0.02) 
Accruals quality  -3.4510 -2.2643 ? 1.1867  -0.3163 -0.3733 -0.0570***  ? 1.2437 
    (-1.12)    (4.59)   (-1.20) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values are 
indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests for earnings sustainability before and after the adoption for all Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS 
broken down into two subsamples, firms with intense use of fair value accounting and firms with minimal use of fair value accounting. Firms with intense use of fair 
value accounting are those in the top quintile and firms with minimal use of fair value accounting are those in the bottom quintile. Quintiles are constructed based on the 
amount of fair value assets in three years before the adoption year (scaled by total assets). Pre-adoption period includes firm-year observations from 2006 to the year 
before the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations starting on the adoption year onward. For most firms, the adoption year is the fiscal year 
starting on or after January 01, 2011.  
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, two a two-tailed 
test. 
 
Earnings persistence is the coefficient of earnings from the persistence regression (Earningst+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt). 
Earnings predictability is the adjusted R2 from the persistence regression (Earningst+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt).  
Cash flow predictability is the adjusted R2 from the regression of future cash flow from operation against current earnings (before extraordinary items) (CFOt+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt). 
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Accruals Quality is the standard deviation of the residuals from the regression of accruals on future year, current year, and previous year’s cash flows from operations 
multiplied by -1 (Accrualst = β0 + β1CFOt-1 + β2CFOt + β3CFOt+1 + εt). 
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Panel B: Cross-sectional tests of sustainability of earnings components 
 
Variables    Prediction Earningst+1 
Accrualst   + 0.5023*** 
    (9.07) 
ΔCASHt   + 0.6531*** 
    (9.24) 
DIST_Dt   + 0.4699*** 
    (4.07) 
DIST_EQt   + 0.5542*** 
    (14.26) 
POST   ? 0.0327 
    (0.78) 
POST×Accrualst   ? 0.2755*** 
    (3.69) 
POST×ΔCASHt   ? -0.0450 
    (-0.50) 
POST×DIST_Dt   ? 0.6217*** 
    (3.14) 
POST×DIST_EQt   ? 0.0160 
    (0.29) 
FAIRVALUE   ? -0.1157*** 
    (-5.90) 
FAIRVALUE ×Accrualst   ? -0.2348*** 
    (-3.61) 
FAIRVALUE ×ΔCASHt   ? -0.1306 
    (-1.63) 
FAIRVALUE ×DIST_Dt   ? -0.2812* 
    (-1.75) 
FAIRVALUE ×DIST_EQt   ? -0.1026** 
    (-2.29) 
Industry fixed effects    Yes 
Year fixed effects    Yes 
N    1896 
Adj. R2    0.4655 
     
F-test: POST×Accrualst + FAIRVALUExAccruals = 0: F = 5.44*** 
F-test: POST×DIST_Dt + FAIRVALUExDIST_D = 0: F = 7.64*** 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. 
 
This table above shows the persistence of accrual and cash flow components of earnings before and after the adoption 
for Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS. The model in this panel shows the decomposition of earnings 
into its components, accruals, retained cash (ΔCASH), distribution to debt holders (DIST_D), and distribution to equity 
holders (DIST_EQ). This panel includes regressions with interactions of earnings components with two indicator 
variables (POST and FAIRVALUE), respectively. POST takes a value of 1 for observations in the post adoption 
period.  FAIRVALUE takes a value of 1 for observations for firms with intense use of fair value accounting, 0 for 
observations for firms with minimal use of fair value accounting. Firms with intense use of fair value accounting are 
those in the top quintile and firms with minimal use of fair value accounting are those in the bottom quintile. Quintiles 
are constructed based on the amount of fair value assets in three years before the adoption year (scaled by total assets). 
Variables are defined as follows. Earnings: Net income before extraordinary items; Accruals: change in net operating 
assets [(ΔAT- ΔCHE) - ( ΔLT-ΔDLC-ΔDLTT)]; FCF: free cash flows (Earnings-Accruals); DIST: distributions to debt 
and equity holders -1× [ΔDTC+ΔDLTT+(ΔAT-ΔLT-IB)]; DIST_D: distributions to debt holders: -1× 
(ΔDLC+ΔDLTTT); and DIST_EQ: distribution to equity holders -1× (ΔAT-ΔLT-IB). All variables are scaled by total 
assets. 
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Panel C: Difference-in-differences test for value relevance 
  
 
Firms with LARGE amount of fair value 
assets  
Firms with SMALL amount of fair value 
assets 
  
Difference 
-in 
-
differences 
(3 - 6) 
Measures of 
Value relevance  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred. 
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Price  0.9532 0.9471 ? -0.0061***  0.6828 0.6114 -0.0714***  ? 0.0653 
     (4.85)    (2.72)   (0.10) 
Return  0.0472 0.0431 ? -0.0041***  0.0128 0.1682 0.1554  ? -0.1595** 
     (4.19)    (0.90)   (2.02) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values are 
indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests for value relevance before and after the adoption for all Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS broken 
down into two subsamples, firms with intense use of fair value accounting and firms with minimal use of fair value accounting. Firms with intense use of fair value 
accounting are those in the top quintile and firms with minimal use of fair value accounting are those in the bottom quintile. Quintiles are constructed based on the 
amount of fair value assets in three years before the adoption year (scaled by total assets). Pre-adoption period includes firm-year observations from 2006 to the year 
before the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations starting on the adoption year onward. For most firms, the adoption year is the fiscal year 
starting on or after January 01, 2011.  
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, using a two-
tailed test. 
 
Price model: Pricet = EPSt + BVEt +  εt 
Return model: Returnt = Earningst + ΔEarningst + εt 
Price is stock price six months after fiscal year end. EPS is earnings per share. BVE is book value per share. Return is cumulative return 9 months before fiscal year end 
to three months after fiscal year end. Earnings and ΔEarningst are scaled by total assets.  
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Panel D: Difference-in-differences test for other earnings quality measures 
 
 
Firms with LARGE amount of fair value 
assets  
Firms with SMALL amount of fair value 
assets 
  
Difference 
-in 
-
differences 
(3 - 6) 
Measures of 
Earnings quality  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred. 
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Earnings smoothness  -1.3504 -1.2402 ? 0.1101  -1.3948 -2.1992 -0.8044  ? 0.9145 
     (0.62)    (1.31)   (-1.05) 
Conservatism   0.4215 1.6303 ? 1.2089  0.3037 0.5483 0.2446**  ? 0.9643* 
     (-1.23)    (2.18)   (-1.94) 
Timeliness  0.0486 0.1286 ? 0.0800***  0.1006 0.2443 0.1436***  ? -0.0636*** 
    (3.42)    (2.90)   (2.90) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values are 
indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests of earnings quality before and after the adoption for all Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS broken 
down into two subsamples, firms with intense use of fair value accounting and firms with minimal use of fair value accounting. Firms with intense use of fair value 
accounting are those in the top quintile and firms with minimal use of fair value accounting are those in the bottom quintile. Quintiles are constructed based on the 
amount of fair value assets in three years before the adoption year (scaled by total assets).  Pre-adoption period includes firm-year observations from 2006 to the year 
before the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations starting on the adoption year onward. For most firms, the adoption year is the fiscal year 
starting on or after January 01, 2011.  
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, using a two-
tailed test. 
 
Earnings smoothness is the ratio of the standard deviation of net income before extraordinary items (scaled by assets) to the standard deviation of cash flows from 
operations (scaled by assets) multiplied by -1.  
Conservatism is the estimated coefficient of the interaction variable from the timeliness regression of annual earnings (before extraordinary items) on an indicator 
variable on an indicator variable equaling one if the company’s annual return is negative and zero otherwise, the company’s annual return, and the interaction of the 
annual return and the indicator variable. Timeliness is the adjusted R2 from that regression (Earningst = β0 + β1Returnt + β2 Negativet + β3 Returnst x Negativet + εt).  
Earnings is net income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets. Returns is cumulative return from nine months before fiscal year end to three months after fiscal 
year end.  
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Table 13: Subsample Analysis – R&D Intensive Firms 
 
Panel A: Difference-in-differences tests for earnings sustainability 
 
 R&D intensive firms  Non-R&D intensive firms 
  Difference -in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) 
Measures of 
Earnings sustainability  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Earnings persistence  0.6229 1.5870 ? 0.9641  0.7066 0.8123 0.1057  + 0.8584 
     (-1.38)    (0.53)   (-1.40) 
Earnings predictability  0.5103 0.5408 ? 0.0305  0.5186 0.3619 -0.1566***  + 0.1871*** 
     (0.43)    (2.89)   (2.89) 
Cash flow predictability  0.5476 0.5371 ? -0.0105  0.4316 0.3472 -0.0844  + 0.0739 
    (-0.08)    (1.59)   (-1.14) 
Accruals quality  -0.5962 -0.4655 ? 0.1307*  -0.3029 -0.3365 -0.0336**  + 0.1643 
    (1.83)    (2.35)   (1.11) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values 
are indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests for earnings sustainability before and after the adoption for all Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS 
broken down into two subsamples, R&D intensive firms and non- R&D intensive firms. R&D intensive firms are those in the top quintile and non-R&D intensive firms 
are those in the bottom quintile. Quintiles are constructed based on the average amount of R&D expenditures in three years before the adoption year (scaled by total 
assets). Pre-adoption period includes firm-year observations from 2006 to the year before the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations starting 
on the adoption year onward. For most firms, the adoption year is the fiscal year starting on or after January 01, 2011.  
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, two a two-tailed 
test. 
 
Earnings persistence is the coefficient of earnings from the persistence regression (Earningst+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt). 
Earnings predictability is the adjusted R2 from the persistence regression (Earningst+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt).  
Cash flow predictability is the adjusted R2 from the regression of future cash flow from operation against current earnings (before extraordinary items) (CFOt+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt). 
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Accruals Quality is the standard deviation of the residuals from the regression of accruals on future year, current year, and previous year’s cash flows from operations 
multiplied by -1 (Accrualst = β0 + β1CFOt-1 + β2CFOt + β3CFOt+1 + εt). 
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Panel B: Cross-sectional tests of sustainability of earnings components 
 
Variables    Prediction Earningst+1 
Accrualst   + 0.7419*** 
    (4.92) 
ΔCASHt   + 0.8615*** 
    (5.02) 
DIST_Dt   + 1.0071*** 
    (4.24) 
DIST_EQt   + 0.5585*** 
    (6.15) 
POST   ? -0.0420 
    (-0.36) 
POST×Accrualst   ? 0.1074 
    (0.57) 
POST×ΔCASHt   ? 0.4343** 
    (1.98) 
POST×DIST_Dt   ? 0.6265* 
    (1.71) 
POST×DIST_EQt   ? 0.0649 
    (0.62) 
 R&D   + -0.0884 
    (-0.77) 
 R&D ×Accrualst   + -0.4344** 
    (-2.49) 
 R&D ×ΔCASHt   + 0.0311 
    (0.16) 
 R&D ×DIST_Dt   + -0.4683 
    (-1.60) 
 R&D ×DIST_EQt   + 0.1710* 
    (1.76) 
Industry fixed effects    Yes 
Year fixed effects    Yes 
N    705 
Adj. R2    0.7132 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in 
parentheses. 
 
This table above shows the persistence of accrual and cash flow components of earnings before and after the adoption 
for Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS. The model in this panel shows the decomposition of earnings 
into its components, accruals, retained cash (ΔCASH), distribution to debt holders (DIST_D), and distribution to equity 
holders (DIST_EQ). This panel includes regressions with interactions of earnings components with two indicator 
variables (POST and R&D), respectively. POST takes a value of 1 for observations in the post adoption period.  R&D 
takes a value of 1 for observations for R&D intensive firms, 0 for non-R&D intensive firms. R&D intensive firms are 
those in the top quintile and non-R&D intensive firms are those in the bottom quintile. Quintiles are constructed based 
on the average amount of R&D expenditures in three years before the adoption year (scaled by total assets). Variables 
are defined as follows. Earnings: Net income before extraordinary items; Accruals: change in net operating assets 
[(ΔAT- ΔCHE) - ( ΔLT-ΔDLC-ΔDLTT)]; FCF: free cash flows (Earnings-Accruals); DIST: distributions to debt and 
equity holders -1× [ΔDTC+ΔDLTT+(ΔAT-ΔLT-IB)]; DIST_D: distributions to debt holders: -1× (ΔDLC+ΔDLTTT); 
and DIST_EQ: distribution to equity holders -1× (ΔAT-ΔLT-IB). All variables are scaled by total assets.  
 
  
152 
 
 
 
Panel C: Difference-in-differences test for value relevance 
  
 R&D intensive firms  Non-R&D intensive firms 
  Difference -in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) 
Measures of 
Value relevance  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Price  0.3955 0.4561 ? 0.0606  0.7405 0.5475 -0.1930***  + 0.2536** 
     (0.07)    (6.36)   (-2.31) 
Return  0.0463 0.0163 ? -0.0300***  0.0234 0.2020 0.1786***  + -0.2086 
     (4.58)    (3.51)   (-0.72) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values 
are indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests for value relevance before and after the adoption for all Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS broken 
down into two subsamples, R&D intensive firms and non- R&D intensive firms. R&D intensive firms are those in the top quintile and non-R&D intensive firms are those 
in the bottom quintile. Quintiles are constructed based on the average amount of R&D expenditures in three years before the adoption year (scaled by total assets). Pre-
adoption period includes firm-year observations from 2006 to the year before the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations starting on the 
adoption year onward. For most firms, the adoption year is the fiscal year starting on or after January 01, 2011.  
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, using a two-
tailed test. 
 
Price model: Pricet = EPSt + BVEt +  εt 
Return model: Returnt = Earningst + ΔEarningst + εt 
Price is stock price six months after fiscal year end. EPS is earnings per share. BVE is book value per share. Return is cumulative return 9 months before fiscal year end 
to three months after fiscal year end. Earnings and ΔEarningst are scaled by total assets.  
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Panel D: Difference-in-differences test for other earnings quality measures 
 
 R&D intensive firms  Non-R&D intensive firms 
  Difference -in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) Measures of Earnings quality  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
Earnings smoothness  -1.5479 -1.0263 ? 0.5216***  -1.1657 -1.5510 -0.3853**  + 0.9069*** 
     (-2.95)    (2.06)   (-3.25) 
Conservatism   0.3306 0.0499 ? -0.2807  0.3568 0.4874 0.1306***  + -0.4113 
     (0.44)    (-3.35)   (0.92) 
Timeliness  0.0009 0.0010 ? 0.0001***  0.0836 0.3195 0.2359  + -0.2358 
    (11.58)    (-1.32)   (-1.32) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values are 
indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests of earnings quality before and after the adoption for all Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS broken 
down into two subsamples, R&D intensive firms and non- R&D intensive firms. R&D intensive firms are those in the top quintile and non-R&D intensive firms are those 
in the bottom quintile. Quintiles are constructed based on the average amount of R&D expenditures in three years before the adoption year (scaled by total assets). Pre-
adoption period includes firm-year observations from 2006 to the year before the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations starting on the 
adoption year onward. For most firms, the adoption year is the fiscal year starting on or after January 01, 2011.  
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, using a two-
tailed test. 
 
Earnings smoothness is the ratio of the standard deviation of net income before extraordinary items (scaled by assets) to the standard deviation of cash flows from 
operations (scaled by assets) multiplied by -1.  
Conservatism is the estimated coefficient of the interaction variable from the timeliness regression of annual earnings (before extraordinary items) on an indicator 
variable on an indicator variable equaling one if the company’s annual return is negative and zero otherwise, the company’s annual return, and the interaction of the 
annual return and the indicator variable. Timeliness is the adjusted R2 from that regression (Earningst = β0 + β1Returnt + β2 Negativet + β3 Returnst x Negativet + εt).  
Earnings is net income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets. Returns is cumulative return from nine months before fiscal year end to three months after fiscal 
year end.  
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Table 14: Subsample Analysis - IFRS Predominant Industries 
 
Panel A: Difference-in-differences tests for earnings sustainability 
 
 IFRS predominant industries  Other industries 
  Difference -in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) 
Measures of 
Earnings sustainability  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Earnings persistence  0.6017 0.7712 ? 0.1695  0.7360 0.7519 0.0159  ? 0.1537* 
     (1.42)    (-1.00)   (1.67) 
Earnings predictability  0.3386 0.4928 ? 0.1542  0.5374 0.5023 -0.0352  ? 0.1894 
     (0.67)    (-0.30)   (-0.30) 
Cash flow predictability  0.4300 0.4535 ? 0.0235  0.5412 0.4912 -0.0500  ? 0.0735 
    (0.67)    (-0.66)   (0.98) 
Accruals quality  -2.6207 -1.7551 ? 0.8656  -0.3619 -0.3586 0.0033  ? 0.8623 
    (0.89)    (0.99)   (0.85) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values 
are indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests for earnings sustainability before and after the adoption for Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS 
broken down into two subsamples, industries in which IFRS is the dominant set of accounting standards and the rest. An industry is identified as an IFRS-dominant 
industry when the most common set of accounting standards among the 30 largest firms in a given industry globally (based on SIC2) is IFRS. Pre-adoption period 
includes firm-year observations from 2006 to the year before the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations starting on the adoption year 
onward. For most firms, the adoption year is the fiscal year starting on or after January 01, 2011.  
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, two a two-tailed 
test. 
 
Earnings persistence is the coefficient of earnings from the persistence regression (Earningst+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt). 
Earnings predictability is the adjusted R2 from the persistence regression (Earningst+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt).  
Cash flow predictability is the adjusted R2 from the regression of future cash flow from operation against current earnings (before extraordinary items) (CFOt+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt). 
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Accruals Quality is the standard deviation of the residuals from the regression of accruals on future year, current year, and previous year’s cash flows from operations 
multiplied by -1 (Accrualst = β0 + β1CFOt-1 + β2CFOt + β3CFOt+1 + εt). 
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Panel B: Cross-sectional tests of sustainability of earnings components 
 
Variables    Prediction Earningst+1 
Accrualst   + 0.4625*** 
    (20.10) 
ΔCASHt   + 0.6042*** 
    (18.86) 
DIST_Dt   + 0.4289*** 
    (7.86) 
DIST_EQt   + 0.6105*** 
    (38.57) 
POST   ? 0.0410** 
    (2.16) 
POST×Accrualst   ? 0.1532*** 
    (4.09) 
POST×ΔCASHt   ? 0.0929* 
    (1.69) 
POST×DIST_Dt   ? 0.3756*** 
    (3.63) 
POST×DIST_EQt   ? 0.0023 
    (0.08) 
IFRS-DOM   ? 0.0015 
    (0.53) 
IFRS-DOM ×Accrualst   ? 0.0195 
    (0.63) 
IFRS-DOM ×ΔCASHt   ? -0.0265 
    (-0.63) 
IFRS-DOM ×DIST_Dt   ? 0.0519 
    (0.61) 
IFRS-DOM ×DIST_EQt   ? -0.1475*** 
    (-6.58) 
Industry fixed effects    Yes 
Year fixed effects    Yes 
N    5847 
Adj. R2    0.4420 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. 
 
This table above shows the persistence of accrual and cash flow components of earnings before and after the adoption 
for Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS. The model in this panel shows the decomposition of earnings 
into its components, accruals, retained cash (ΔCASH), distribution to debt holders (DIST_D), and distribution to equity 
holders (DIST_EQ). This panel includes regressions with interactions of earnings components with two indicator 
variables (POST and IFRS-DOM), respectively. POST takes a value of 1 for observations in the post adoption period.  
IFRS-DOM takes a value of 1 for observations for firms in industries in which IFRS is the dominant set of accounting 
standards, 0 otherwise. An industry is identified as an IFRS-dominant industry when the most common set of 
accounting standards among the 30 largest firms in a given industry globally (based on SIC2) is IFRS, 0 otherwise. 
Variables are defined as follows. Earnings: Net income before extraordinary items; Accruals: change in net operating 
assets [(ΔAT- ΔCHE) - ( ΔLT-ΔDLC-ΔDLTT)]; FCF: free cash flows (Earnings-Accruals); DIST: distributions to debt 
and equity holders -1× [ΔDTC+ΔDLTT+(ΔAT-ΔLT-IB)]; DIST_D: distributions to debt holders: -1× 
(ΔDLC+ΔDLTTT); and DIST_EQ: distribution to equity holders -1× (ΔAT-ΔLT-IB). All variables are scaled by total 
assets.  
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Panel C: Difference-in-differences test for value relevance 
  
 IFRS predominant industries  Other industries 
  Difference -in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) 
Measures of 
Value relevance  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Price  0.5265 0.8078 ? 0.2812***  0.8359 0.8405 0.0045  ? 0.2767*** 
     (-4.95)    (0.76)   (-3.64) 
Return  0.0286 0.0946 ? 0.0660  0.0367 0.0927 0.0560  ? 0.0100 
     (0.22)    (1.40)   (-1.58) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values 
are indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests for value relevance before and after the adoption for all Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS broken 
down into two subsamples, industries in which IFRS is the dominant set of accounting standards and the rest. An industry is identified as an IFRS-dominant industry 
when the most common set of accounting standards among the 30 largest firms in a given industry globally (based on SIC2) is IFRS. Pre-adoption period includes firm-
year observations from 2006 to the year before the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations starting on the adoption year onward. For most 
firms, the adoption year is the fiscal year starting on or after January 01, 2011.  
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, using a two-
tailed test. 
 
Price model: Pricet = EPSt + BVEt +  εt 
Return model: Returnt = Earningst + ΔEarningst + εt 
Price is stock price six months after fiscal year end. EPS is earnings per share. BVE is book value per share. Return is cumulative return 9 months before fiscal year end 
to three months after fiscal year end. Earnings and ΔEarningst are scaled by total assets.  
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Panel D: Difference-in-differences test for other earnings quality measures 
 
 IFRS predominant industries  Other industries 
  Difference -in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) Measures of Earnings quality  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Earnings smoothness  -1.7299 -1.4725 ? 0.2574  -1.3056 -1.4722 -0.1666  ? 0.4240 
     (-0.55)    (0.24)   (-0.60) 
Conservatism   0.2937 0.6369 ? 0.3432  0.4744 0.7346 0.2602  ? 0.0830 
     (0.68)    (-1.27)   (1.20) 
Timeliness  0.0508 0.1076 ? 0.0568  0.0865 0.1718 0.0853***  ? -0.0285*** 
    (0.07)    (2.61)   (2.61) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values are 
indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests for earnings sustainability before and after the adoption for Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS 
broken down into two subsamples, industries in which IFRS is the dominant set of accounting standards and the rest. An industry is identified as an IFRS-dominant 
industry when the most common set of accounting standards among the 30 largest firms in a given industry globally (based on SIC2) is IFRS. Pre-adoption period 
includes firm-year observations from 2006 to the year before the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations starting on the adoption year 
onward. For most firms, the adoption year is the fiscal year starting on or after January 01, 2011.  
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, using a two-
tailed test. 
 
Earnings smoothness is the ratio of the standard deviation of net income before extraordinary items (scaled by assets) to the standard deviation of cash flows from 
operations (scaled by assets) multiplied by -1.  
Conservatism is the estimated coefficient of the interaction variable from the timeliness regression of annual earnings (before extraordinary items) on an indicator 
variable on an indicator variable equaling one if the company’s annual return is negative and zero otherwise, the company’s annual return, and the interaction of the 
annual return and the indicator variable. Timeliness is the adjusted R2 from that regression (Earningst = β0 + β1Returnt + β2 Negativet + β3 Returnst x Negativet + εt).  
Earnings is net income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets. Returns is cumulative return from nine months before fiscal year end to three months after fiscal 
year end.  
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Table 15: Subsample Analysis – Firms with Negative Earnings 
 
Panel A: Difference-in-differences tests for earnings sustainability 
 
 Negative earnings  Positive earnings 
  Difference -in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) Measures of Earnings sustainability  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Earnings persistence  0.6605 0.8323 ? 0.1719  0.2182 0.2533 0.0352**  ? 0.1367 
     (0.44)    (1.99)   (-1.44) 
Earnings predictability  0.4194 0.4673 ? 0.0479  0.0404 0.0282 -0.0123***  ? 0.0602*** 
     (-0.28)    (5.35)   (5.35) 
Cash flow predictability  0.5170 0.4154 ? -0.1015  0.0337 0.0863 0.0525  ? -0.1541 
    (-0.83)    (1.50)   (-1.49) 
Accruals quality  -2.2015 -1.6146 ? 0.5869  -0.3408 -0.2961 0.0448***  ? 0.5422 
    (0.70)    (-3.41)   (1.01) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values are 
indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests for earnings sustainability before and after the adoption for all Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS 
broken down into two subsamples, firms with negative earnings and firms with positive earnings. Pre-adoption period includes firm-year observations from 2006 to the 
year before the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations starting on the adoption year onward. For most firms, the adoption year is the fiscal 
year starting on or after January 01, 2011.  
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, two a two-tailed 
test. 
 
Earnings persistence is the coefficient of earnings from the persistence regression (Earningst+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt). 
Earnings predictability is the adjusted R2 from the persistence regression (Earningst+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt).  
Cash flow predictability is the adjusted R2 from the regression of future cash flow from operation against current earnings (before extraordinary items) (CFOt+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt). 
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Accruals Quality is the standard deviation of the residuals from the regression of accruals on future year, current year, and previous year’s cash flows from operations 
multiplied by -1 (Accrualst = β0 + β1CFOt-1 + β2CFOt + β3CFOt+1 + εt). 
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Panel B: Cross-sectional tests of sustainability of earnings components 
 
Variables    Prediction Earningst+1 
Accrualst   ? 0.0346 
    (0.72) 
ΔCASHt   ? 0.1722*** 
    (3.25) 
DIST_Dt   ? -0.0636 
    (-0.75) 
DIST_EQt   ? 0.2312*** 
    (5.59) 
POST   ? 0.0222 
    (1.18) 
POST×Accrualst   ? 0.1456*** 
    (3.93) 
POST×ΔCASHt   ? 0.0565 
    (1.04) 
POST×DIST_Dt   ? 0.3336*** 
    (3.25) 
POST×DIST_EQt   ? -0.0155 
    (-0.53) 
LOSS   ? -0.1065*** 
    (-11.11) 
LOSS ×Accrualst   ? 0.4493*** 
    (8.96) 
LOSS ×ΔCASHt   ? 0.4490*** 
    (7.76) 
LOSS ×DIST_Dt   ? 0.5106*** 
    (5.34) 
LOSS ×DIST_EQt   ? 0.2879*** 
    (6.65) 
Industry fixed effects    Yes 
Year fixed effects    Yes 
N    5847 
Adj. R2    0.4531 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in 
parentheses. 
 
This table above shows the persistence of accrual and cash flow components of earnings before and after the adoption 
for Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS. The model in this panel shows the decomposition of earnings 
into its components, accruals, retained cash (ΔCASH), distribution to debt holders (DIST_D), and distribution to equity 
holders (DIST_EQ). This panel includes regressions with interactions of earnings components with two indicator 
variables (POST and LOSS), respectively. POST takes a value of 1 for observations in the post adoption period.  LOSS 
takes a value of 1 for observations for firms with NEGATIVE earnings, 0 otherwise. Variables are defined as follows. 
Earnings: Net income before extraordinary items; Accruals: change in net operating assets [(ΔAT- ΔCHE) - ( ΔLT-
ΔDLC-ΔDLTT)]; FCF: free cash flows (Earnings-Accruals); DIST: distributions to debt and equity holders -1× 
[ΔDTC+ΔDLTT+(ΔAT-ΔLT-IB)]; DIST_D: distributions to debt holders: -1× (ΔDLC+ΔDLTTT); and DIST_EQ: 
distribution to equity holders -1× (ΔAT-ΔLT-IB). All variables are scaled by total assets.  
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Panel C: Difference-in-differences test for value relevance 
  
 Negative earnings  Positive earnings 
  Difference -in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) Measures of Value relevance  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Price  0.8115 0.9000 ? 0.0885***  0.8028 0.8348 0.0321***  ? 0.0564*** 
     (-10.38)    (-2.86)   (-8.65) 
Return  0.0235 0.0149 ? -0.0086**  0.0358 0.0011 -0.0348**  ? 0.0262 
     (2.14)    (2.34)   (-0.49) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values 
are indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests for value relevance before and after the adoption for all Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS broken 
down into two subsamples, firms with negative firms and firms with positive earnings. Pre-adoption period includes firm-year observations from 2006 to the year before 
the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations starting on the adoption year onward. For most firms, the adoption year is the fiscal year starting 
on or after January 01, 2011.  
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, using a two-
tailed test. 
 
Price model: Pricet = EPSt + BVEt +  εt 
Return model: Returnt = Earningst + ΔEarningst + εt 
Price is stock price six months after fiscal year end. EPS is earnings per share. BVE is book value per share. Return is cumulative return 9 months before fiscal year end 
to three months after fiscal year end. Earnings and ΔEarningst are scaled by total assets.  
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Panel D: Difference-in-differences test for other earnings quality measures 
 
 Negative earnings  Positive earnings 
  Difference -in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) Measures of Earnings quality  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Earnings smoothness  -1.4790 -1.4426 ? 0.0365  -0.8575 -0.7218 0.1356  + -0.0992 
     (0.03)    (-0.49)   (0.29) 
Conservatism   0.1886 0.6113 ? 0.4226  0.0141 0.0573 0.0431  ? 0.4794 
     (-0.71)    (1.40)   (-0.97) 
Timeliness  0.0158 0.0332 ? 0.0174  0.0131 0.0112 -0.0019***  ? 0.0193*** 
    (1.15)    (3.06)   (3.06) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values are 
indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests of earnings quality before and after the adoption for all Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS broken 
down into two subsamples, firms with negative firms and firms with positive earnings. Pre-adoption period includes firm-year observations from 2006 to the year before 
the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations starting on the adoption year onward. For most firms, the adoption year is the fiscal year starting 
on or after January 01, 2011.  
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, using a two-
tailed test. 
 
Earnings smoothness is the ratio of the standard deviation of net income before extraordinary items (scaled by assets) to the standard deviation of cash flows from 
operations (scaled by assets) multiplied by -1.  
Conservatism is the estimated coefficient of the interaction variable from the timeliness regression of annual earnings (before extraordinary items) on an indicator 
variable on an indicator variable equaling one if the company’s annual return is negative and zero otherwise, the company’s annual return, and the interaction of the 
annual return and the indicator variable. Timeliness is the adjusted R2 from that regression (Earningst = β0 + β1Returnt + β2 Negativet + β3 Returnst x Negativet + εt).  
Earnings is net income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets. Returns is cumulative return from nine months before fiscal year end to three months after fiscal 
year end.  
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Table 16: Sensitivity Analysis – Serious Adopters Identified by Size 
 
Panel A: Difference-in-differences tests for earnings sustainability 
 
 Serious adopters  Label adopters 
  Difference -in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) Measures of Earnings sustainability  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Earnings persistence  0.6628 0.7649 ? 0.1021*  0.6939 0.7528 0.0589*  ? 0.0432 
     (-1.93)    (-1.90)   (-0.08) 
Earnings predictability  0.4592 0.5594 ? 0.1002  0.4461 0.4571 0.0110  ? 0.0892 
     (-1.30)    (-1.01)   (-1.01) 
Cash flow predictability  0.4926 0.5657 ? 0.0730  0.4905 0.4101 -0.0804  ? 0.1534 
    (-0.39)    (-0.58)   (0.11) 
Accruals quality  -1.2941 -0.9408 ? 0.3533***  -1.4394 -1.4413 -0.0019***  ? 0.3552*** 
    (-4.57)    (4.86)   (-6.50) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values 
are indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests for earnings sustainability before and after the adoption for all Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS 
broken down into two subsamples, serious adopters and label adopters. To identify serious adopters, I rely on reporting incentives defined as size (market value of 
equity). I compute reporting incentives as a rolling average over the previous three years. Next, I subtract for each Canadian firm adopter the rolling average in the year 
before the adoption from the rolling average right after the adoption year. I then use the distribution of the changes of reporting incentives around IFRS adoption (which 
is based one value per firm) to classify firms with above median changes in reporting incentives as Serious Adopters and as label adopters otherwise. Pre-adoption period 
includes firm-year observations from 2006 to the year before the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations starting on the adoption year 
onward. For most firms, the adoption year is the fiscal year starting on or after January 01, 2011. 
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, two a two-tailed 
test. 
 
Earnings persistence is the coefficient of earnings from the persistence regression (Earningst+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt). 
Earnings predictability is the adjusted R2 from the persistence regression (Earningst+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt).  
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Cash flow predictability is the adjusted R2 from the regression of future cash flow from operation against current earnings (before extraordinary items) (CFOt+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt). 
Accruals Quality is the standard deviation of the residuals from the regression of accruals on future year, current year, and previous year’s cash flows from operations 
multiplied by -1 (Accrualst = β0 + β1CFOt-1 + β2CFOt + β3CFOt+1 + εt). 
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Panel B: Cross-sectional tests of sustainability of earnings components 
 
Variables    Prediction Earningst+1 
Accrualst   + 0.4886*** 
    (23.02) 
ΔCASHt   + 0.6478*** 
    (22.78) 
DIST_Dt   + 0.4370*** 
    (7.34) 
DIST_EQt   + 0.5538*** 
    (36.83) 
POST   + 0.0275 
    (1.45) 
POST×Accrualst   + 0.1368*** 
    (3.65) 
POST×ΔCASHt   + 0.0715 
    (1.31) 
POST×DIST_Dt   + 0.3448*** 
    (3.34) 
POST×DIST_EQt   + 0.0150 
    (0.51) 
SERIOUS ADOPTERS   ? 0.0526*** 
    (6.41) 
SERIOUS ADOPTERS ×Accrualst   ? -0.0428* 
    (-1.69) 
SERIOUS ADOPTERS ×ΔCASHt   ? -0.1217*** 
    (-2.93) 
SERIOUS ADOPTERS ×DIST_Dt   ? 0.0285 
    (0.35) 
SERIOUS ADOPTERS ×DIST_EQt   ? -0.0581*** 
    (-2.72) 
Industry fixed effects    Yes 
Year fixed effects    Yes 
N    5842 
Adj. R2    0.4441 
     
F-test: POST×Accrualst + SERIOUS ADOPTERSxAccruals = 0: F-value = 8.47 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. 
 
This table above shows the persistence of accrual and cash flow components of earnings before and after the adoption 
for Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS. The model in this panel shows the decomposition of earnings 
into its components, accruals, retained cash (ΔCASH), distribution to debt holders (DIST_D), and distribution to equity 
holders (DIST_EQ). This panel includes regressions with interactions of earnings components with two indicator 
variables (POST and SERIOUS ADOPTERS), respectively. POST takes a value of 1 for observations in the post 
adoption period. SERIOUS ADOPTERS takes value 1 for serious adopters, 0 otherwise. To identify serious adopters, I 
rely on reporting incentives defined as size (market value of equity). I compute reporting incentives as a rolling average 
over the previous three years. Next, I subtract for each Canadian firm adopter the rolling average in the year before the 
adoption from the rolling average right after the adoption year. I then use the distribution of the changes of reporting 
incentives around IFRS adoption (which is based one value per firm) to classify firms with above median changes in 
reporting incentives as Serious Adopters and as label adopters otherwise. Variables are defined as follows. Earnings: 
Net income before extraordinary items; Accruals: change in net operating assets [(ΔAT- ΔCHE) - ( ΔLT-ΔDLC-
ΔDLTT)]; FCF: free cash flows (Earnings-Accruals); DIST: distributions to debt and equity holders -1× 
[ΔDTC+ΔDLTT+(ΔAT-ΔLT-IB)]; DIST_D: distributions to debt holders: -1× (ΔDLC+ΔDLTTT); and DIST_EQ: 
distribution to equity holders -1× (ΔAT-ΔLT-IB). All variables are scaled by total assets.  
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Panel C: Difference-in-differences test for value relevance 
  
 Serious adopters  Label adopters 
  Difference -in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) Measures of Value relevance  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Price  0.7312 0.7795 ? 0.0483***  0.8750 0.9564 0.0814***  ? -0.0331 
     (-6.22)    (-7.23)   (0.47) 
Return  0.0386 0.0655 ? 0.0270***  0.0207 0.0937 0.0730***  ? -0.0460 
     (3.34)    (2.63)   (0.70) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values 
are indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests for value relevance before and after the adoption for all Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS broken 
down into two subsamples, serious adopters and label adopters. To identify serious adopters, I rely on reporting incentives defined as size (market value of equity). I 
compute reporting incentives as a rolling average over the previous three years. Next, I subtract for each Canadian firm adopter the rolling average in the year before the 
adoption from the rolling average right after the adoption year. I then use the distribution of the changes of reporting incentives around IFRS adoption (which is based 
one value per firm) to classify firms with above median changes in reporting incentives as Serious Adopters and as label adopters otherwise. Pre-adoption period includes 
firm-year observations from 2006 to the year before the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations starting on the adoption year onward. For 
most firms, the adoption year is the fiscal year starting on or after January 01, 2011. 
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, using a two-
tailed test. 
 
Price model: Pricet = EPSt + BVEt +  εt 
Return model: Returnt = Earningst + ΔEarningst + εt 
Price is stock price six months after fiscal year end. EPS is earnings per share. BVE is book value per share. Return is cumulative return 9 months before fiscal year end 
to three months after fiscal year end. Earnings and ΔEarningst are scaled by total assets.  
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Panel D: Difference-in-differences test for other earnings quality measures 
 
 Serious adopters  Label adopters 
  Difference -in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) Measures of Earnings quality  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Earnings smoothness  -1.3682 -1.2184 ? 0.1498  -1.4661 -1.5379 -0.0718  ? 0.2216 
     (1.33)    (-0.50)   (1.19) 
Conservatism   0.4054 0.4989 ? 0.0934  0.4139 0.8045 0.3906  ? -0.2971 
     (0.24)    (1.23)   (-0.99) 
Timeliness  0.0867 0.1209 ? 0.0342**  0.0557 0.1183 0.0626**  ? -0.0284 
    (2.54)    (2.09)   (0.09) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values are 
indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests of earnings quality before and after the adoption for all Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS broken 
down into two subsamples, serious adopters and label adopters. To identify serious adopters, I rely on reporting incentives defined as size (market value of equity). I 
compute reporting incentives as a rolling average over the previous three years. Next, I subtract for each Canadian firm adopter the rolling average in the year before the 
adoption from the rolling average right after the adoption year. I then use the distribution of the changes of reporting incentives around IFRS adoption (which is based 
one value per firm) to classify firms with above median changes in reporting incentives as Serious Adopters and as label adopters otherwise. Pre-adoption period includes 
firm-year observations from 2006 to the year before the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations starting on the adoption year onward. For 
most firms, the adoption year is the fiscal year starting on or after January 01, 2011. 
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, using a two-
tailed test. 
 
Earnings smoothness is the ratio of the standard deviation of net income before extraordinary items (scaled by assets) to the standard deviation of cash flows from 
operations (scaled by assets) multiplied by -1.  
Conservatism is the estimated coefficient of the interaction variable from the timeliness regression of annual earnings (before extraordinary items) on an indicator 
variable on an indicator variable equaling one if the company’s annual return is negative and zero otherwise, the company’s annual return, and the interaction of the 
annual return and the indicator variable. Timeliness is the adjusted R2 from that regression (Earningst = β0 + β1Returnt + β2 Negativet + β3 Returnst x Negativet + εt).  
Earnings is net income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets. Returns is cumulative return from nine months before fiscal year end to three months after fiscal 
year end.  
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Table 17: Sensitivity Analysis – Serious Adopters Identified by Leverage 
 
Panel A: Difference-in-differences tests for earnings sustainability 
 
 Serious adopters  Label adopters 
  Difference -in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) Measures of Earnings sustainability  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Earnings persistence  0.7442 0.8585 ? 0.1142  0.6010 0.7731 0.1721  ? -0.0578 
     (0.53)    (0.66)   (-0.04) 
Earnings predictability  0.4692 0.5185 ? 0.0493  0.4300 0.4607 0.0307  ? 0.0186 
     (0.69)    (1.33)   (1.33) 
Cash flow predictability  0.5188 0.4325 ? -0.0863  0.4799 0.4862 0.0063  ? -0.0926 
    (0.72)    (0.31)   (0.28) 
Accruals quality  -0.4617 -0.6671 ? -0.2054***  -0.6041 -0.3078 0.2963***  ? -0.5017*** 
    (8.74)    (-6.23)   (10.31) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values 
are indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests for earnings sustainability before and after the adoption for all Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS 
broken down into two subsamples, serious adopters and label adopters. To identify serious adopters, I rely on reporting incentives defined as the degree of leverage. I 
compute reporting incentives as a rolling average over the previous three years. Next, I subtract for each Canadian firm adopter the rolling average in the year before the 
adoption from the rolling average right after the adoption year. I then use the distribution of the changes of reporting incentives around IFRS adoption (which is based 
one value per firm) to classify firms with above median changes in reporting incentives as Serious Adopters and as label adopters otherwise. Pre-adoption period includes 
firm-year observations from 2006 to the year before the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations starting on the adoption year onward. For 
most firms, the adoption year is the fiscal year starting on or after January 01, 2011. 
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, two a two-tailed 
test. 
 
Earnings persistence is the coefficient of earnings from the persistence regression (Earningst+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt). 
Earnings predictability is the adjusted R2 from the persistence regression (Earningst+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt).  
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Cash flow predictability is the adjusted R2 from the regression of future cash flow from operation against current earnings (before extraordinary items) (CFOt+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt). 
Accruals Quality is the standard deviation of the residuals from the regression of accruals on future year, current year, and previous year’s cash flows from operations 
multiplied by -1 (Accrualst = β0 + β1CFOt-1 + β2CFOt + β3CFOt+1 + εt). 
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Panel B: Cross-sectional tests of sustainability of earnings components 
 
Variables    Prediction Earningst+1 
Accrualst   + 0.4168*** 
    (18.10) 
ΔCASHt   + 0.5689*** 
    (18.36) 
DIST_Dt   + 0.4885*** 
    (8.30) 
DIST_EQt   + 0.4988*** 
    (30.23) 
POST   + 0.0310 
    (1.63) 
POST×Accrualst   + 0.0960** 
    (2.51) 
POST×ΔCASHt   + 0.0454 
    (0.82) 
POST×DIST_Dt   + 0.2921*** 
    (2.77) 
POST×DIST_EQt   + -0.0207 
    (-0.70) 
SERIOUS ADOPTERS   ? -0.0441*** 
    (-5.43) 
SERIOUS ADOPTERS ×Accrualst   ? -0.1226*** 
    (-3.96) 
SERIOUS ADOPTERS ×ΔCASHt   ? 0.0733 
    (1.39) 
SERIOUS ADOPTERS ×DIST_Dt   ? -0.0745 
    (-0.90) 
SERIOUS ADOPTERS ×DIST_EQt   ? 0.0706*** 
    (3.31) 
Industry fixed effects    Yes 
Year fixed effects    Yes 
N    5842 
Adj. R2    0.4429 
     
F-test: POST×Accrualst + SERIOUS ADOPTERSxAccruals = 0: F-value = 1.43 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in 
parentheses. 
 
This table above shows the persistence of accrual and cash flow components of earnings before and after the adoption 
for Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS. The model in this panel shows the decomposition of earnings 
into its components, accruals, retained cash (ΔCASH), distribution to debt holders (DIST_D), and distribution to equity 
holders (DIST_EQ). This panel includes regressions with interactions of earnings components with two indicator 
variables (POST and SERIOUS ADOPTERS), respectively. POST takes a value of 1 for observations in the post 
adoption period.  SERIOUS ADOPTERS takes value 1 for serious adopters, 0 otherwise. To identify serious adopters, I 
rely on reporting incentives defined as the degree of leverage. I compute reporting incentives as a rolling average over 
the previous three years. Next, I subtract for each Canadian firm adopter the rolling average in the year before the 
adoption from the rolling average right after the adoption year. I then use the distribution of the changes of reporting 
incentives around IFRS adoption (which is based one value per firm) to classify firms with above median changes in 
reporting incentives as Serious Adopters and as label adopters otherwise. Variables are defined as follows. Earnings: 
Net income before extraordinary items; Accruals: change in net operating assets [(ΔAT- ΔCHE) - ( ΔLT-ΔDLC-
ΔDLTT)]; FCF: free cash flows (Earnings-Accruals); DIST: distributions to debt and equity holders -1× 
[ΔDTC+ΔDLTT+(ΔAT-ΔLT-IB)]; DIST_D: distributions to debt holders: -1× (ΔDLC+ΔDLTTT); and DIST_EQ: 
distribution to equity holders -1× (ΔAT-ΔLT-IB). All variables are scaled by total assets.  
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Panel C: Difference-in-differences test for value relevance 
  
 Serious adopters  Label adopters 
  Difference -in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) Measures of Value relevance  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Price  0.7210 0.7055 ? -0.0154***  0.8384 0.8834 0.0450*  ? -0.0604*** 
     (3.43)    (-1.72)   (3.14) 
Return  0.0210 0.0944 ? 0.0734***  0.0416 0.1303 0.0887  ? -0.0152* 
     (3.26)    (0.40)   (1.79) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values 
are indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests for value relevance before and after the adoption for all Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS broken 
down into two subsamples, serious adopters and label adopters. To identify serious adopters, I rely on reporting incentives defined as the degree of leverage. I compute 
reporting incentives as a rolling average over the previous three years. Next, I subtract for each Canadian firm adopter the rolling average in the year before the adoption 
from the rolling average right after the adoption year. I then use the distribution of the changes of reporting incentives around IFRS adoption (which is based one value 
per firm) to classify firms with above median changes in reporting incentives as Serious Adopters and as label adopters otherwise. Pre-adoption period includes firm-year 
observations from 2006 to the year before the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations starting on the adoption year onward. For most firms, 
the adoption year is the fiscal year starting on or after January 01, 2011. 
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, using a two-
tailed test. 
 
Price model: Pricet = EPSt + BVEt +  εt 
Return model: Returnt = Earningst + ΔEarningst + εt 
Price is stock price six months after fiscal year end. EPS is earnings per share. BVE is book value per share. Return is cumulative return 9 months before fiscal year end 
to three months after fiscal year end. Earnings and ΔEarningst are scaled by total assets.  
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Panel D: Difference-in-differences test for other earnings quality measures 
 
 Serious adopters  Label adopters 
  Difference -in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) Measures of Earnings quality  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Earnings smoothness  -1.4107 -1.4593 ? -0.0485  -1.4542 -1.2521 0.2021  ? -0.2507 
     (0.19)    (-1.12)   (0.86) 
Conservatism   0.4319 0.9110 ? 0.4792  0.3995 0.3744 -0.0251  ? 0.5042 
     (0.12)    (-0.73)   (0.44) 
Timeliness  0.0715 0.1398 ? 0.0683  0.0770 0.1638 0.0869  ? -0.0186 
    (1.56)    (0.59)   (0.59) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values are 
indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests of earnings quality before and after the adoption for all Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS broken 
down into two subsamples, serious adopters and label adopters. To identify serious adopters, I rely on reporting incentives defined as the degree of leverage. I compute 
reporting incentives as a rolling average over the previous three years. Next, I subtract for each Canadian firm adopter the rolling average in the year before the adoption 
from the rolling average right after the adoption year. I then use the distribution of the changes of reporting incentives around IFRS adoption (which is based one value 
per firm) to classify firms with above median changes in reporting incentives as Serious Adopters and as label adopters otherwise. Pre-adoption period includes firm-year 
observations from 2006 to the year before the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations starting on the adoption year onward. For most firms, 
the adoption year is the fiscal year starting on or after January 01, 2011. 
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, using a two-
tailed test. 
 
Earnings smoothness is the ratio of the standard deviation of net income before extraordinary items (scaled by assets) to the standard deviation of cash flows from 
operations (scaled by assets) multiplied by -1.  
Conservatism is the estimated coefficient of the interaction variable from the timeliness regression of annual earnings (before extraordinary items) on an indicator 
variable on an indicator variable equaling one if the company’s annual return is negative and zero otherwise, the company’s annual return, and the interaction of the 
annual return and the indicator variable. Timeliness is the adjusted R2 from that regression (Earningst = β0 + β1Returnt + β2 Negativet + β3 Returnst x Negativet + εt).  
Earnings is net income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets. Returns is cumulative return from nine months before fiscal year end to three months after fiscal 
year end.  
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Table 18: Sensitivity Analysis – Serious Adopters Identified by ROA 
 
Panel A: Difference-in-differences tests for earnings sustainability 
 
 Serious adopters  Label adopters 
  Difference -in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) Measures of Earnings sustainability  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Earnings persistence  0.6387 0.5098 ? -0.1289  0.7672 0.8854 0.1182  ? -0.2471 
     (-0.62)    (-0.62)   (-0.00) 
Earnings predictability  0.4753 0.3276 ? -0.1478  0.4387 0.5438 0.1051  ? -0.2528 
     (1.46)    (0.23)   (0.23) 
Cash flow predictability  0.5520 0.3317 ? -0.2203  0.4581 0.5506 0.0925  ? -0.3128* 
    (1.32)    (-1.04)   (1.72) 
Accruals quality  -1.3529 -0.6581 ? 0.6948**  -0.3315 -0.3876 -0.0560  ? 0.7508** 
    (-2.41)    (0.89)   (-2.46) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values 
are indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests for earnings sustainability before and after the adoption for all Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS 
broken down into two subsamples, serious adopters and label adopters. To identify serious adopters, I rely on reporting incentives defined as return on assets. I compute 
reporting incentives as a rolling average over the previous three years. Next, I subtract for each Canadian firm adopter the rolling average in the year before the adoption 
from the rolling average right after the adoption year. I then use the distribution of the changes of reporting incentives around IFRS adoption (which is based one value 
per firm) to classify firms with above median changes in reporting incentives as Serious Adopters and as label adopters otherwise. Pre-adoption period includes firm-year 
observations from 2006 to the year before the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations starting on the adoption year onward. For most firms, 
the adoption year is the fiscal year starting on or after January 01, 2011. 
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, two a two-tailed 
test. 
 
Earnings persistence is the coefficient of earnings from the persistence regression (Earningst+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt). 
Earnings predictability is the adjusted R2 from the persistence regression (Earningst+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt).  
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Cash flow predictability is the adjusted R2 from the regression of future cash flow from operation against current earnings (before extraordinary items) (CFOt+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt). 
Accruals Quality is the standard deviation of the residuals from the regression of accruals on future year, current year, and previous year’s cash flows from operations 
multiplied by -1 (Accrualst = β0 + β1CFOt-1 + β2CFOt + β3CFOt+1 + εt). 
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Panel B: Cross-sectional tests of sustainability of earnings components 
 
Variables    Prediction Earningst+1 
Accrualst   + 0.5496*** 
    (21.70) 
ΔCASHt   + 0.7064*** 
    (21.64) 
DIST_Dt   + 0.4405*** 
    (6.65) 
DIST_EQt   + 0.5996*** 
    (32.96) 
POST   + 0.0315* 
    (1.66) 
POST×Accrualst   + 0.0949** 
    (2.47) 
POST×ΔCASHt   + 0.0206 
    (0.37) 
POST×DIST_Dt   + 0.2939*** 
    (2.82) 
POST×DIST_EQt   + -0.0329 
    (-1.10) 
SERIOUS ADOPTERS   ? 0.0285*** 
    (3.52) 
SERIOUS ADOPTERS ×Accrualst   ? -0.0964*** 
    (-3.11) 
SERIOUS ADOPTERS ×ΔCASHt   ? -0.1403*** 
    (-3.41) 
SERIOUS ADOPTERS ×DIST_Dt   ? 0.0892 
    (1.09) 
SERIOUS ADOPTERS ×DIST_EQt   ? -0.0882*** 
    (-4.06) 
Industry fixed effects    Yes 
Year fixed effects    Yes 
N    5842 
Adj. R2    0.3241 
     
F-test: POST×Accrualst + SERIOUS ADOPTERSxAccruals = 0: F-value = 1.05  
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in 
parentheses. 
 
This table above shows the persistence of accrual and cash flow components of earnings before and after the adoption 
for Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS. The model in this panel shows the decomposition of earnings 
into its components, accruals, retained cash (ΔCASH), distribution to debt holders (DIST_D), and distribution to equity 
holders (DIST_EQ). This panel includes regressions with interactions of earnings components with two indicator 
variables (POST and SERIOUS ADOPTERS), respectively. POST takes a value of 1 for observations in the post 
adoption period.  SERIOUS ADOPTERS takes value 1 for serious adopters, 0 otherwise. To identify serious adopters, I 
rely on reporting incentives defined as return on assets. I compute reporting incentives as a rolling average over the 
previous three years. Next, I subtract for each Canadian firm adopter the rolling average in the year before the adoption 
from the rolling average right after the adoption year. I then use the distribution of the changes of reporting incentives 
around IFRS adoption (which is based one value per firm) to classify firms with above median changes in reporting 
incentives as Serious Adopters and as label adopters otherwise. Variables are defined as follows. Earnings: Net income 
before extraordinary items; Accruals: change in net operating assets [(ΔAT- ΔCHE) - ( ΔLT-ΔDLC-ΔDLTT)]; FCF: 
free cash flows (Earnings-Accruals); DIST: distributions to debt and equity holders -1× [ΔDTC+ΔDLTT+(ΔAT-ΔLT-
IB)]; DIST_D: distributions to debt holders: -1× (ΔDLC+ΔDLTTT); and DIST_EQ: distribution to equity holders -1× 
(ΔAT-ΔLT-IB). All variables are scaled by total assets.  
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Panel C: Difference-in-differences test for value relevance 
  
 Serious adopters  Label adopters 
  Difference -in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) Measures of Value relevance  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Price  0.8783 0.8733 ? -0.0051***  0.7222 0.8600 0.1378***  ? -0.1429* 
     (-7.76)    (-7.12)   (-1.78) 
Return  0.0474 0.0844 ? 0.0370**  0.0182 0.1238 0.1056  ? -0.0686 
     (2.18)    (0.73)   (0.98) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values 
are indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests for value relevance before and after the adoption for all Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS broken 
down into two subsamples, serious adopters and label adopters. To identify serious adopters, I rely on reporting incentives defined as return on assets. I compute 
reporting incentives as a rolling average over the previous three years. Next, I subtract for each Canadian firm adopter the rolling average in the year before the adoption 
from the rolling average right after the adoption year. I then use the distribution of the changes of reporting incentives around IFRS adoption (which is based one value 
per firm) to classify firms with above median changes in reporting incentives as Serious Adopters and as label adopters otherwise. Pre-adoption period includes firm-year 
observations from 2006 to the year before the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations starting on the adoption year onward. For most firms, 
the adoption year is the fiscal year starting on or after January 01, 2011. 
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, using a two-
tailed test. 
 
Price model: Pricet = EPSt + BVEt +  εt 
Return model: Returnt = Earningst + ΔEarningst + εt 
Price is stock price six months after fiscal year end. EPS is earnings per share. BVE is book value per share. Return is cumulative return 9 months before fiscal year end 
to three months after fiscal year end. Earnings and ΔEarningst are scaled by total assets. 
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Panel D: Difference-in-differences test for other earnings quality measures 
 
 Serious adopters  Label adopters 
  Difference -in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) Measures of Earnings quality  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Earnings smoothness  -1.5022 -1.1821 ? 0.3201  -1.3883 -1.4607 -0.0724  ? 0.3925 
     (-0.50)    (1.32)   (-1.28) 
Conservatism   0.4693 0.3816 ? -0.0878  0.3504 0.9481 0.5977  ? -0.6854 
     (0.77)    (1.43)   (-0.92) 
Timeliness  0.0659 0.1373 ? 0.0715***  0.0808 0.1529 0.0721*  ? -0.0006 
    (2.63)    (1.75)   (1.45) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values are 
indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests of earnings quality before and after the adoption for all Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS broken 
down into two subsamples, serious adopters and label adopters. To identify serious adopters, I rely on reporting incentives defined as return on assets. I compute 
reporting incentives as a rolling average over the previous three years. Next, I subtract for each Canadian firm adopter the rolling average in the year before the adoption 
from the rolling average right after the adoption year. I then use the distribution of the changes of reporting incentives around IFRS adoption (which is based one value 
per firm) to classify firms with above median changes in reporting incentives as Serious Adopters and as label adopters otherwise. Pre-adoption period includes firm-year 
observations from 2006 to the year before the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations starting on the adoption year onward. For most firms, 
the adoption year is the fiscal year starting on or after January 01, 2011. 
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, using a two-
tailed test. 
 
Earnings smoothness is the ratio of the standard deviation of net income before extraordinary items (scaled by assets) to the standard deviation of cash flows from 
operations (scaled by assets) multiplied by -1.  
Conservatism is the estimated coefficient of the interaction variable from the timeliness regression of annual earnings (before extraordinary items) on an indicator 
variable on an indicator variable equaling one if the company’s annual return is negative and zero otherwise, the company’s annual return, and the interaction of the 
annual return and the indicator variable. Timeliness is the adjusted R2 from that regression (Earningst = β0 + β1Returnt + β2 Negativet + β3 Returnst x Negativet + εt).  
Earnings is net income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets. Returns is cumulative return from nine months before fiscal year end to three months after fiscal 
year end.  
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Table 19: Sensitivity Analysis – Serious Adopters Identified by BM 
 
Panel A: Difference-in-differences tests for earnings sustainability 
 
 Serious adopters  Label adopters 
  Difference -in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) Measures of Earnings sustainability  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Earnings persistence  0.6225 0.7242 ? 0.1016   0.7439 0.8772 0.1333  ? -0.0317*** 
     (-1.66)    (1.58)   (-2.59) 
Earnings predictability  0.4448 0.4427 ? -0.0021  0.4659 0.5291 0.0632  ? -0.0653 
     (-0.89)    (1.30)   (1.30) 
Cash flow predictability  0.4730 0.4228 ? -0.0502  0.5224 0.4654 -0.0571**  ? 0.0069 
    (0.53)    (2.00)   (-0.98) 
Accruals quality  -1.0005 -0.9487 ? 0.0518***  -1.3651 -1.4084 -0.0433***  ? 0.0951*** 
    (-4.38)    (4.35)   (-5.89) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values 
are indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests for earnings sustainability before and after the adoption for all Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS 
broken down into two subsamples, serious adopters and label adopters. To identify serious adopters, I rely on reporting incentives defined as book to market. I compute 
reporting incentives as a rolling average over the previous three years. Next, I subtract for each Canadian firm adopter the rolling average in the year before the adoption 
from the rolling average right after the adoption year. I then use the distribution of the changes of reporting incentives around IFRS adoption (which is based one value 
per firm) to classify firms with above median changes in reporting incentives as Serious Adopters and as label adopters otherwise. Pre-adoption period includes firm-year 
observations from 2006 to the year before the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations starting on the adoption year onward. For most firms, 
the adoption year is the fiscal year starting on or after January 01, 2011. 
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, two a two-tailed 
test. 
 
Earnings persistence is the coefficient of earnings from the persistence regression (Earningst+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt). 
Earnings predictability is the adjusted R2 from the persistence regression (Earningst+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt).  
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Cash flow predictability is the adjusted R2 from the regression of future cash flow from operation against current earnings (before extraordinary items) (CFOt+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt). 
Accruals Quality is the standard deviation of the residuals from the regression of accruals on future year, current year, and previous year’s cash flows from operations 
multiplied by -1 (Accrualst = β0 + β1CFOt-1 + β2CFOt + β3CFOt+1 + εt). 
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Panel B: Cross-sectional tests of sustainability of earnings components 
 
Variables    Prediction Earningst+1 
Accrualst   + 0.5202*** 
    (23.28) 
ΔCASHt   + 0.6474*** 
    (21.43) 
DIST_Dt   + 0.4945*** 
    (8.28) 
DIST_EQt   + 0.5750*** 
    (37.31) 
POST   + 0.0348* 
    (1.83) 
POST×Accrualst   + 0.1237*** 
    (3.27) 
POST×ΔCASHt   + 0.0706 
    (1.28) 
POST×DIST_Dt   + 0.3138*** 
    (3.01) 
POST×DIST_EQt   + -0.0079 
    (-0.27) 
SERIOUS ADOPTERS   + 0.0248*** 
    (3.07) 
SERIOUS ADOPTERS ×Accrualst   + -0.0992*** 
    (-3.21) 
SERIOUS ADOPTERS ×ΔCASHt   + -0.0846** 
    (-2.07) 
SERIOUS ADOPTERS ×DIST_Dt   + -0.0692 
    (-0.85) 
SERIOUS ADOPTERS ×DIST_EQt   + -0.0823*** 
    (-3.87) 
Industry fixed effects    Yes 
Year fixed effects    Yes 
N    5847 
Adj. R2    0.4401 
     
F-test: POST×Accrualst + SERIOUS ADOPTERSxAccruals = 0: F-value = 6.05*** 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in 
parentheses. 
 
This table above shows the persistence of accrual and cash flow components of earnings before and after the adoption 
for Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS. The model in this panel shows the decomposition of earnings 
into its components, accruals, retained cash (ΔCASH), distribution to debt holders (DIST_D), and distribution to equity 
holders (DIST_EQ). This panel includes regressions with interactions of earnings components with two indicator 
variables (POST and SERIOUS ADOPTERS), respectively. POST takes a value of 1 for observations in the post 
adoption period. SERIOUS ADOPTERS takes value 1 for serious adopters, 0 otherwise. To identify serious adopters, I 
rely on reporting incentives defined as book to market. I compute reporting incentives as a rolling average over the 
previous three years. Next, I subtract for each Canadian firm adopter the rolling average in the year before the adoption 
from the rolling average right after the adoption year. I then use the distribution of the changes of reporting incentives 
around IFRS adoption (which is based one value per firm) to classify firms with above median changes in reporting 
incentives as Serious Adopters and as label adopters otherwise. Variables are defined as follows. Earnings: Net income 
before extraordinary items; Accruals: change in net operating assets [(ΔAT- ΔCHE) - ( ΔLT-ΔDLC-ΔDLTT)]; FCF: 
free cash flows (Earnings-Accruals); DIST: distributions to debt and equity holders -1× [ΔDTC+ΔDLTT+(ΔAT-ΔLT-
IB)]; DIST_D: distributions to debt holders: -1× (ΔDLC+ΔDLTTT); and DIST_EQ: distribution to equity holders -1× 
(ΔAT-ΔLT-IB). All variables are scaled by total assets.  
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Panel C: Difference-in-differences test for value relevance 
  
 Serious adopters  Label adopters 
  Difference -in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) Measures of Value relevance  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Price  0.8197 0.9196 ? 0.0999***  0.7970 0.8208 0.0238***  ? 0.0761*** 
     (-9.41)    (-4.46)   (-4.56) 
Return  0.0262 0.1108 ? 0.0846  0.0346 0.1372 0.1026*  ? -0.0180 
     (1.40)    (1.91)   (-0.35) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values 
are indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests for value relevance before and after the adoption for all Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS broken 
down into two subsamples, serious adopters and label adopters. To identify serious adopters, I rely on reporting incentives defined as book to market. I compute 
reporting incentives as a rolling average over the previous three years. Next, I subtract for each Canadian firm adopter the rolling average in the year before the adoption 
from the rolling average right after the adoption year. I then use the distribution of the changes of reporting incentives around IFRS adoption (which is based one value 
per firm) to classify firms with above median changes in reporting incentives as Serious Adopters and as label adopters otherwise. Pre-adoption period includes firm-year 
observations from 2006 to the year before the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations starting on the adoption year onward. For most firms, 
the adoption year is the fiscal year starting on or after January 01, 2011. 
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, using a two-
tailed test. 
 
Price model: Pricet = EPSt + BVEt +  εt 
Return model: Returnt = Earningst + ΔEarningst + εt 
Price is stock price six months after fiscal year end. EPS is earnings per share. BVE is book value per share. Return is cumulative return 9 months before fiscal year end 
to three months after fiscal year end. Earnings and ΔEarningst are scaled by total assets.  
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Panel D: Difference-in-differences test for other earnings quality measures 
 
 Serious adopters  Label adopters 
  Difference -in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) Measures of Earnings quality  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Earnings smoothness  -1.4089 -1.3739 ? 0.0350***  -1.4713 -1.4589 0.0124  ? 0.0226** 
     (3.60)    (0.63)   (1.99) 
Conservatism   0.4167 0.5180 ? 0.1012  0.4208 0.9440 0.5232  ? -0.4220 
     (-0.01)    (-0.93)   (0.71) 
Timeliness  0.0651 0.1490 ? 0.0839  0.0842 0.2049 0.1207  ? -0.0368 
    (1.44)    (1.14)   (1.14) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values are 
indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests of earnings quality before and after the adoption for all Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS broken 
down into two subsamples, serious adopters and label adopters. To identify serious adopters, I rely on reporting incentives defined as book to market. I compute 
reporting incentives as a rolling average over the previous three years. Next, I subtract for each Canadian firm adopter the rolling average in the year before the adoption 
from the rolling average right after the adoption year. I then use the distribution of the changes of reporting incentives around IFRS adoption (which is based one value 
per firm) to classify firms with above median changes in reporting incentives as Serious Adopters and as label adopters otherwise. Post-adoption period includes firm-
year observations starting on the adoption year onward. For most firms, the adoption year is the fiscal year starting on or after January 01, 2011. 
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, using a two-
tailed test. 
 
Earnings smoothness is the ratio of the standard deviation of net income before extraordinary items (scaled by assets) to the standard deviation of cash flows from 
operations (scaled by assets) multiplied by -1.  
Conservatism is the estimated coefficient of the interaction variable from the timeliness regression of annual earnings (before extraordinary items) on an indicator 
variable on an indicator variable equaling one if the company’s annual return is negative and zero otherwise, the company’s annual return, and the interaction of the 
annual return and the indicator variable. Timeliness is the adjusted R2 from that regression (Earningst = β0 + β1Returnt + β2 Negativet + β3 Returnst x Negativet + εt).  
Earnings is net income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets. Returns is cumulative return from nine months before fiscal year end to three months after fiscal 
year end.  
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Table 20: Sensitivity Analysis – Serious Adopters Identified by Percentage of Foreign Sales 
 
Panel A: Difference-in-differences tests for earnings sustainability 
 
 Serious adopters  Label adopters 
  Difference -in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) Measures of Earnings sustainability  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Earnings persistence  0.6524 0.7466 ? 0.0942  0.6930 0.7612 0.0682  ? 0.0261 
     (-0.28)    (0.50)   (-0.46) 
Earnings predictability  0.4408 0.4559 ? 0.0151  0.4600 0.5064 0.0464  ? -0.0313 
     (-0.26)    (0.48)   (0.48) 
Cash flow predictability  0.4376 0.3795 ? -0.0580***  0.5168 0.4867 -0.0302  ? -0.0279*** 
    (3.46)    (-0.62)   (3.40) 
Accruals quality  -0.5338 -0.3611 ? 0.1727  -1.8498 -1.3294 0.5204  ? -0.3477 
    (-1.62)    (0.58)   (-0.85) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values 
are indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests for earnings sustainability before and after the adoption for all Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS 
broken down into two subsamples, serious adopters and label adopters. To identify serious adopters, I rely on reporting incentives defined as percentage of foreign sales. 
I compute reporting incentives as a rolling average over the previous three years. Next, I subtract for each Canadian firm adopter the rolling average in the year before 
the adoption from the rolling average right after the adoption year. I then use the distribution of the changes of reporting incentives around IFRS adoption (which is based 
one value per firm) to classify firms with above median changes in reporting incentives as Serious Adopters and as label adopters otherwise. Pre-adoption period includes 
firm-year observations from 2006 to the year before the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations starting on the adoption year onward. For 
most firms, the adoption year is the fiscal year starting on or after January 01, 2011. 
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, two a two-tailed 
test. 
 
Earnings persistence is the coefficient of earnings from the persistence regression (Earningst+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt). 
Earnings predictability is the adjusted R2 from the persistence regression (Earningst+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt).  
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Cash flow predictability is the adjusted R2 from the regression of future cash flow from operation against current earnings (before extraordinary items) (CFOt+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt). 
Accruals Quality is the standard deviation of the residuals from the regression of accruals on future year, current year, and previous year’s cash flows from operations 
multiplied by -1 (Accrualst = β0 + β1CFOt-1 + β2CFOt + β3CFOt+1 + εt). 
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Panel B: Cross-sectional tests of sustainability of earnings components 
 
Variables    Prediction Earningst+1 
Accrualst   + 0.4880*** 
    (26.50) 
ΔCASHt   + 0.6052*** 
    (24.34) 
DIST_Dt   + 0.4631*** 
    (9.35) 
DIST_EQt   + 0.5380*** 
    (41.51) 
POST   + 0.0325* 
    (1.70) 
POST×Accrualst   + 0.1545*** 
    (4.11) 
POST×ΔCASHt   + 0.0858 
    (1.55) 
POST×DIST_Dt   + 0.3612*** 
    (3.47) 
POST×DIST_EQt   + 0.0056 
    (0.19) 
SERIOUS ADOPTERS   ? 0.0055 
    (0.53) 
SERIOUS ADOPTERS ×Accrualst   ? -0.0332 
    (-0.80) 
SERIOUS ADOPTERS ×ΔCASHt   ? 0.0656 
    (1.17) 
SERIOUS ADOPTERS ×DIST_Dt   ? 0.0113 
    (0.11) 
SERIOUS ADOPTERS ×DIST_EQt   ? 0.0019 
    (0.07) 
Industry fixed effects    Yes 
Year fixed effects    Yes 
N    5842 
Adj. R2    0.3119 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in 
parentheses. 
 
This table above shows the persistence of accrual and cash flow components of earnings before and after the adoption 
for Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS. The model in this panel shows the decomposition of earnings 
into its components, accruals, retained cash (ΔCASH), distribution to debt holders (DIST_D), and distribution to equity 
holders (DIST_EQ). This panel includes regressions with interactions of earnings components with two indicator 
variables (POST and SERIOUS ADOPTERS), respectively. POST takes a value of 1 for observations in the post 
adoption period. SERIOUS ADOPTERS takes value 1 for serious adopters, 0 otherwise. To identify serious adopters, I 
rely on reporting incentives defined as percentage of foreign sales. I compute reporting incentives as a rolling average 
over the previous three years. Next, I subtract for each Canadian firm adopter the rolling average in the year before the 
adoption from the rolling average right after the adoption year. I then use the distribution of the changes of reporting 
incentives around IFRS adoption (which is based one value per firm) to classify firms with above median changes in 
reporting incentives as Serious Adopters and as label adopters otherwise. Variables are defined as follows. Earnings: 
Net income before extraordinary items; Accruals: change in net operating assets [(ΔAT- ΔCHE) - ( ΔLT-ΔDLC-
ΔDLTT)]; FCF: free cash flows (Earnings-Accruals); DIST: distributions to debt and equity holders -1× 
[ΔDTC+ΔDLTT+(ΔAT-ΔLT-IB)]; DIST_D: distributions to debt holders: -1× (ΔDLC+ΔDLTTT); and DIST_EQ: 
distribution to equity holders -1× (ΔAT-ΔLT-IB). All variables are scaled by total assets.  
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Panel C: Difference-in-differences test for value relevance 
  
 Serious adopters  Label adopters 
  Difference -in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) Measures of Value relevance  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Price  0.6312 0.6125 ? -0.0187***  0.8138 0.8446 0.0308  ? -0.0495*** 
     (6.35)    (0.49)   (3.73) 
Return  0.0522 0.1308 ? 0.0786  0.0268 0.1002 0.0733  ? 0.0052 
     (0.64)    (1.25)   (0.10) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values 
are indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests for value relevance before and after the adoption for all Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS broken 
down into two subsamples, serious adopters and label adopters. To identify serious adopters, I rely on reporting incentives defined as percentage of foreign sales. I 
compute reporting incentives as a rolling average over the previous three years. Next, I subtract for each Canadian firm adopter the rolling average in the year before the 
adoption from the rolling average right after the adoption year. I then use the distribution of the changes of reporting incentives around IFRS adoption (which is based 
one value per firm) to classify firms with above median changes in reporting incentives as Serious Adopters and as label adopters otherwise. Pre-adoption period includes 
firm-year observations from 2006 to the year before the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations starting on the adoption year onward. For 
most firms, the adoption year is the fiscal year starting on or after January 01, 2011. 
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, using a two-
tailed test. 
 
Price model: Pricet = EPSt + BVEt +  εt 
Return model: Returnt = Earningst + ΔEarningst + εt 
Price is stock price six months after fiscal year end. EPS is earnings per share. BVE is book value per share. Return is cumulative return 9 months before fiscal year end 
to three months after fiscal year end. Earnings and ΔEarningst are scaled by total assets.  
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Panel D: Difference-in-differences test for other earnings quality measures 
 
 Serious adopters  Label adopters 
  Difference -in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) Measures of Earnings quality  
Post- 
(1) 
Pre- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Earnings smoothness  -1.4115 -1.3398 ? 0.0717  -1.4666 -1.4021 0.0645  ? 0.0072 
     (-1.46)    (-0.56)   (-1.03) 
Conservatism   0.4273 0.4036 ? -0.0237  0.4184 0.7396 0.3212  ? -0.3449 
     (-0.40)    (0.60)   (-0.68) 
Timeliness  0.0855 0.1715 ? 0.0859***  0.0738 0.1435 0.0696***  ? 0.0163*** 
    (2.96)    (3.59)   (3.59) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values 
are indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests of earnings quality before and after the adoption for all Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS broken 
down into two subsamples, serious adopters and label adopters. To identify serious adopters, I rely on reporting incentives defined as percentage of foreign sales. I 
compute reporting incentives as a rolling average over the previous three years. Next, I subtract for each Canadian firm adopter the rolling average in the year before the 
adoption from the rolling average right after the adoption year. I then use the distribution of the changes of reporting incentives around IFRS adoption (which is based 
one value per firm) to classify firms with above median changes in reporting incentives as Serious Adopters and as label adopters otherwise. Pre-adoption period includes 
firm-year observations from 2006 to the year before the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations starting on the adoption year onward. For 
most firms, the adoption year is the fiscal year starting on or after January 01, 2011. 
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, using a two-
tailed test. 
 
Earnings smoothness is the ratio of the standard deviation of net income before extraordinary items (scaled by assets) to the standard deviation of cash flows from 
operations (scaled by assets) multiplied by -1.  
Conservatism is the estimated coefficient of the interaction variable from the timeliness regression of annual earnings (before extraordinary items) on an indicator 
variable on an indicator variable equaling one if the company’s annual return is negative and zero otherwise, the company’s annual return, and the interaction of the 
annual return and the indicator variable. Timeliness is the adjusted R2 from that regression (Earningst = β0 + β1Returnt + β2 Negativet + β3 Returnst x Negativet + εt).  
Earnings is net income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets. Returns is cumulative return from nine months before fiscal year end to three months after fiscal 
year end.  
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Table 21: Sensitivity Analysis – Serious Adopters Identified by Big 4 Auditors 
 
Panel A: Difference-in-differences tests for earnings sustainability 
 
 Serious adopters  Label adopters 
  Difference -in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) Measures of Earnings sustainability  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Earnings persistence  0.6598 0.7255 ? 0.0657*  0.7030 0.8950 0.1920  ? -0.1263 
     (1.82)    (0.52)   (0.48) 
Earnings predictability  0.4367 0.4726 ? 0.0359**  0.4854 0.5020 0.0166  ? 0.0194 
     (2.28)    (0.53)   (0.53) 
Cash flow predictability  0.4692 0.4436 ? -0.0256  0.5266 0.4210 -0.1056  ? 0.0800 
    (0.70)    (1.19)   (-0.66) 
Accruals quality  -0.3190 -0.3208 ? -0.0017  -3.0726 -2.0956 0.9771  ? -0.9788 
    (-0.06)    (0.25)   (-0.25) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values 
are indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests for earnings sustainability before and after the adoption for all Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS 
broken down into two subsamples, serious adopters and label adopters. To identify serious adopters, I rely on their reporting environment determined by firms’ auditors. 
Firms are classified as serious adopters if their auditors are big 4 auditors the majority of the sample period (at least three years centering on the adoption year). Pre-
adoption period includes firm-year observations from 2006 to the year before the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations starting on the 
adoption year onward. For most firms, the adoption year is the fiscal year starting on or after January 01, 2011. 
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, two a two-tailed 
test. 
 
Earnings persistence is the coefficient of earnings from the persistence regression (Earningst+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt). 
Earnings predictability is the adjusted R2 from the persistence regression (Earningst+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt).  
Cash flow predictability is the adjusted R2 from the regression of future cash flow from operation against current earnings (before extraordinary items) (CFOt+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt). 
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Accruals Quality is the standard deviation of the residuals from the regression of accruals on future year, current year, and previous year’s cash flows from operations 
multiplied by -1 (Accrualst = β0 + β1CFOt-1 + β2CFOt + β3CFOt+1 + εt). 
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Panel B: Cross-sectional tests of sustainability of earnings components 
 
Variables    Prediction Earningst+1 
Accrualst   + 0.5176*** 
    (22.25) 
ΔCASHt   + 0.6370*** 
    (19.99) 
DIST_Dt   + 0.4743*** 
    (6.62) 
DIST_EQt   + 0.5240*** 
    (30.99) 
POST   + 0.0169 
    (0.90) 
POST×Accrualst   + 0.1335*** 
    (3.59) 
POST×ΔCASHt   + 0.0734 
    (1.35) 
POST×DIST_Dt   + 0.3346*** 
    (3.26) 
POST×DIST_EQt   + -0.0134 
    (-0.46) 
SERIOUS ADOPTERS   ? 0.0910*** 
    (9.68) 
SERIOUS ADOPTERS ×Accrualst   ? -0.0959*** 
    (-3.17) 
SERIOUS ADOPTERS ×ΔCASHt   ? -0.0884** 
    (-2.17) 
SERIOUS ADOPTERS ×DIST_Dt   ? -0.0536 
    (-0.63) 
SERIOUS ADOPTERS ×DIST_EQt   ? -0.0224 
    (-1.02) 
Industry fixed effects    Yes 
Year fixed effects    Yes 
N    5847 
Adj. R2    0.4504 
     
F-test: POST×Accrualst + SERIOUS ADOPTERS ×Accrualst = 0: F-value = 4.68***
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in 
parentheses. 
 
This table above shows the persistence of accrual and cash flow components of earnings before and after the adoption 
for Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS. The model in this panel shows the decomposition of earnings 
into its components, accruals, retained cash (ΔCASH), distribution to debt holders (DIST_D), and distribution to equity 
holders (DIST_EQ). This panel includes regressions with interactions of earnings components with two indicator 
variables (POST and SERIOUS ADOPTERS), respectively. POST takes a value of 1 for observations in the post 
adoption period. SERIOUS ADOPTERS takes value 1 for serious adopters, 0 otherwise. To identify serious adopters 
(coded as 1, 0 otherwise), I rely on their reporting environment determined by firms’ auditors. Firms are classified as 
serious adopters if their auditors are big 4 auditors the majority of the sample period (at least three years centering on 
the adoption year). Variables are defined as follows. Earnings: Net income before extraordinary items; Accruals: 
change in net operating assets [(ΔAT- ΔCHE) - ( ΔLT-ΔDLC-ΔDLTT)]; FCF: free cash flows (Earnings-Accruals); 
DIST: distributions to debt and equity holders -1× [ΔDTC+ΔDLTT+(ΔAT-ΔLT-IB)]; DIST_D: distributions to debt 
holders: -1× (ΔDLC+ΔDLTTT); and DIST_EQ: distribution to equity holders -1× (ΔAT-ΔLT-IB). All variables are 
scaled by total assets.  
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Panel C: Difference-in-differences test for value relevance 
  
 Serious adopters  Label adopters 
  Difference -in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) Measures of Value relevance  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Price  0.8092 0.8368 ? 0.0275  0.6865 0.7920 0.1055***  ? -0.0780*** 
     (-0.45)    (-7.18)   (6.00) 
Return  0.0504 0.1272 ? 0.0768  0.0084 0.0357 0.0272**  ? 0.0496 
     (0.37)    (2.39)   (-1.17) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values 
are indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests for value relevance before and after the adoption for all Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS broken 
down into two subsamples, serious adopters and label adopters. To identify serious adopters, I rely on their reporting environment determined by firms’ auditors. Firms 
are classified as serious adopters if their auditors are big 4 auditors the majority of the sample period (at least three years centering on the adoption year). Pre-adoption 
period includes firm-year observations from 2006 to the year before the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations starting on the adoption year 
onward. For most firms, the adoption year is the fiscal year starting on or after January 01, 2011. 
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, using a two-
tailed test. 
 
Price model: Pricet = EPSt + BVEt +  εt 
Return model: Returnt = Earningst + ΔEarningst + εt 
Price is stock price six months after fiscal year end. EPS is earnings per share. BVE is book value per share. Return is cumulative return 9 months before fiscal year end 
to three months after fiscal year end. Earnings and ΔEarningst are scaled by total assets.  
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Panel D: Difference-in-differences test for other earnings quality measures 
 
 Serious adopters  Label adopters 
  Difference -in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) Measures of Earnings quality  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Earnings smoothness  -1.3122 -1.3321 ? -0.0200  -1.6374 -1.4644 0.1730**  ? -0.1929* 
     (-0.63)    (-2.56)   (1.83) 
Conservatism   0.3676 0.5053 ? 0.1376  0.3512 0.4872 0.1360  ? 0.0016 
     (0.71)    (-0.99)   (1.13) 
Timeliness  0.0968 0.1900 ? 0.0932  0.0208 0.0394 0.0186***  ? 0.0747*** 
    (0.60)    (4.29)   (4.29) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values are 
indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests of earnings quality before and after the adoption for all Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS broken 
down into two subsamples, serious adopters and label adopters. To identify serious adopters, I rely on their reporting environment determined by firms’ auditors. Firms 
are classified as serious adopters if their auditors are big 4 auditors the majority of the sample period (at least three years centering on the adoption year). Pre-adoption 
period includes firm-year observations from 2006 to the year before the adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations starting on the adoption year 
onward. For most firms, the adoption year is the fiscal year starting on or after January 01, 2011. 
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, using a two-
tailed test. 
 
Earnings smoothness is the ratio of the standard deviation of net income before extraordinary items (scaled by assets) to the standard deviation of cash flows from 
operations (scaled by assets) multiplied by -1.  
Conservatism is the estimated coefficient of the interaction variable from the timeliness regression of annual earnings (before extraordinary items) on an indicator 
variable on an indicator variable equaling one if the company’s annual return is negative and zero otherwise, the company’s annual return, and the interaction of the 
annual return and the indicator variable. Timeliness is the adjusted R2 from that regression (Earningst = β0 + β1Returnt + β2 Negativet + β3 Returnst x Negativet + εt).  
Earnings is net income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets. Returns is cumulative return from nine months before fiscal year end to three months after fiscal 
year end.  
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Table 22: Sensitivity Analysis – Serious Adopters Identified by Filing Status in the US  
 
Panel A: Difference-in-differences tests for earnings sustainability 
 
 Serious adopters  Label adopters 
  Difference -in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) Measures of Earnings sustainability  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Earnings persistence  0.7872 0.7280 ? -0.0592  0.6726 0.7816 0.1090  ? -0.1682 
     (0.72)    (-0.81)   (1.05) 
Earnings predictability  0.6089 0.6466 ? 0.0377  0.4244 0.5014 0.0769  ? -0.0393 
     (0.18)    (-1.26)   (-1.26) 
Cash flow predictability  0.5750 0.6500 ? 0.0750  0.4826 0.4765 -0.0061***  ? 0.0812* 
    (-0.64)    (2.76)   (-1.79) 
Accruals quality  -0.3008 -0.2865 ? 0.0143   -1.8673 -1.3563 0.5110  ? -0.4967 
    (0.72)    (-0.49)   (0.69) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values are 
indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests for earnings sustainability before and after the adoption for Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS 
broken down into two subsamples, U.S. cross-listed firms and domestics firms. Pre-adoption period includes firm-year observations from 2006 to the year before the 
adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations starting on the adoption year onward. For most firms, the adoption year is the fiscal year starting on 
or after January 01, 2011.  
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, two a two-tailed 
test. 
 
Earnings persistence is the coefficient of earnings from the persistence regression (Earningst+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt). 
Earnings predictability is the adjusted R2 from the persistence regression (Earningst+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt).  
Cash flow predictability is the adjusted R2 from the regression of future cash flow from operation against current earnings (before extraordinary items) (CFOt+1 = β0 + β1Earningst + εt). 
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Accruals Quality is the standard deviation of the residuals from the regression of accruals on future year, current year, and previous year’s cash flows from operations 
multiplied by -1 (Accrualst = β0 + β1CFOt-1 + β2CFOt + β3CFOt+1 + εt). 
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Panel B: Cross-sectional tests of sustainability of earnings components 
 
Variables    Prediction Earningst+1 
Accrualst   + 0.4747*** 
    (26.32) 
ΔCASHt   + 0.6123*** 
    (25.18) 
DIST_Dt   + 0.4803*** 
    (10.12) 
DIST_EQt   + 0.5256*** 
    (40.89) 
POST   + 0.0251 
    (1.32) 
POST×Accrualst   + 0.1545*** 
    (4.12) 
POST×ΔCASHt   + 0.0827 
    (1.50) 
POST×DIST_Dt   + 0.3510*** 
    (3.39) 
POST×DIST_EQt   + 0.0035 
    (0.12) 
SERIOUS ADOPTERS   ? 0.0671*** 
    (5.52) 
SERIOUS ADOPTERS ×Accrualst   ? 0.0377 
    (0.76) 
SERIOUS ADOPTERS ×ΔCASHt   ? -0.0086 
    (-0.14) 
SERIOUS ADOPTERS ×DIST_Dt   ? -0.1773** 
    (-2.36) 
SERIOUS ADOPTERS ×DIST_EQt   ? 0.0740** 
    (2.21) 
Industry fixed effects    Yes 
Year fixed effects    Yes 
N    5847 
Adj. R2    0.4397 
     
F-test: POST×DIST_Dt + SERIOUS ADOPTERSxDIST_D = 0: F-value = 5.29*** 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. 
 
This table above shows the persistence of accrual and cash flow components of earnings before and after the adoption 
for Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS. The model in this panel shows the decomposition of earnings 
into its components, accruals, retained cash (ΔCASH), distribution to debt holders (DIST_D), and distribution to equity 
holders (DIST_EQ). This panel includes regressions with interactions of earnings components with two indicator 
variables (POST and CL), respectively. POST takes a value of 1 for observations in the post adoption period.  CL takes 
a value of 1 for observations for firms that are cross-listed in the U.S., 0 otherwise. Variables are defined as follows. 
Earnings: Net income before extraordinary items; Accruals: change in net operating assets [(ΔAT- ΔCHE) - ( ΔLT-
ΔDLC-ΔDLTT)]; FCF: free cash flows (Earnings-Accruals); DIST: distributions to debt and equity holders -1× 
[ΔDTC+ΔDLTT+(ΔAT-ΔLT-IB)]; DIST_D: distributions to debt holders: -1× (ΔDLC+ΔDLTTT); and DIST_EQ: 
distribution to equity holders -1× (ΔAT-ΔLT-IB). All variables are scaled by total assets.  
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Panel C: Difference-in-differences test for value relevance 
  
 Cross-listed firms in the US  Domestic firms 
  Difference -in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) Measures of Value relevance  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Price  0.6873 0.8316 ? 0.1443***  0.8743 0.8786 0.0043  ? 0.1400*** 
     (-4.68)    (0.70)   (-3.97) 
Return  0.0238 0.0577 ? 0.0339***  0.0316 0.1221 0.0905*  ? -0.0566*** 
     (5.43)    (1.76)   (4.15) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values 
are indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests for value relevance before and after the adoption for all Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS broken 
down into two subsamples, U.S. cross-listed firms and domestic firms. Pre-adoption period includes firm-year observations from 2006 to the year before the adoption 
year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations starting on the adoption year onward. For most firms, the adoption year is the fiscal year starting on or after 
January 01, 2011.  
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, using a two-
tailed test. 
 
Price model: Pricet = EPSt + BVEt +  εt 
Return model: Returnt = Earningst + ΔEarningst + εt 
Price is stock price six months after fiscal year end. EPS is earnings per share. BVE is book value per share. Return is cumulative return 9 months before fiscal year end 
to three months after fiscal year end. Earnings and ΔEarningst are scaled by total assets.  
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Panel D: Difference-in-differences test for other earnings quality measures 
 
 Cross-listed firms in the US  Domestic firms 
  Difference -in 
-differences 
(3 - 6) Measures of Earnings quality  
Pre- 
(1) 
Post- 
(2) Pred.
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1)  
Pre- 
(4) 
Post- 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) = (5)-(4)  Pred.
             
Earnings smoothness  -1.2131 -1.1948 ? 0.0183  -1.4690 -1.4417 0.0273  ? -0.0090 
     (-1.34)    (-0.26)   (-0.94) 
Conservatism   0.2062 0.4716 ? 0.2655  0.4537 0.6447 0.1910  ? 0.0745 
     (-0.67)    (0.07)   (-0.64) 
Timeliness  0.0226 0.0886 ? 0.0659**  0.0858 0.1559 0.0700*  ? -0.0041 
    (2.21)    (1.81)   (1.41) 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in parentheses. All measures are constructed in a way that higher values are 
indicative of better earnings quality. 
 
This table includes difference-in-differences tests for earnings sustainability before and after the adoption for Canadian firms that switch from Can. GAAP to IFRS 
broken down into two subsamples, U.S. cross-listed firms and domestic firms. Pre-adoption period includes firm-year observations from 2006 to the year before the 
adoption year. Post-adoption period includes firm-year observations starting on the adoption year onward. For most firms, the adoption year is the fiscal year starting on 
or after January 01, 2011.  
 
I test for differences (difference-in-differences) in each earnings quality measure using a t-test based on the empirical distribution of the differences (difference-in-
differences). Specifically, for each test, I first randomly select, with replacement, firm observations that I assign to one or the other type of firm, depending on test. I then 
calculate the difference (difference-in-differences) between the two types of firms in the measure that is the subject of the particular test. I obtain this empirical 
distribution of this difference (difference-in-differences) by repeating this procedure 1,000 times. Significant tests for difference (difference-in-differences) from before 
to after the adoption are based on the frequency of finding a difference (difference-in-differences) of greater magnitude in the bootstrapped distribution, using a two-
tailed test. 
 
Earnings smoothness is the ratio of the standard deviation of net income before extraordinary items (scaled by assets) to the standard deviation of cash flows from 
operations (scaled by assets) multiplied by -1.  
Conservatism is the estimated coefficient of the interaction variable from the timeliness regression of annual earnings (before extraordinary items) on an indicator 
variable on an indicator variable equaling one if the company’s annual return is negative and zero otherwise, the company’s annual return, and the interaction of the 
annual return and the indicator variable. Timeliness is the adjusted R2 from that regression (Earningst = β0 + β1Returnt + β2 Negativet + β3 Returnst x Negativet + εt).  
Earnings is net income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets. Returns is cumulative return from nine months before fiscal year end to three months after fiscal 
year end. 
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